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 Preface 
 
THE VOICE YOU HEAR WHEN YOU READ SILENTLY 
 
is not silent, it is a speaking- 
out-loud voice in your head;  it is *spoken*, 
a voice is *saying* it 
as you read.  It's the writer's words, 
of course, in a literary sense 
his or her "voice" but the sound 
of that voice is the sound of *your* voice. 
Not the sound your friends know 
or the sound of a tape played back 
but your voice 
caught in the dark cathedral 
of your skull, your voice heard 
by an internal ear informed by internal abstracts 
and what you know by feeling, 
having felt.  It is your voice 
saying, for example, the word "barn" 
that the writer wrote 
but the "barn" you say 
is a barn you know or knew.  The voice 
in your head, speaking as you read, 
never says anything neutrally- some people 
hated the barn they knew, 
some people love the barn they know 
so you hear the word loaded 
and a sensory constellation 
is lit:  horse-gnawed stalls, 
hayloft, black heat tape wrapping 
a water pipe, a slippery 
spilled *chirr* of oats from a split sack, 
the bony, filthy haunches of cows... 
And "barn" is only a noun- no verb 
or subject has entered into the sentence yet! 
The voice you hear when you read to yourself 
is the clearest voice:  you speak it 
speaking to you. 
 
                          -Thomas Lux 
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 Abstract 
Researchers often collect data on attitudes using “balanced” measurement 
scales—that is, scales with comparable numbers of positive and negative (i.e., reverse-
scored) items. Many previous measurement studies have found the inclusion of negative 
items to be detrimental to scale reliability and validity. However, these studies have 
rarely distinguished among negatively-worded items, negatively-keyed items, and items 
with negative wording and keying. The purpose of the current study was to make those 
distinctions and investigate why the psychometric properties of balanced scales tend to be 
worse than those of scales with uniformly positive wording/keying.  
A mixed-methods approach was employed. In Study 1 (quantitative), item 
wording and keying were systematically varied in adaptations of two published attitude 
measures that were administered to a large college student sample. Reliability and 
dimensionality of the resulting data were examined across the measures in each of four 
wording/keying configurations. Study 2 (qualitative) incorporated a mix of the same four 
wording/keying conditions in an adapted measure that was administered individually to a 
small sample of college students. A think-aloud design was implemented to elicit 
verbalizations that were subsequently analyzed using a thematic networks approach.  
Study 1 findings indicated that reliability estimates were generally highest for 
scales where all items were positively worded/keyed and lowest for scales with balanced 
keying (or balanced keying and wording). Regarding dimensionality, method variance 
was more evident when keying was balanced than when keying was consistent. This 
tended to be the case whether wording was balanced or consistent. Study 2 revealed a 
number of factors that could contribute to differences in the response patterns elicited by 
negative and positive items. These factors included the relative difficulty of processing 
ix 
 
 negatively-worded statements, respondent characteristics such as reading skill and 
frustration tolerance, and idiosyncratic response styles. Among previously posited 
explanations for the differential functioning of negative and positive items, results from 
the studies supported some explanations (e.g., method variance; careless responding) 
more than others (e.g., the substantive explanation). Overall, it appeared that the 
psychometric consequences of balanced keying are no less substantial than those of 
balanced wording. An important question raised by the findings is whether the apparent 
advantage of consistent keying (in terms of reliability and dimensionality) came at the 
expense of validity, since careless responding and other forms of satisficing may be 
masked when keying is not balanced. 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 Often in the social sciences, the object of study/measurement is an attitude or 
trait. For example, a researcher may decide to investigate people’s opinions about taxes; 
or a clinician may wish to gauge the amount of anxiety being experienced by a patient. In 
either case, a self-report measurement instrument is likely to be used (in isolation or as 
part of a broader examination) to measure the target construct. On the surface, the idea of 
administering such an instrument seems logical and straightforward—by asking specific 
taxation-related questions, for example, one should be able to ascertain individuals’ 
attitudes about that topic in an efficient manner.  
 Alas, the efficiency advantage of self-report attitude scales can be offset by a host 
of potential disadvantages. Some of these pitfalls stem from the fact that as objects of 
measurement, “attitudes” may be nebulous (i.e., multidimensional) and moving (i.e., 
fluctuating) targets; this problem is not unique to data collection methods that involve 
self-report instruments. Other potential sources of error come under the general heading 
of method variance—that is, variance in scores that is due to the measurement method 
rather than the substantive object of measurement (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003).  
One much-discussed subcategory of method variance has been variously referred 
to as response sets, response styles, or response biases. The three terms have often been 
used interchangeably. According to Cronbach (1946), a response set involves any 
consistent response tendency that is independent of content. For example, the tendency to 
agree with the statements on an instrument, regardless of the content of the individual 
statements, would constitute a response set. Cronbach noted that his definition was 
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theoretical rather than practical, since it is not possible to truly separate an item’s content 
from its form. In subsequent studies, response styles were conceptualized as consistencies 
in responding associated with general item characteristics such as direction of wording 
and level of social desirability—features distinct from item content (Bentler, Jackson, & 
Messick, 1971, 1972). In short, a distinction was drawn between content (the “signal” in 
an individual’s response to an item; his or her self-perceived level of the target trait) and 
style (“noise” in the response attributable to an individual’s consistent response 
tendency—for example, the tendency to give socially desirable responses). Bentler, 
Jackson, and Messick (1971) opined that a response style is “…a potentially measurable 
personality variable or trait” (p. 188) distinct from but possibly related to the target 
constructs of personality/attitude measures.  
During the 20th century, the response style that received the most attention from 
researchers and methodologists was probably acquiescence, which Cronbach (1946) 
initially described as a tendency to answer True rather than False (or vice versa). The 
concept extends to measurement instruments using Likert scales (i.e., more than two 
response alternatives). Although acquiescence as a measurement term is often associated 
with (or at least exemplified as) a respondent’s tendency to agree or say yes (i.e., yea-
saying), it can also refer to the opposite tendency (i.e., nay-saying). For example, an 
individual who tended to agree with positively-keyed items on a happiness scale might 
tend to disagree with positively-keyed items on an unhappiness scale. Thus acquiescence 
has sometimes been referred to as “monopolar” responding (McPherson & Mohr, 2005). 
Some early researchers questioned the existence (e.g., Rorer, 1965; Samelson, 1972) or 
importance (e.g., Block, 1971) of acquiescence—or of response styles as a 
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phenomenon—but since that time, the idea that response styles (including acquiescence) 
can result in method variance has gained general acceptance (e.g., Bentler, Jackson, & 
Messick, 1972; Crocker & Algina, 1986; DiStefano, Morgan, & Motl, 2012; Krosnick, 
1991; Podsakoff et al., 2003; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988).   
By definition, acquiescence—a phenomenon involving the respondent and the 
response scale—is distinct from the object of measurement, content (i.e., the amount of 
the target trait the respondent possesses). Lorge (1937), as cited in Cloud and Vaughn 
(1970), used an example (paraphrased here) to illustrate how individuals might differ in 
their use of the same response scale: One participant might endorse “I like…” items for 
every activity he did not positively dislike, while another might endorse such items only 
for activities toward which he felt a strong affinity. Either style would manifest as 
acquiescence and result in systematic error and undesirable effects on reliability and 
validity (e.g., Cronbach, 1946). According to Bentler et al. (1972), “Response styles can 
obscure or drastically modify the observed interrelationships of content traits, and this 
variance ought to be identified and controlled” (p. 109). Even Block (1971), who 
questioned the usefulness of efforts to understand the nature of acquiescence, stated that 
it should be addressed by either methodological or statistical means.  
Over the years, various recommendations have been made regarding identification 
of and/or correction for acquiescent responding. Perhaps the most-heeded advice on the 
matter, judging by the frequency of its application in the literature, has been the use of 
balanced scales—that is, scales designed to have an equal number of positive (i.e., 
positively-keyed) and negative (i.e., negatively-keyed) items. Negatively-keyed items can 
be (grammatically) negatively worded (e.g., “I am not healthy”) or (grammatically) 
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positively worded (e.g., “I am ill”); in the latter example, the adjective ill might be 
considered a polar opposite of healthy. Regardless of the manner in which items are made 
negative, they are reverse-scored. The purpose of balanced scales is not to dissuade or 
eliminate acquiescent responding (though it is possible that they have a reductive effect 
on another response style, careless responding). Rather, the approach is intended to 
ensure that on a given scale, acquiescent respondents receive a summated score near the 
scale mean (e.g., Cloud & Vaughn, 1970). In other words, any response tendency toward 
one end of the response scale (e.g., Agree) will “balance out” when the respondent’s 
score for the positive items is summed with her score for the (reverse-scored) negative 
items, assuming that tendency is consistent across both sets of items. As a result, the logic 
goes, the mean score for the overall sample will not be biased. However, the accuracy 
and interpretability of individuals’ scores may be affected. The balanced scales approach 
is not without controversy (e.g., Billiet & McClendon, 2000; McPherson & Mohr, 2005), 
but it continues to be recommended and used.  
An implicit assumption underlying the use of balanced scales is that negative 
items (regardless of wording direction) are psychometrically comparable to positive 
items. That is, after reverse scoring, the response elicited by a negative item (e.g., “I am 
not healthy”) should be the same as the response elicited by the corresponding positive 
item (e.g., “I am healthy”). If such is not the case—for example, due to inexpert crafting 
of items, response sets/styles, or for other, more esoteric reasons (e.g., some have 
suggested that there is no such thing as a true polar reversal, due to semantic connotations 
and the subtle changes in meaning that can result from altered syntax)—then the 
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balancing method itself will introduce construct-irrelevant variance and acquiescence 
may appear to be present when in fact it is not (Block, 1971).  
Unfortunately, evidence from a preponderance of studies calls into question the 
assumption that parallel positive and negative statements will elicit congruent responses. 
As will be explicated below, negative and positive items on attitude and personality 
measures tend to function differentially in terms of factor structure, internal consistency, 
and correlation with external variables. Forty years ago, Bentler et al. (1972) cited “…no 
fewer than 15 separate analyses of diverse populations [in which] a factor separating true- 
and false-keyed subscales has appeared” (p. 111). That trend has only continued; 
published findings based on a variety of populations and measures suggest that balanced 
scales designed to be unidimensional yield two factors rather than one, with positively- 
and negatively-keyed items loading onto different factors (e.g., Barnette, 2000; Lai, 1994; 
Marsh, 1986; Motl, Conroy, & Horan, 2000; Pilotte & Gable, 1990; Schriesheim & Hill, 
1981). The differential functioning of negatively-worded items, and their tendency to 
exhibit lower internal consistency than positively-worded items, led one researcher to 
describe the word not–typically the operative agent by which reversals are 
accomplished—as an “insidious grammatical element” that “contaminated” scale items 
(Ahlawat, 1985). Some studies have found no differences between the negative and 
positive items within a balanced scale, but such published findings have been rare (e.g., 
Borgers, Hox, & Sikkel, 2004; Finney, 2001).  
In short, the dominant theme among factor-analytic studies of balanced scales is 
the emergence of two factors that are essentially defined by item wording or keying 
(positive versus negative). The two-factor solution has sometimes been interpreted 
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substantively (e.g., as “optimism” and “pessimism” subscales within the Life Orientation 
Test); in other studies, it has been presumed to reflect the presence of a method effect or 
measurement artifact. Regarding the former (substantive) interpretation, the implied 
conceptual stance—that, say, optimism and pessimism are separable constructs or 
dimensions rather than opposite ends of a continuum—seems neither intuitive nor 
parsimonious. Spector, Van Katwyk, Brannick, and Chen (1997) explicitly cautioned 
against such claims. Regarding the latter (artifactual) interpretation, fundamental 
questions remain about the nature of the variance associated with negative items. To what 
extent might such variance be a function of individual characteristics or response styles, 
either stable or transient? On the other hand, to what extent might such variance reflect 
general cognitive or psycholinguistic phenomena—for example, that disagreeing with a 
negated reversal may not be the same as agreeing with its affirmative equivalent? It 
seems likely that these possibilities (respondent-related and item-related characteristics) 
are not mutually exclusive (e.g., Kuncel, 1977; Holden, Fekken, & Cotton, 1991; 
Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988).  
One posited explanation for the differential functioning of negative and positive 
items is item extremity (e.g., Simpson, Rentz, & Shrum, 1976). Stated simply, some 
items are worded more strongly than others. Spector et al. (1997) demonstrated that if 
scale items are extreme (e.g., “I loathe my job”; “I am in love with my job”) relative to 
where most respondents fall on the underlying construct, people will vary in the 
consistency with which they (validly) respond to items on opposite ends of the spectrum 
(i.e., positive and negative): “If a scale contains only extreme items…some people might 
disagree with all items because the items are too far from the people on the continuum of 
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interest” (Spector et al., p. 662; emphasis added). For example, respondents who are not 
particularly satisfied or dissatisfied with their jobs might well disagree with both “I loathe 
my job” and “I am in love with my job,” yielding seemingly incongruent responses after 
reverse scoring. Such respondents will likely have consistent responses within item types 
(positive and negative), but not across them. The presence of such respondents within a 
larger participant sample (at least some of whom respond to oppositely-keyed items in a 
seemingly congruent manner) means that “[c]orrelations between items at opposite ends 
of the continuum will be attenuated, while correlations between items at the same end 
will be relatively strong. As a result, artifactual [CFA] factors would appear based on the 
response patterns to these items” (Spector et al., p. 664). A related issue involves the 
reversal of items; some have argued that creating true (i.e., semantically parallel) 
reversals is difficult if not impossible (e.g., Samelson, 1972). To the extent that any lack 
of comparability between types of items is systematic within a balanced scale (e.g., as 
written, the negative items are consistently harder to disagree with), artifactors (i.e., 
method effects) are likely to result.  
Another phenomenon that could contribute to wording-related method variance is 
careless responding, or a lack of attention to item content/polarity. Studies have shown 
that if at least 10% of a sample were to respond carelessly to negative items (i.e., respond 
as if the items were not negatively keyed) on a balanced scale measuring a 
unidimensional construct, the resulting data would likely yield a two-factor solution 
rather than the (true) one-factor solution (Schmitt & Stults, 1985; Woods, 2006). Such a 
scenario is not implausible, given that research data are often collected from participants 
who may have minimal interest in the research and little incentive to give thorough 
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attention and consideration to individual items. The term “satisficing” has been used to 
describe response strategies that are characterized by less-than-optimal engagement in the 
stages of the cognitive response process (e.g., Krosnick, 1991). For instance, a satisficing 
respondent might expend suboptimal effort in reading/interpreting the items, searching 
her memories/feelings related to the target construct, and/or responding with precision. 
Careless responding would constitute a strong (i.e., extreme) form of satisficing.  
Cognitive or psycholinguistic factors have also been indicated as possible 
contributors to observed differences between negative and positive items. In other words, 
there may be language-based reasons for differential positive/negative responding across 
respondents. For example, it is well-established that relative to affirmative statements, 
grammatically negative statements take longer to process and are more likely to be 
misinterpreted (e.g., Peterson & Peterson, 1976; Wason, 1959, 1961). Thus it has been 
suggested that the differential functioning of negatively-worded items may be attributable 
to the cognitive/linguistic processing demands inherent in such items (e.g., Ahlawat, 
1985; Schuman & Presser, 1981). In short, method effects result because, holding other 
things equal (or as equal as possible), responding to an affirmative statement is not the 
same as responding to a negatively-worded reversal. Although etiologically distinct from 
the “careless responding” hypothesis described earlier, the cognitive/psycholinguistic 
mechanism could have the same consequence: differential correlations within and 
between subsets of items, leading to factors defined by wording direction.  
In a related explanation, Marsh (1996) found that reading ability was associated 
with a “negative wording” method factor. Specifically, children and adolescents with less 
well-developed reading skills tended to have difficulty responding accurately to 
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negatively-worded items. Other studies involving adults have reached similar 
conclusions—that respondents with lower levels of education or cognitive ability are 
more likely to respond to negative items in a way that seems inconsistent with their 
responses to positive items (e.g., Cordery & Sevastos, 1993; Juni, Hanson, & 
Ottomanelli, 1996; Krosnick, Narayan, & Smith, 1996; Melnick & Gable, 1990). Thus it 
seems probable not only that negative items are processed differently by the general 
population, but that individuals may vary in their ability to respond accurately to those 
items. Such a combination of potentially interacting mechanisms exemplifies the 
complexity entailed in the cognitive processing model proposed by Tourangeau (e.g., 
Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988), a model that will be described in detail in the next 
chapter.  
Most of the published research studies on balanced scales and negative items have 
used a quantitative methodology. Empirical studies are extremely valuable because they 
allow for direct testing of theories about factor structure and wording effects based on 
item-level response data. As noted above, such research has established that, in general, 
the positive and negative items on balanced scales do not elicit equivalent responses. 
Quantitative research has also contributed to our understanding of the possible 
mechanisms underlying that lack of equivalence (e.g., respondent characteristics; 
psycholinguistic factors). However, there is as yet no consensus regarding the nature of 
the differential functioning of positive and negative items. In short, although several 
explanations have been offered, the mechanisms that drive differential responses to 
positive and negative items on self-report scales are not completely understood. We do 
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not know for sure why individuals tend to respond differently to positive items than to 
negative items on self-report scales. 
Given that many of the hypothesized explanations for wording effects involve the 
behavior of respondents, surprisingly little research has been published (excluding 
hypothetical illustrative examples and anecdotal asides) in which respondents were given 
the opportunity to provide their own opinions/insights related to response processes and 
styles. A think-aloud protocol, which entails individuals talking through their response 
process as they complete a self-report measure, has been used to investigate phenomena 
such as item context effects (i.e., item responses being affected by the content of 
preceding items) (Harrison, McLaughlin, & Coalter, 1996) and construct validity or the 
extent to which score-based inferences are justifiable (Gadermann, Guhn, & Zumbo, 
2011). However, a search revealed no published qualitative studies specifically related to 
negative wording/keying of self-report items. In the absence of qualitative research about 
response processes and balanced scales, a fuller understanding of the nature of negative 
wording effects may prove elusive. It is entirely possible, for example, that an individual 
suspected (based on observed responses) of being a “careless” or “acquiescent” 
respondent (i.e., giving invalid responses due to satisficing) has in fact given earnest and 
valid responses—we simply do not understand the process/logic by which those 
responses were generated.   
Purpose 
The purpose of the current project is to investigate, using a mixed-methods 
approach, the functioning of negative and positive items on self-report attitude scales. In 
the quantitative part of the project (Study 1), the wording of two attitude scales will be 
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systematically varied to investigate the effects of negative keying and negative wording 
on scale dimensionality and internal consistency. In previous CFA studies of balanced 
scales, a two-factor solution (or a correlated traits-correlated uniquenesses model) has 
usually been found to provide a better fit than a one-factor model to data collected on 
instruments designed to measure a unidimensional construct (e.g., Corwyn, 2000; Marsh, 
1986; Pohl & Steyer, 2010; Tomás & Oliver, 1999). Prior studies in which wording 
schemes have been systematically varied across parallel versions of the same measure 
have generally found that scale versions characterized by consistent wording (all positive 
or all negative items) yield better-fitting one-factor models and/or higher internal 
consistency than do versions in which wording direction is balanced (e.g., Barnette, 2000; 
Benson & Hocevar, 1985; Greenberger, Cheng, Dmitrieva, & Farruggia, 2003; Pilotte & 
Gable, 1990), although there have been exceptions (e.g., Finney, 2001).  
The use of multiple measures in Study 1 will constitute an advantage over studies 
whose findings have been based on a single instrument. Because the two measures 
selected for this project vary in length (8 items versus 19 items) and substantive 
dimensionality (one substantive factor versus four), it will be possible to examine 
measurement trends over those conditions. The design will also allow for the testing of 
factorial models in which method effects related to negative wording/keying are 
hypothesized to be evident across measurement instruments. Prior studies have found 
evidence in support of the stability of response styles across measures and over time (e.g., 
Billiet & McClendon, 2000; Horan, DiStefano, & Motl, 2003; Marsh, Scalas, & 
Nagenast, 2010; Pohl & Steyer, 2010).  
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Regarding wording, at least one novel condition will be explored in the current 
study: a version of the scales in which all items are negatively keyed (i.e., reverse-
scored), but only half are negatively worded. This condition is important because it has 
the potential to yield insight into the heretofore unaddressed question of whether the 
well-documented psychometric effects of “negative items” are a function of wording 
rather than keying. Dimensionality and reliability will be investigated for that condition 
as well as for three others: (1) all positive wording/keying; (2) half positive wording/ 
keying and half negative wording/keying; and (3) half positive wording/keying and half 
positive wording/negative keying. In addition, the association between method effects 
related to negative keying will be estimated across instruments. 
In the qualitative part of the project (Study 2), a think-aloud protocol will be used 
to explore the response processes of a small subsample of participants. Of particular 
interest is the question of why negative items tend to elicit non-parallel responses to their 
positively-keyed equivalents, even when such pairs have been carefully crafted to be 
opposite in meaning. As noted earlier, qualitative information about this question is 
sorely lacking in the literature. It is expected that the think-aloud method will yield 
insight into the way respondents process and respond to different types of items (e.g., 
positively worded and keyed; negatively worded and keyed) and shed light on the nature 
of the positive and negative “artifactor” issue. For example, do reading/attentional errors 
lead to different response distributions for negative and positive items? Does the reversal 
of positively-worded items alter meaning/extremity and thereby elicit non-parallel 
responses? It is likely that the answers to such questions will vary by individual. It should 
be noted that the think-aloud format may preclude the detection of certain response 
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behaviors that might occur in other, more typical data collection conditions (e.g., 
participants in large-group sessions responding to items without reading them).   
Regarding participants, the availability of a large sample of matriculating college 
freshmen entails both limitations and advantages. Factors such as education level and age 
are essentially controlled, limiting generalizability but also decreasing within-group 
(error) variance. For variables related to cognitive ability, ranges may be relatively 
restricted since all participants are incoming freshmen at the same institution. In an effort 
to ensure a range of cognitive ability in the qualitative study sample, participants will be 
randomly selected within two categories based on SAT Critical Reading scores (average 
and high). As noted earlier, previous research has indicated that individuals with lower 
verbal/reading skills may be more likely to respond differentially to positive and negative 
self-report items. It is hoped that the think-aloud approach will reveal some organic 
examples of this phenomenon and elicit respondent insights into why it might happen. 
Finally, it is expected that college students, regardless of verbal ability, may have greater 
potential than other populations (e.g., children) to provide insight into their own response 
processes. 
 
 
 
 
II. Review of the Literature 
 This section will begin with brief summaries of the measurement literature on 
response styles in general and acquiescence in particular. Terminology related to 
balanced measurement scales and negative items will be delineated. Previous studies of 
balanced scales and reversed items will then be reviewed with an emphasis on the 
psychometric consequences of including negative (i.e., reverse-scored) items on 
measurement instruments. Finally, posited explanations for observed differences in the 
functioning of negative and positive items will be discussed in turn.   
Response Styles 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) defined method variance as “...variance that is attributable 
to the measurement method rather than to the constructs the measures represent” (p. 879). 
According to some estimates, more than 25% of the observed variance in a typical study 
might be attributable to systematic method variance (Cote & Buckley, 1987; Williams, 
Cote, & Buckley, 1989). Response styles—also referred to synonymously as response 
sets or response biases—constitute one form of systematic method variance. Cronbach 
(1946) defined a response set as “…any tendency causing a person consistently to give 
different responses to test items than he would when the same content is presented in a 
different form” (p. 476). Examples of hypothesized response styles include socially-
desirable responding, extreme responding, and acquiescent responding (Holden & 
Troister, 2009). Several researchers have suggested that such response styles may be 
stable and related to personality characteristics (e.g., Cronbach, 1946, 1950; Jackson et 
al., 1971; Weijters, Geuens, & Schillewaert, 2010). Perhaps the best place to begin is 
 
15 
 
with a discussion of acquiescence, which has been much debated and has led to the 
prevalent use of balanced scales in modern measurement practice. 
Acquiescence  
 When a respondent encounters an item on an attitude scale with constrained 
answer choices (e.g., a Likert scale), how exactly does he or she arrive at a response?  
The cognitive process model proposed by Tourangeau provides a framework for 
understanding the response process. As described in Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988), the 
theoretical model concerns attitudes or “...networks of interrelated beliefs. ...[W]e use this 
term [beliefs] loosely to encompass memories of specific experiences, general 
propositions, images, and feelings” (p. 299). The model includes four stages:  
(1) interpretation of the attitude question; (2) retrieval of relevant beliefs/feelings from 
memory; (3) rendering of a judgment based on the retrieved information; and  
(4) mapping the judgment onto one of the response choices.  
According to Krosnick et al. (1996), satisficing occurs when respondents give 
suboptimal effort in one or more of the above stages. For example, a respondent might 
proceed through the entire sequence of stages but be less than thorough in some of them 
(e.g., searching for relevant memories); this approach would be a “weak” form of 
satisficing. “Strong” satisficing would involve the skipping of one or more response 
stages (e.g., random responding).  Acquiescence may constitute a weak form of 
satisficing in which a respondent tends to lean in a certain direction (e.g., “Agree”) when 
mapping judgments onto the response choices (Krosnick et al., 1996).  
Cronbach (1946) defined acquiescence as follows: “When students are offered 
two alternatives, as ‘True’ versus ‘False,’ ‘Like’ versus ‘Dislike,’ ‘Agree’ versus 
 
16 
 
‘Disagree,’ etc., some use one more than the other” (p. 479). Extending this idea to a 
Likert scale, the acquiescent respondent is one who, regardless of item content, favors 
one side of the response scale. Cronbach (1946) noted that the respondent might or might 
not be aware of the tendency, which would be most likely to manifest in “ambiguous or 
unstructured situations” (p. 483)—for example, in response to unclear or difficult items—
and would compromise reliability and validity. Thus his recommendations for controlling 
response sets included maximizing clarity in instructions and items. Cronbach (1950) 
later stated that a response set such as acquiescence could be conceptualized as stemming 
from three respondent-related sources, combined in some proportion: “1. Chance 
variance; resulting from purely random excess of choice of one or another alternative.    
2. Internally consistent but momentary response tendencies; sets operating throughout 
one testing, but shifting on a retest at another time. 3. Stable response tendencies; sets 
operating consistently even when the same test is given at different times” (p. 17). 
Subsequent acquiescence research has focused on response patterns that are consistent 
within or across measures.  
Bentler et al. (1971) suggested that there might be two possible kinds of 
acquiescence: agreement and acceptance. They defined agreement acquiescence as the 
tendency to agree with items, regardless of content; they defined acceptance 
acquiescence as “…individual differences in the tendency to consider characteristics as 
descriptive” (p. 190). Either category (agreement or acceptance) might manifest in either 
direction. Regarding acceptance acquiescence, for example, individuals might be extreme 
accepters (agreeing with all affirmative items describing personality characteristics) or 
extreme rejecters (disagreeing with all items denying personality characteristics). The 
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acquiescence subtypes proposed by Bentler et al. (1971) were inferred through observed 
correlations in Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) data. The 
distinction between agreement and acceptance acquiescence is not central to the current 
review, but it was debated rather contentiously in the field during the 1960s and 1970s.  
Not all accepted the notion of acquiescence as a measurement phenomenon. There 
has been debate about the extent to which response distributions are a function of the 
measurement items, the respondent, or both. Rorer (1965) drew a distinction between 
response sets (conscious or unconscious attempts to portray oneself a certain way via 
response choices) and purported response styles such as yea-saying or nay-saying (the 
tendency to favor a certain response category). He argued that response styles, being a 
test-specific function of item ambiguity and having nothing to do with item content, were 
“of no more than trivial importance” as response mechanisms. Samelson (1972) criticized 
Bentler et al.’s (1971) operational definitions of acquiescence/response styles as being 
unclear and ill-conceived. He argued that their conceptions of acquiescence were based 
on a false premise (that oppositely-keyed items are equal in strength) that led to an 
erroneous analysis of seemingly inconsistent response patterns: “The root of the problem 
seems to be that the experimenters mistake their own interpretation, based on an 
oversimplified model, for the (actual or functional) item content and then define all 
discrepant responses as acquiescence” (p. 13).  
Block (1971) took issue with Bentler et al.’s (1971) theory of acquiescence 
subtypes, dismissing it as mere “post hoc conjecture” (p. 209). While he did not dispute 
the existence of response styles, he doubted that acquiescence could have an appreciable 
effect on responses to personality inventories. Thus Block concluded that, “[f]or most 
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purposes of psychological assessment, it is not necessary to study why certain response 
tendencies obscure relationships—the reasons may be uninteresting or trivial or 
idiosyncratic ones” (p. 210). Rather, he advocated for addressing the issue via preventive 
strategies (e.g., better instrument design/administration) or statistical adjustment of 
scores. In their response, Bentler et al. (1972) countered that response styles were worth 
researching; in the absence of efforts to understand them, “…attempts at identification 
and control of response styles will flounder, content will remain difficult to verify, and 
controversy will persist” (p. 112).  
Although there remain naysayers, the existence of acquiescence as a measurement 
phenomenon seems to have gained general acceptance (e.g., Crocker & Algina, 1986; 
Holden & Troister, 2009; Podsakoff et al., 2003; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988) and its 
nature continues to be investigated (e.g., DiStefano, Morgan, & Motl, 2012). Theory and 
research suggest that a number of factors, and interactions among these factors, may 
contribute to acquiescence and other response styles. Trott and Jackson (1967), for 
example, observed that acquiescence can be experimentally manipulated. They found it 
to be “elicited more readily” when item saturation (an item characteristic) was weak and 
when respondent exposure to items (a respondent characteristic) was reduced, 
presumably leading to decreased attention/comprehension (p. 278). Many researchers 
have suggested that the propensity for acquiescent responding may vary based on person 
characteristics such as individual differences in education (e.g., Krosnick et al., 1996), 
personality (e.g., Cronbach, 1946, 1950), or other variables. Recent research has 
indicated that response styles such as acquiescence may be more/less prevalent among 
different countries or cultures (e.g., Lindwall et al., 2012; Yang, Harkness, Chin, & 
 
19 
 
Villar, 2010). Thus researchers have suggested that apparent response styles may stem 
from item-related characteristics, person-related characteristics, culture-related 
characteristics, and/or characteristics specific to the testing context.  
Various suggestions for dealing with the potential measurement problems posed 
by response styles have been offered since the 1940s or earlier. Some suggestions involve 
design strategies intended to minimize method variance; others are statistical in nature 
and pertain to identifying or adjusting for response styles. Cronbach (1946, 1950), for 
example, advised scale developers to anticipate potential response sets and discourage 
them by reducing ambiguity in items, response scales, and instructions (e.g., encouraging 
respondents to give an answer even when in doubt). He also recommended the use of 
post-hoc control strategies as needed, including the weighting of scores (to adjust for 
response tendencies) and the removal of data generated by individuals demonstrating 
extreme response sets. Other suggested approaches have involved partialing out 
acquiescence from substantive scores based on separate (e.g., Bass, 1956; Couch & 
Keniston, 1960) or embedded (e.g., Watson, 1992) acquiescence measures. Interestingly, 
in one of his recommendations for reducing or eliminating acquiescence, Bass (1956) 
advised researchers to employ “more intelligent and critical subjects” (p. 299). By and 
large, however, reviews of the literature indicate that the most pervasive advice on 
controlling acquiescence has been the recommendation to use balanced scales (Finney, 
2001; McPherson & Mohr, 2005).  
Balanced Scales and Negative Items  
Acquiescence involves the tendency to give responses that are biased toward one 
end of the response scale, regardless of item content and wording direction. Imagine, for 
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example, an attitude scale with ten items—all worded positively—and a response scale 
ranging from 1 (Disagree) to 5 (Agree). A yea-saying acquiescent respondent would tend 
to agree with all statements, leading to an artificially inflated total score (close to 50) that 
would also distort the group mean score. A long-established practice for addressing this 
problem is the use of item reversals. Continuing with the above example, five of the ten 
items on the attitude scale could be rewritten so as to be “reversed” in polarity (e.g., “I 
like cookies” might be rewritten as “I do not like cookies”). This version of the measure 
would be a balanced scale—that is, it would consist of equal numbers of positively-
keyed and negatively-keyed items. After reverse scoring of the negatively-keyed items, 
the yea-saying respondent (who would tend to agree with positive and negative items 
alike) would receive a total score near the middle of the scale (~30), and the mean score 
for the overall sample would not be biased. Thus the purpose of balanced scales is not to 
prevent acquiescent responding, but to identify and control for it (Cloud & Vaughn, 
1970; Crocker & Algina, 1986; Grove & Geerken 1977; Nunnally, 1978).  
 At this juncture, some clarification of terminology is warranted; as noted by 
Finney (2001), descriptors related to item wording/polarity have been used inconsistently 
in the literature and at times confounded with aspects of social desirability. Most notably, 
many studies have used “keying” and “wording” interchangeably. Relevant terms in the 
literature (all referring to items or item stems) include the following:  
• negatively keyed: written to be reverse-scored. For example, on an anxiety scale 
where higher ratings/scores indicate greater anxiety, an item such as “I feel calm” would 
be negatively keyed. Throughout this document, the descriptor “negative” (where 
otherwise undifferentiated) refers to negative keying.   
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• positively keyed: written to be scored directly. An item such as “I feel anxious” 
would be positively keyed on a scale where higher ratings/scores indicate greater anxiety. 
Throughout this document, the descriptor “positive” (where otherwise undifferentiated) 
refers to positive keying.   
• negatively worded: containing a grammatically negative marker that negates or 
reverses the meaning a sentence would otherwise convey. Most commonly in item 
writing, negation is accomplished by the insertion of  not or do not. Note that negatively-
worded items may be keyed positively (e.g., “I do not feel calm”) or negatively (e.g., “I 
do not feel anxious”).  
• positively worded: grammatically affirmative or unmarked; containing no 
negative syntactic (sentence-level) markers (e.g., “I feel calm”; “I feel anxious”; “I feel 
free of anxiety”).  
• polar opposites: adjectives/sentences thought to be precisely opposite in semantic 
value (e.g., “I am happy” versus “I am sad”). Problematically, language is not like math, 
where +6 and -6 are true opposites identical in absolute value. Due to the connotations 
inherent in words/phrases and individual differences in lexical representations, paired 
adjectives or statements “intended” to be opposite in meaning may well lack equivalence 
(e.g., Biber, 1988; Chang, 1995a; Pinker, 1994; Samelson, 1972).  
The above descriptors are not the only ones encountered in the literature. For 
example, Chang (1995a, 1995b) proposed classifying items as “connotatively consistent” 
or “connotatively inconsistent” rather than positive or negative. On a given scale, the 
keying direction shared by the majority of items would define the connotatively 
consistent category, while the remaining items would be connotatively inconsistent. It 
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was not clear, however, how the labels should be used for equally balanced scales. Some 
researchers (e.g., Holden, Fekken, & Jackson, 1985) have made distinctions between 
syntactic negations using “not,” syntactic negations using adverbs such as “never,” and 
reversals accomplished via “implicit negatives” or words containing prefixes such as 
“im-“ or “-un” (e.g., “I am unhappy”).  
Balanced scales have been the focus of two primary types of research studies. In 
the first type (validation), the dimensionality, validity, and/or reliability of a balanced 
scale (e.g., the Life Orientation Test or the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale) is investigated 
using data from one or more convenience samples. Often, one of the goals of such a study 
is to determine the presence or absence of method effects associated with item wording or 
keying. In the second type of study (manipulation), the item wording within a measure is 
systematically manipulated to create different versions (e.g., all items positive keyed; all 
items negatively keyed) whose psychometric properties can be compared based on 
participant responses. Representative examples of both kinds of studies (and variations on 
them) will be reviewed in the following section. It should be noted that in some studies, 
the manner of balancing scales and reversing items has been either lopsided (e.g., highly 
discrepant numbers of negative and positive items) or unspecified. Additionally, as noted 
earlier, descriptors related to item wording have not always been used clearly. Thus the 
accuracy and generalizability of some reported findings may be questionable.  
Psychometric Consequences of Including Negative Items on Scales 
As suggested by Steinberg (2001), it may be impossible to know what form of an 
instrument (with regard to response scale, item wording, item order, etc.) will do the best 
job of eliciting a respondent’s “true” level of the target construct. However, the literature 
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strongly suggests that the inclusion of negative items can be detrimental to scale 
reliability/validity and introduce method variance that is largely or entirely unrelated to 
the object of measurement. Regarding balanced scales, Trott and Jackson (1967) 
observed that “…the method of scoring used pits acquiescence against content” (p. 285). 
Research has indicated that the inclusion of even one (scored) negative item can be 
detrimental to scale functioning (Horan, DiStefano, & Motl, 2003; Ibrahim, 2001).  
Evidence of differences between negative and positive items has been provided in 
the form of internal consistency estimates (e.g., Barnette, 2000), item-total correlations 
(e.g., Juni et al., 1996), predictive validity (e.g., Lai, 1994), and factor-analytic solutions 
(e.g., Ebesutani et al., 2012; Pilotte & Gable, 1990). Regarding the latter area, earlier 
studies tended to focus on a limited number of competing models (e.g., one factor versus 
two); more recently, researchers have begun to compare a wider range of models—for 
example, multiple variants of correlated trait, correlated methods (CTCM) and correlated 
trait, correlated uniquenesses (CTCU) models. Several CFA studies have used CTCM 
models to explore potential relationships between response style and measures of 
reading/cognitive ability (e.g., Marsh, 1996) and personality (e.g., DiStefano & Motl, 
2006). Selected validation and manipulation studies (and additional studies using 
alternative or hybrid designs) that have shed light on the psychometric properties of 
balanced scales are reviewed below.  
 Validation Studies. The Life Optimism Test (LOT), a measure of dispositional 
optimism, was first introduced by Scheier and Carver (1985). The LOT uses a 5-point 
Likert scale (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) and includes eight substantive items 
plus four “filler” items whose intended purpose was “…to disguise (somewhat) the 
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underlying purpose of the test” (p. 224). Of the eight substantive items, half are positively 
keyed and half are negatively keyed. Of the four reversed items, three are negated via 
adverbs (e.g., “I hardly ever expect things to go my way”) and the other contains no 
negative markers (“If something can go wrong for me, it will”). Using data collected 
from 624 undergraduates, Scheier and Carver (1985) performed an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) that yielded two factors defined by keying direction. They then used 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) techniques on the same data to test the fit of a one-
factor model versus a two-factor model. In both models, correlated error terms were 
apparently included (a) among the positive items and (b) between the affirmatively-
phrased negative item noted above and one of the positive items. Results indicated an 
acceptable fit for both models, with a nested χ2 test favoring the two-factor solution. 
However, the authors argued that the LOT could “just as reasonably be considered 
unidimensional” for the following reasons: in the EFA, all items had loadings of at least 
.50 on the first unrotated factor; and in the two-factor CFA solution, there was a “high 
positive correlation” of .64 between the factors (p. 227). Ignoring for the moment 
concerns about the authors’ analytic methods and interpretations, the study provided 
evidence of differential functioning across the negatively-keyed and positively-keyed 
LOT items.   
 Similar findings were reported by Lai (1994), who administered the LOT to a 
sample of 202 undergraduates in Hong Kong (the English language proficiency of the 
participants was not discussed). An EFA based on the data yielded two factors, one 
associated with positively-keyed items and the other with negatively-keyed items. The 
correlation between the factors (.18) was much lower than that found by Scheier and 
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Carver (1985). Lai also found that the positive and negative “subscales” differed in terms 
of both internal consistency estimates (coefficient alpha = .71 and .66, respectively) and 
correlations (unadjusted for reliability) with scores on health-related symptom checklists 
(e.g., -.31 versus .12).  
Using archival data from two samples (1,967 male US Air Force trainees; 415 
high school students), Bernstein and Eveland (1982) investigated the factor structure of 
the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushener, 1970). The 
20-item STAI was designed to measure two distinct constructs: state (i.e., transitory) 
anxiety and trait (i.e., stable or chronic) anxiety. The STAI is a balanced scale, as half the 
items are negatively keyed. Based on an oblique multiple-groups (OMG) CFA approach, 
Bernstein and Eveland advocated for a four-factor solution defined by the two 
hypothesized substantive constructs and keying (State+, State-, Trait+, Trait-). The 
pattern of correlations between factors was of interest. In both samples, the strongest 
relationship was between State+ and State- (.59 to .65); the relationship between Trait+ 
and Trait- factors was considerably weaker (.27 to .49) and, in fact, less strong than the 
correlations between factors with the same keying direction (positive: .58 to .61; 
negative: .49 to .55).  
 In another CFA study, Magazine, Williams, and Williams (1996) administered 
Meyer and Allen’s (1984) Affective  and Continuance Commitment Scales (ACS and 
CCS) to a sample of library and bank employees (N = 333). Both the ACS and the CCS 
contain eight items. On the ACS, four items are negatively keyed (three of which are 
negatively worded); on the CCS, two items are negatively keyed (both negatively 
worded). Of the four competing (theory-based) models the authors fit to the combined 
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data (two- and three-factor models with and without method factors), none exhibited 
acceptable fit based on χ2 and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) statistics. However, the 
models with “reverse coding” method factors fit significantly better than the models 
without them. Based on the results, Magazine et al. (1996) raised the question of whether 
it might be beneficial to replace the negative ACS and CCS items with positively-keyed 
equivalents.  
In a study based on a 7-item version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; 
Rosenberg, 1989), Marsh (1996) investigated the lingering question of its factor structure. 
He tested the fit of six competing CFA models to data collected in 1988 (nominal N = 
8,764) and 1990 (nominal N = 4,251) as part of the National Education Longitudinal 
Study of 1998 (the response scale was not specified, but historically the RSE has been 
operationalized with a four-point Likert scale). For both data sets, the best fit was 
obtained with a one-factor model that included method effects (correlated errors among 
all three negatively-keyed items and between two of the four positively-keyed items). In 
addition, Marsh conducted follow-up analyses involving a two-factor model (positive 
versus negative items) and concurrent measures of verbal/reading ability. The positive 
and negative “factors” became less distinct as reading ability increased, lending support 
to the hypothesis that “…the underlying separation between two empirically identified 
[RSE] factors may reflect method effects…” rather than substantively meaningful 
differences (p. 817). In his conclusions, Marsh (1996) proposed (as he had in 1986) an 
alternative way to control/screen for response biases in attitude and personality 
questionnaires: Include a small number of negative items, but do not count them (or, 
alternatively, weight them less) in calculating scale scores. This approach, he argued, 
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would serve to “…disrupt potential response biases…” (p. 817). It was not clear in 
Marsh’s argument whether the disruption of potential response biases would result from 
encouraging respondents to pay attention to item wording (through the intermittent 
inclusion of negative items), screening out aberrant response patterns post hoc, or both 
mechanisms. 
 In a similar study, Corwyn (2000) investigated the factor structure of the full, 10-
item RSE based on five data sets. This form of the RSE was balanced (five negatively-
keyed items, two of them negatively worded) and included a four-point Likert scale 
(Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree). Consistent with prior studies of the RSE, all 
models incorporating method effects related to keying direction fit the data better than 
did models without method effects. The best-fitting model was a full bifactor model that 
included one substantive factor (self-esteem) and two method factors (positive and 
negative keying). In this model, (standardized) substantive factor loadings were 
consistently higher for the positive items whereas uniquenesses (i.e., error variances) 
were consistently higher for the negative items. This pattern would suggest that the 
positive items were of higher quality and validity than the negative items as indicators of 
the target construct (self-esteem). 
 Motl and colleagues have published several studies of method effects associated 
with negative items. In Motl, Conroy, and Horan (2000), the dimensionality of the 12-
item Social Physique Anxiety Scale (SPAS; Hart, Leary, & Rejeski, 1989) was examined. 
The studied version of the SPAS used a 5-point response scale (Not At All to Extremely). 
It appeared that seven of the 12 items were positively keyed (i.e., higher responses 
reflecting higher levels of anxiety) while the other five were negatively keyed (e.g., “I 
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never worry about wearing clothes that might make me look too thin or overweight”). 
Eight competing CFA models, including CTCM and CTCU variants, were tested with 
archival data from four samples (N = 1,053). Results favored models with a single, global 
substantive factor and (substantively irrelevant) method effects (modeled as correlated 
uniquenesses, a positive method factor, or a negative method factor). In their conclusions, 
the authors emphasized the need to model method effects for personality scales on which 
the direction of item wording (keying) varies.  
Horan, DiStefano, and Motl (2003) used National Educational Longitudinal 
Sample (NELS 1988-1994) data to investigate the factor structure of the RSE (the same 
7-item version used by Marsh [1996]), an Attitude toward School scale (10 items, 7 
positively keyed and 3 negatively keyed) and a Locus of Control scale (6 items, one 
positively keyed and 5 negatively keyed). Each measure had a four-point response scale 
(Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree), and negative items were reverse-scored prior to 
analyses. For all scales, models that included method effects (method factors or 
correlated uniquenesses) for either positive or negative items fit the data better than 
models that did not; the best-fitting variants were those that modeled method effects for 
negative items.  
To investigate the relationships of wording/keying effects across the three 
instruments, Horan et al. (2003) tested additional CFA models that included three 
substantive factors and (a) no wording effects, (b) three correlated negative-wording 
factors, and (c) a single negative-wording factor operating across all measures. Results 
favored the second model, which was deemed to have adequate fit statistics. Correlations 
among the three substantive factors ranged from .38 to .76, while correlations among the 
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method factors ranged from .31 to .43. Thus although the model with a single method 
effect (across all measures) was not supported, there was evidence of similarity in the 
differential functioning of negative and positive items across measures. The presumed 
“negative wording” effect was present across measures but manifested differently on 
each. A structural model based on RSE data from three time points suggested that the 
method effects were also stable over time. 
 Method effects associated with negatively-keyed items have been reported in 
numerous other validation studies using different scales and populations. For example, 
Hazlett-Stevens, Ullman, and Craske (2004) investigated the factor structure of the Penn 
State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) using 
data from two college samples. Their results indicated the presence of a single 
substantive factor (worry) plus a method factor to account for differential responding to 
negative items. Chen, Rendina-Gobioff, and Dedrick (2010), using data from two 
Taiwanese elementary school samples, found evidence of method effects associated with 
negatively-worded items on a Chinese measure of self-esteem. Similar results were 
reported by Ebesutani et al. (2012), who investigated the factor structure of the 
Loneliness Questionnaire (LQ; Asher, Hymel, & Renshaw, 1984) using data from U.S. 
children in grades 2-12.  
 Few published validation-type studies of balanced (or mixed) scales have reported 
a lack of method variance associated with wording/keying. In one such example, 
Bernstein and Garbin (1985) used an OMG CFA approach to test various proposed 
subscales of MMPI Scale 2 (Depression); data came from a small outpatient sample (N = 
76) and a large job applicant sample (N = 3,808). It should be noted that the MMPI has a 
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dichotomous response scale (True/False). None of the proposed structures, including 
subscales based on keying, adequately reproduced the observed inter-item correlation 
matrix. Thus there was no evidence that positive and negative items were functioning 
differentially, though there was also no evidence that they were functioning comparably.  
 In a more recent example, Borgers, Hox, and Sikkel (2004) analyzed internet-
based survey responses to a simplified Dutch version of the RSE and another well-being 
scale from 202 children (aged 8-16). Contrary to expectations, there was no effect of 
negatively-keyed items on the internal consistency of the responses. In discussing these 
results, the authors suggested that their analytic approach (the use of reliability estimates 
as dependent variables) may have obscured differences between responses to negative 
and positive items. They noted that for more than half of all possible comparisons, 
significant mean differences were found between oppositely-keyed items.  
 Manipulation Studies. Benson and Hocevar (1985) examined the effects of item 
wording on the responses of elementary schoolers (grades 4-6, N = 522) to an attitude 
measure. The study was designed to test two assumptions implicit in recommendations to 
use “balanced” scales: (1) that positive and negative items measure the same construct; 
and (2) that balancing yields a more valid index of the target construct. Each student was 
administered one of three versions of a 15-item scale assessing attitudes about school 
integration: all positively worded; all negatively worded; and mixed (8 and 7 items, 
respectively). Item order was consistent across forms, and all negative items were created 
by adding the word “not.” The all-positive and all-negative forms were shown to have 
different item means, item variances, and factor loadings. The pattern of means suggested 
that it was “…difficult for the students to indicate agreement by disagreeing with a 
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negative statement” (p. 231). Factor analyses of the mixed-form responses supported a 
two-factor solution defined by item wording.  
In a study of the effects of “negative valence” items, Ahlawat (1985) analyzed the 
responses of 501 Jordanian teenagers (grades 8-9) to a version of the STAI that had been 
expanded and then translated into Arabic. The measure included a 5-point Likert scale 
and 92 items—23 each of four types that were classified as semantically and 
grammatically positive (e.g., “I feel happy”), semantically positive and grammatically 
negative (e.g., “I do not feel happy”), semantically negative and grammatically positive 
(e.g., “I feel sad”), and semantically and grammatically negative (e.g., “I do not feel 
sad”). The data were found to have good overall internal consistency (.90), but patterns of 
means, standard deviations, and correlations suggested marked differences in the 
functioning of the four types of items within each of four sample subgroups (rural girls, 
urban girls, rural boys, and urban boys). In interpreting the results, the author concluded 
that some types of items “…were contaminated by the introduction of an insidious 
grammatical element, the negative” (p. 97). It should be noted that Ahlawat’s (1985) use 
of item descriptors (“positive” and negative”) seemed to confound semantics and social 
desirability.  
Schriesheim and colleagues conducted several studies involving the systematic 
manipulation of wording/keying (Schriesheim & Eisenbach, 1995; Schriesheim, 
Eisenbach, & Hill, 1991; Schriesheim & Hill, 1981). Each study investigated 
psychometric consequences of using different proportions of item reversals on two 
subscales from the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire (LBDQ; Stogdill, 1963). 
Items from the Initiating Structure (IS) subscale were alternated with items from the 
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Consideration (C) subscale, yielding an instrument with 16-20 items; the response scale 
had five options (Always to Never). The research design addressed a perceived weakness 
in other wording-related studies of attitude scales: “…there was no known referent or 
objective standard against which subject responses could be compared; the validity of 
subjects’ responses could, as a consequence, be only inferred” (Schriesheim et al., 1991, 
p. 70). Thus in each study, participants were asked to carefully read a one-page 
description of behaviors displayed by a fictitious supervisor; after they had finished 
reading, they were asked to turn the description face down and (from memory) rate the 
supervisor’s behaviors. Through substitution of adverbs, two versions of the description 
were created: one in which the IS behaviors were high, and one in which they were low 
(Consideration behaviors were neutral across both versions). Different variations of the 
response instrument were used in each study.   
In Schriesheim and Hill (1981), three versions of the 20-item response instrument 
were created: one in which all items were positively worded; one in which all items were 
reversed (usually this was accomplished by the insertion of “not” or a prefix like “un-”); 
and one in which half of the items on each subscale were reversed (“mixed”). Participants 
(N = 150 undergraduates) were randomly assigned to one of the six (2x3) conditions. The 
focus of analysis was the IS subscale, on which participants were expected to give 
extreme responses (because they read descriptions in which these behaviors were either 
frequent or rare). Internal consistency, as estimated by coefficient alpha, was highest 
when all survey items were positively worded (.96) and slightly lower in the all-negative 
(.91) and mixed (.89) conditions; in the latter condition, the subset of five negative items 
was much less reliable than the subset of five positive items (.70 versus .91). To equate 
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responses from the high- and low-IS conditions, the authors calculated accuracy scores 
for each response (1 for perfect accuracy, 5 for extreme inaccuracy). For example, the 
fictitious supervisor in the high-IS script should have received the highest possible scores 
from respondents (5) on IS items. Similarly, the supervisor in the low-IS script should 
have received the lowest possible score on each IS item. Accuracy scores were computed 
as the difference between expected and observed IS item scores (i.e., 5 - X for the high-IS 
condition and X - 1 for the low-IS condition). Descriptive statistics for these scores 
suggested that the mixed and negative item wording conditions resulted in about 50 
percent more inaccuracy (and more variability) than that observed in the all-positive 
condition. A one-way ANOVA revealed statistically significant effects of item wording 
on accuracy. Based on the results, the authors concluded that “…although the inclusion 
of negatively stated items may theoretically control or offset agreement response 
tendencies, their actual effect is to reduce response validity” (p. 1113).  
Holden, Fekken, and Jackson (1985) questioned the claim that the use of balanced 
scales necessarily compromises response validity: “Although the balancing of scales may 
serve to reduce acquiescent response biases, nowhere has it been put forth that this must 
be accomplished through the use of negative wording. It appears that Schriesheim and 
Hill [1981] have not drawn a proper distinction between negative wording and negative 
keying” (Holden et al., 1985, p. 387). Holden et al. (1985) suggested that the two 
dimensions are mutually exclusive and could be varied to create four kinds of items 
(examples reproduced from p. 387): “He mixes with others” (positive wording, positive 
keying); “He doesn’t mix with others” (negative wording, negative keying); “He keeps to 
himself” (positive wording, negative keying); and “He doesn’t keep to himself” (negative 
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wording, positive keying). In an effort to explore those item subtypes, the authors 
conducted a correlational study on 80 items from a Likert-based personality measure (the 
Personality Research Form or PRF). Studied features of the items included length (three 
proxies), negative keying (yes/no), judged face validity, judged subtlety, and three types 
of negative wording (use of “not”; use of negative qualifiers such as “rarely”; and use of 
implicit negatives such as the prefix in “unpleasant”). Another variable, “item criterion 
validity,” was based on “…point biserial correlations of individual items with multiple 
criterion scores [that] represented unweighted composites of self-evaluations on a rating 
scale, an adjective endorsement list, and an experimental preference rating” (p. 388). 
These values were calculated based on data from two prior studies involving the PRF.  
An initial and predictable finding in Holden et al. (1985) was that criterion 
validity decreased for lengthier items (correlations between -.14 and -.23). After item 
length was partialed out  (because negatively-worded items tend to be longer than 
positively-worded ones), use of negative wording (all types combined) remained 
significantly associated with reduced criterion validity (-.22). By contrast, the correlation 
between negative keying and criterion validity was not statistically significant (.01; 
presumably this was calculated as a point-biserial correlation). None of the three types of 
negative wording was significantly correlated with criterion validity on its own (“not”:    
-.16; negative qualifiers: -.07; implicit negatives: -.08). Due to the correlational approach 
of the study, the import and generalizability of its findings are uncertain. However, it 
raised important questions about item keying and wording that influenced subsequent 
research.  
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In Schriesheim et al. (1991), for example, the authors refined their previous 
research design (Schriesheim & Hill, 1981) to include four wording conditions for the 
response instrument (which was also shortened to 16 items): all items positively 
worded/keyed (“regular”); half items regular, half positively worded/negatively keyed 
(“polar opposite”); half items regular, half negatively worded/positively keyed (“negated 
polar opposite”); and half items regular, half negatively worded/negatively keyed 
“negated regular”). Participants, 280 undergraduates, were randomly assigned to one of 
the eight (2x4) conditions. As was the case in the 1981 study, internal consistency 
estimates for the IS subscale (8 items) were higher for the all-positive condition (.94) 
than for the mixed conditions (.77-.89). A one-way ANOVA indicated that item wording 
had a significant effect on accuracy. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that accuracy scores 
were significantly higher (p < .05) for regular and negated regular items than for polar 
opposite and negated polar opposite items.  
A very similar data collection design was adopted in Schriesheim and Eisenbach 
(1995), though the response instrument was returned to its original length (20 items) and 
four versions of the supervisor description were used. Based on data from 496 
undergraduates, EFA and CFA analyses were conducted to investigate possible method 
effects. The best-fitting CFA model included a single (IS) trait factor and four method 
factors, one for each wording condition. Correlations between the method factors were 
generally nonsignificant, with the exception of that involving the two types of reverse-
scored items (.42). The results indicated that method effects can result not only from 
keying differences, but also from different wording strategies, as had been suggested by 
Holden et al. (1985).  
 
36 
 
 Barnette (2000) examined the effects of both item wording (2 conditions) and 
response scale presentation (3 conditions) on means, variances, and reliability estimates. 
Participants (a mix of high school students, undergraduates, graduate students, and in-
service teachers; N = 915) were administered one of six versions of a 20-item 
questionnaire designed by the author to assess attitudes about year-round schooling. 
Items were either (a) all “direct-worded” (i.e., positively keyed and worded) or (b) half 
direct-worded and half reverse-worded (reversals were accomplished by the insertion of 
an underlined “not”). The 5-point response scales were presented as (a) Strongly 
Disagree to Strongly Agree, (b) Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree, or (c) a randomly-
determined half-and-half mix of the two (varying by item). After reverse-scoring, items 
presented in the “mixed wording” format had higher means and lower variances than 
items presented in the “all-direct” format. Reliability estimates were higher for the all-
direct wording condition (.81-.85) than the mixed wording condition (.65-.73), and the 
highest internal consistency was observed when items were all positively worded and the 
response scale varied from item to item. Barnette concluded that “…using a bidirectional 
response set of alternatives [i.e., varying the direction of the response scale from item to 
item, as opposed to keeping the response scale constant and including negatively worded 
items] does not result in a loss of internal consistency but would permit the possible 
detection of acquiescence or response set bias.” (p. 369). The author did not explain 
precisely how said detection should be carried out.  
 Several other wording-manipulation studies have reported differences in the 
psychometric properties of scale versions with different proportions of negative and 
positive items. For example, Chang (1995a) administered four versions of the LOT to 
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university students. CFA results indicated a two-factor solution for balanced versions and 
a one-factor solution for versions with all-positive or all-negative keying. Miller and 
Cleary (1993), analyzing loneliness scale data from undergraduate and graduate students, 
found that balanced versions yielded a factor defined by negatively-keyed items. Similar 
results were reported by Höfling, Moosbrugger, Schermelleh-Engel, and Heidenreich 
(2011), who examined the factor structure of a balanced version of the Mindfulness 
Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), and by Greenberger et 
al. (2003), who created three versions of the 10-item RSE (all positive, all negative, 
balanced) to be administered to university students.  
 Occasionally, published manipulation studies have found the psychometric 
functioning of negative and positive items to be comparable. For example, Jackson and 
Lay (1968) crossed wording and keying conditions for selected PRF items that were then 
administered (in one of two questionnaires) to 158 female university students on two 
occasions (one week apart). Participants also completed separate measures of 
acquiescence and social desirability. Correlational results suggested that participants 
“…generally had little difficulty in responding appropriately to positively and negatively 
worded variations of the same item” (p. 326). Similarly, EFA results yielded substantive 
factors and “negligible” relationships between PRF items and acquiescence/desirability 
scores.  
 In two parallel studies with college student samples (total N ~ 1,000), Finney 
(2001) investigated measurement consequences of using negative items on a Likert-based 
test anxiety scale (the TAI). In both studies, approximately half of the sample completed 
the standard version of the 8-item scale (which contained only positively-worded items) 
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while the other half completed an adapted “mixed” version in which the word “not” was 
added to four items, making them negatively worded and negatively keyed. Additional 
measures were subsequently completed by all participants. The main difference between 
the two studies involved data collection procedures: In Study 1, the procedure was highly 
structured (e.g., participants completed one measure at a time and were not permitted to 
move on until everyone was ready); in Study 2, participants were allowed to work at their 
own pace and depart once they had finished.  
 In describing her analyses (primarily t-tests and CFAs), Finney (2001) reported 
that while the two studies yielded similar results, the data collection procedures in Study 
2 resulted in “...a general deterioration of the [questionnaire’s] psychometric properties” 
(p. 142). Regarding the primary research hypotheses, some were supported. First, 
negative items were less reliable than positive items. Also, the presence of negative items 
decreased the reliability of positive items when participants were allowed to proceed at 
their own pace. Some findings were contrary to both expectations and results from other 
studies. Most notably, the negative items did not exhibit lesser validity than positive 
items, did not have a detrimental effect on mixed-form validity coefficients for positive 
items, and did not adversely impact the factor structure of the data. It was unclear 
whether the unexpectedly adequate fit of a one-factor (trait) model to balanced-scale data 
was due to the cognitive ability of the sample (i.e., they were not confused by negative 
wording) or some interaction among respondent characteristics, item characteristics, and 
data collection procedures. Finney also raised the possibility that the directions of her 
hypotheses may have been biased by the “file drawer problem” (i.e., previous studies that 
failed to find significant wording/keying effects may not have been published).  
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 Additional Studies. Most published studies of wording-related method effects 
have used either a validation or a manipulation approach (or both). Exceptions include 
Melnick and Gable (1990), in which an attitude questionnaire was completed by parents 
of 3,328 elementary schoolers in an urban school district. The instrument used a five-
point Likert scale (Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree). Analyses were based on pairs of 
parallel items—that is, pairs of items deemed to be equivalent in meaning but opposite in 
keying direction. For each item pair, respondents were classified into groups depending 
on whether their two responses were “consistent” (e.g., Agree/Strongly Agree for the 
positive item and Disagree/Strongly Disagree for the negative item) or “inconsistent” 
(e.g., Agree/Strongly Agree for both items). T-tests revealed that the consistent 
responders had significantly higher mean scores than the inconsistent responders on all 
questionnaire subscales (Home/School Relations; Clear School Mission; High 
Expectations; Safe and Orderly Environment; Instructional Leadership; Frequent 
Monitoring of Student Leadership). In addition, chi-square tests indicated that for each 
pair of items studied, the consistent responders had a higher education level than did the 
inconsistent responders. The authors concluded that balanced scales might be particularly 
confusing for adults with lower levels of education.  
 Chang (1995b) conducted a generalizability study to examine the comparability of 
positively- and negatively-keyed (connotatively consistent and inconsistent) items. A 
Likert-based attitude scale created by the author (related to math/statistics) was 
administered on two occasions (one week apart) to 102 graduate students enrolled in a 
research methods course. The study was based on eight items from the scale (four 
positive, four negative), each of which was rewritten to have opposite keying at the 
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second occasion. Thus the initial design was partially nested with three facets: wording, 
scale version (i.e., occasion), and item. The main effect for wording was nearly zero 
(0.5% of total variance), but the variance components were more substantial for the two-
way interaction between person and wording (5.5%) and the three-way interaction 
between person, wording, and scale version (9.1%). Because the largest variance 
component was associated with the interaction between person and scale (26.1%), 
indicating that the relative standing of individuals varied markedly across the two scale 
versions, the two versions were subsequently analyzed separately. Large variance 
components for the person-wording interaction (14 and 16%) indicated that wording 
impacted the relative standing of individuals. Finally, follow-up decision studies revealed 
that positively worded items had higher G coefficients (reliability) than their reversed 
counterparts. Thus Chang’s (1995b) conclusions were consistent with those of most other 
wording-related studies: Positive and negative items do not elicit equivalent responses.   
Cognitive/Psycholinguistic Processing of Negation 
 Before various measurement-related explanations for the non-equivalence of 
positive and negative items are discussed, it may be informative to review the findings of 
experimental studies of cognitive/psycholinguistic processing of negated statements. As 
noted by Block (1971), “The use of ‘negation reversals’ avoids the trap of ‘polar 
reversals’ which possibly are not received by respondents as psychological reversals” (p. 
206). For example, the word healthy has a number of antonyms that could be used as 
reversals (e.g., ill; sick; unhealthy; unwell). Are any of those antonyms likely to be 
perceived as true “polar” opposites, identical in absolute value? Given the nuances of 
semantics (e.g., denotative and connotative aspects of meaning), the answer is probably 
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no. And even if one person felt strongly that healthy and ill were precise opposites, 
another person might perceive a lack of symmetry (e.g., on a state-versus-trait 
connotative dimension). Words are not numbers, and individual representations and 
perceptions of words vary (e.g., Pinker, 1994). Thus sentence-level negation (e.g., 
reversing a measurement item by adding “not”) has been an appealing strategy for 
researchers constructing balanced attitude/affective scales. However, the literature 
strongly suggests that negated items present challenges of their own.   
Wason (1959, 1961) conducted several experimental studies in which 
undergraduate and graduate students responded to four types of (printed) statements: true 
affirmatives (e.g., “Ice is cold”); false affirmatives (e.g., “Ice is hot”); true negatives (e.g., 
“Ice is not hot”) and false negatives (e.g., “Ice is not cold”). Performance was measured 
in terms of both accuracy and speed. Results consistently showed that affirmative 
statements were processed more quickly, and with fewer errors, than negative statements.  
These trends were congruent with observations volunteered by participants (e.g., during 
self-assessments of performance across conditions). Wason (1959) concluded that there 
was “…considerable evidence to suggest that responding to negative information in the 
logically sufficient way is detrimental to the assessment of performance” (p. 101).  
The same four wording conditions were used by Peterson and Peterson (1976), 
who asked adults to answer (from memory) true-false statements about reading passages. 
Analyses of variance for accuracy data confirmed that negative statements yielded more 
errors than did affirmative ones. Response times were not measured in the study.   
 Sherman (1973, 1976) conducted several studies investigating the effects of 
different kinds of negation on sentence-level comprehension. Participants were asked to 
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read statements and indicate for each whether it made sense (half of the statements were 
reasonable, while half were not). Performance was measured in terms of both accuracy 
and speed. Consistent with expectations, “unmarked” (i.e., affirmative) sentences were 
processed more quickly and accurately than negated sentences. Among subtypes of 
negated sentences, those including “not” were the most problematic for respondents. 
Those with implicit (prefix-based) negation (e.g., “I am unhappy”) and adjectival 
negation (e.g., “I am sad”) had “…little effect on comprehension in an otherwise 
affirmative context… [but] a consistent and substantial effect when added to [an 
otherwise] negative sentence [e.g., “I am not unhappy”] (1976, p. 143). Finally, sentence 
comprehension became increasingly more difficult with increasing numbers of negative 
markers (regardless of subtype).  
In summary, it is well-established that negated statements are processed more 
slowly and less accurately than corresponding affirmative statements. The effect appears 
to be strongest when negation is accomplished via overt syntactic markers (e.g., “not”). 
Linguistic factors impacting working memory—such as sentence length, sentence 
structure, and number of negative markers—can also affect comprehension (e.g., 
Angleitner, John, & Löhr, 1986; Carpenter & Just, 1975; Foss & Hakes, 1978).  
Explanations for the Differential Functioning of Negative and Positive Items  
The measurement literature on balanced scales suggests that negative and positive 
items tend to function differentially, often leading to undesirable consequences for scale 
dimensionality, reliability, and validity. The “blame” for those consequences has 
typically been laid at the doorstep of the “insidious” negative items, which appear to be 
more difficult to process than affirmatively-worded items, particularly for respondents 
 
43 
 
with lower levels of cognitive ability, reading skill, and/or education. As yet, however, 
there is no consensus regarding the exact nature of the difficulty negative items seem to 
present for both respondents and researchers. Why is it that confirmatory factor analysis 
of data from scales designed to be unidimensional so often supports a model with two 
factors defined by item wording/keying? Previously posited explanations for that 
phenomenon are reviewed below.  
 The Substantive Explanation. According to this line of reasoning, a two-factor 
model fits or emerges from the data because both factors reflect independent constructs 
or dimensions of a construct. The systematic variance modeled by the “negative” factor 
is, like that of the “positive” factor, substantive (rather than artifactual) in nature. As 
summarized by Finney (2001), “…some researchers have hypothesized that the negative 
item wording may tap into different or additional affective or attitudinal constructs than 
the positive item wording” (p. 37).  
 As described earlier, Bernstein and Eveland (1982) examined the dimensionality 
of the STAI, a balanced scale, using a multiple-groups approach with data from two 
samples (high school students and Air Force trainees). Results supported a solution with 
four factors defined by positively-keyed State items, negatively-keyed State items, 
positively-keyed Trait items, and negatively-keyed Trait items. The authors offered a 
substantive interpretation of the structure, suggesting that STAI respondents “…tend to 
perceive items describing the symptoms of anxiety [i.e., negatively-keyed items] and the 
symptoms of positive moods [i.e., positively-keyed items] as being at least as different as 
items describing the immediate present (state) and the long term (trait)” (p. 371).  
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 The possibility of a substantive explanation for negative/positive differences was 
also raised by Mook, Kleijn, and van der Ploeg (1991), who investigated the factor 
structure of balanced scales measuring anxiety (a Dutch trait-only version of the STAI) 
and depression symptoms. Each measure consisted of 20 items, half of which were 
negatively keyed (it was unclear how many were negatively worded). A principal 
components analysis (PCA) was conducted using pooled data on both measures collected 
from four groups of adults (N = 1,409). Results supported a two-component solution 
defined entirely by keying direction—that is, all negatively-keyed anxiety and depression 
items loaded on one component, while all positively-keyed anxiety and depression items 
loaded on the other. These components were tentatively referred to as “absence of 
positive affect” and “presence of negative affect.” The authors suggested that their results 
might be due to stylistic responding (e.g., social desirability), but favored an alternative 
explanation: “…our consistent positive-negative differences reflect the workings of two 
independent dimensions of positive and negative affect” (p. 558).  
 Mook and colleagues (1992) conducted a similar study of a Dutch version of the 
LOT dispositional optimism scale (8 items, half negatively keyed). A PCA of data from 
two adult samples (N = 404) yielded two components defined by keying direction; the 
correlation between the two components was .31. As in their previous (1991) study, the 
authors favored a substantive interpretation of the apparent multidimensionality of the 
LOT. It was suggested that the two components reflected optimism (i.e., presence of 
positive affect) and pessimism (i.e., absence of negative affect).  
More recently, Alessandri, Vecchione, Tisak, and Barbaranelli (2011) 
investigated the dimensionality of a revised (and translated) version of the LOT (LOT-r). 
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The measure (6 items: half positively keyed, half negatively keyed) was administered to a 
sample of 372 Italian adults, with 372 matched acquaintances serving as informants. 
Participants gave self-ratings, while each informant independently rated the participant 
with whom he or she was acquainted. In addition to the LOT-r, participants and 
informants gave ratings on measures of Big Five personality traits (40 adjectives) and 
egoistic bias (7 items). Results of five competing CFAs for each group yielded three 
plausible models, of which Model 4 (one trait factor plus a “specific factor” associated 
with positively-worded items) was favored for theoretical reasons. The Model 4 variance 
was then decomposed into three components (self-report: optimism = 29%, specific = 
23%, error = 48%; other-report: 31%, 24%, 46%). Scores from the six personality 
indicators were included, along with the optimism factor and the specific factor, in a 
CTCU model. The set of personality measures explained similar amounts of variance for 
each factor (.41 and .50), supporting the researchers’ hypothesis that “…the tendency to 
endorse positively worded items represents a personality characteristic linked to 
individual adjustment (i.e., emotional stability) and to a specific facet of social 
desirability” (p. 638). In other words, a substantive interpretation of the second 
(“specific”) factor was favored.  
 The Method Variance Explanation. Proponents of this explanation posit that for 
balanced scales, multiple factors may emerge due to wording-based method variance—
that is, because negative and positive items elicit different response distributions. The 
method variance, while systematic, is not of substantive interest; it is merely noise that 
should be partitioned from the measurement signal (e.g., via CFA/SEM techniques). This 
explanation is at odds with the substantive interpretation of wording-based variance. 
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Russell and Carroll (1999), for example, argued that research studies had provided little 
support for the idea that the relationship between positive affect and negative affect might 
be independent rather than bipolar (i.e., opposite ends of a unidimensional spectrum). 
According to Carmines and Zeller (1979), evidence of spurious (i.e., artifactual) factors 
based on keying/wording would include (1) high correlations between the “positive” and 
“negative” factors, and (2) similar correlational patterns of these with external (criterion) 
variables.  
 This approach is illustrated in Roberts, Lewinsohn, and Seeley (1993), who 
investigated the dimensionality of the UCLA Loneliness scale (Russell, Peplau, & 
Cutrona, 1980) using data collected from 1,710 high school students. The measure 
consisted of eight items, half negatively keyed (one negatively worded) and half 
positively keyed (again, one negatively worded); there were four response options 
ranging from Never to Often. The sample was randomly split into halves so that an initial 
PCA could be followed up with a CFA. As hypothesized, results of the PCA yielded two 
components defined by item keying direction; in the follow-up two-factor CFA, the 
correlation between the factors was high (.72). Roberts and colleagues then used 
theoretically relevant external variables (e.g., depression; social skills; social 
competence) to determine whether the observed factor structure might be artifactual (as 
recommended by Carmines and Zeller). For almost all variables, there was little variation 
among correlations with Loneliness scores based on all items, positive items, and 
negative items. Thus the authors concluded that the two-factor solution was “…largely an 
artifact of the attempt to counter response set by using items with both negative and 
positive valence” (p. 1388).  
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 Several researchers have interpreted wording/keying-defined factors as artifactual 
even in the absence of information about patterns of associations with external variables 
(e.g., Motl et al., 2000; Schriesheim, Eisenbach, & Hill, 1991). In a study conducted by 
Tomás and Oliver (1999), participants (640 high school students) completed Spanish 
translations of the original 10-item RSE (balanced; 4-point Likert scale). Nine competing 
CFA models were fit to the data, the best-fitting of which were Model 6 (CTCU) and 
Model 9 (CTCM with two method factors; i.e., full bifactor). The authors suggested that 
the results likely reflected the presence of method effects, but added a caveat: “To further 
analyze this question, it would be useful to relate self-esteem as defined in each of the 
models here to other trait measures with positively and negatively worded items.” (p. 95).  
 The Item Extremity Explanation. Spector and colleagues (1997) showed that 
artifactual multidimensionality can result through a certain kind of interaction between 
item and respondent characteristics. Naturally, respondents vary in the amount of a target 
construct (e.g., job satisfaction) they possess. Similarly, measurement items vary in 
strength of wording/content; “extreme” items are those that are so strongly worded that 
they may be difficult for respondents to endorse (regardless of keying). The concept can 
be illustrated with two extreme items used in the Spector et al. study: “I loathe my job” 
and “I am in love with my job.” In the study, real and simulated data were used to 
demonstrate that if items on a balanced scale are extreme relative to where most 
respondents fall on the underlying construct, people’s valid responses may appear 
inconsistent across negative/positive items. For example, a respondent very high on job 
satisfaction might give “consistent” responses by agreeing with “I am in love with my 
job” and disagreeing with “I loathe my job.” However,  respondents with more moderate 
 
48 
 
levels of job satisfaction—who would presumably outnumber extreme responders—
would likely disagree with both items. As explained by Spector et al. (1997), this 
combination of response patterns would likely result in higher correlations within items 
sets (positive and negative) than across item sets, leading to an artifactual two-factor 
solution:  
Therefore, the appearance of two factors depends upon the joint distributions of 
both items and people on the underlying measurement continuum. If the items are  
extreme relative to where most people are..., and the people are spread throughout 
the continuum, there will be a mix of people who are consistent and inconsistent  
in agreeing with items on opposite ends of the continuum. Correlations between  
items at opposite ends of the continuum will be attenuated, while correlations  
between items at the same end will be relatively strong. As a result, artifactual  
factors would appear based on the response patterns to these items. Specifically,  
these factors merely reflect the greater magnitude of correlation within versus  
across item type based on the distributions of responses to items rather than  
multiple constructs. (p. 664) 
According to Spector et al. (1997), the above scenario is quite plausible because “…the 
use of [some] extreme items in bipolar scales of unidimensional constructs is often 
necessary….when one intends to distinguish individuals who are extreme on the 
construct from those who are moderate” (p. 676). Thus the above-described joint 
distribution of people and items, which is likely to be the rule rather than the exception, 
can be expected to result in artifactual multidimensionality.  
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An interaction between item keying and item extremity was also evident in a 
study by McPherson and Mohr (2005). Participants (N=277; mostly women) were 
students enrolled in undergraduate psychology courses. Each participant was 
administered either the original LOT or a “moderate” version of it (LOT-M) created by 
the replacement or insertion of words (e.g., “I’m always optimistic” became “I’m usually 
optimistic”). A validity check of the relative extremity of the LOT and LOT-M items 
(embedded among other items) was performed by graduate students. Both scales were 
balanced (eight items total) and used a 5-point response scale. Based on an initial 
ANOVA, “The hypothesis that negatively keyed item means tend to become larger 
relative to positively keyed item means as item extremity increases [was] thus supported. 
The tendency for this effect to be reversed as items become less extreme [was] also 
evident” (p. 124). Next, monopolar “disagreeing” and “agreeing” respondents were 
identified as those whose raw positive and negative subscale scores fell to the same side 
of the subscales’ midpoint. In other words, individuals who tended to agree with all items 
(or disagree with all items) regardless of wording direction were flagged as exhibiting a 
monopolar (i.e., acquiescent) response style. Results (more disagreeing respondents on 
the LOT; more agreeing respondents on the LOT-M) “supported the suggestion that the 
less extreme items in the LOT–M could also result in a greater tendency for respondents 
to agree with items keyed in both directions” (p. 125).  
McPherson and Mohr (2005) then tested one- and two-factor CFA models with 
both data sets. The unidimensional model fit the LOT-M data better than the LOT data, 
though fit statistics were not acceptable with either data set (the fit of the model to the 
LOT data did improve after removal of data from “disagreeing” respondents). The two-
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factor model (factors defined by keying) represented a better fit to both data sets; based 
on the chi-square statistic, the fit to the LOT-M data was adequate while the fit to the 
LOT data was not. The interfactor correlation was also higher for the LOT-M (.70) than 
for the LOT (.59), lending support to the claims of Spector et al. (1997). In other words, 
data from both balanced scales yielded two wording-based artifactors; but for the version 
of the LOT with the more extreme items, the two factors were more distinct.  
 The Careless Responding Explanation. Based on the results of an acquiescence 
study, Couch and Keniston (1960) suggested that yea-saying response patterns might be 
related to impulsivity. A similar idea was explored by Schmitt and Stults (1985), who 
hypothesized that factors associated with negative keying could emerge due to careless 
responding (i.e., strong satisficing). They defined a careless respondent as one who “…is 
simply reading a few of the items in a measuring instrument, inferring what it is the items 
are asking of the respondent, and then responding in like manner to the remainder of the 
items in the instrument” (p. 367). Simulated data sets of 400 were generated based on 
five careless responding conditions (0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%). Results indicated that 
a negative keying factor would emerge if at least 10% of respondents used a consistently 
careless response style. Schmitt and Stults (1985) acknowledged that their simulated 
careless responding patterns might not be entirely realistic, but they encouraged 
researchers to take steps to minimize, screen for, and control for careless responding.  
 The findings of the above study were confirmed by Woods (2006), who 
conducted a CFA-based simulation study in which sample size (250; 500; 1,000) and 
proportion of careless respondents (0%; 5%; 10% 20%; 30%) were systematically varied. 
Data were generated for 23 items (10 negatively keyed) on a unidimensional measure 
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with two response options (e.g., True/False); item parameters were based on a 2PL IRT 
model and drawn from a normal distribution. Careless responders were simulated by 
switching 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 for the reverse-keyed items. One- and two-factor models were 
fit to all data sets, and fit indices for each of the 15 conditions were averaged over 1,000 
replications. In summarizing her results, Woods (2006) concluded that “…if at least 
about 10% respond to [negatively-keyed] items carelessly, researchers are likely to reject 
a one-factor model for [data based on] a unidimensional scale” (p. 189). Thus the 
possibility of careless responding should be of concern to researchers, particularly when 
administration conditions are relatively unstructured and participant motivation may be 
suboptimal—circumstances that are likely to lead to satisficing (Krosnick, 1991).    
 The Response Style/Personality Explanation. It has long been suggested that 
individual response styles might be related to personality and, therefore, stable across 
time/measures (e.g., Bentler et al., 1971; Cronbach, 1946). According to the response 
style/personality explanation for CFA solutions with wording-based factors, systematic 
variance above and beyond that associated with the target construct results not from 
balanced scales or item wording per se but from individual response styles (e.g., 
acquiescence). This variance is not presumed to reflect a substantive aspect of the target 
construct (as in the distinction between “optimism” and “pessimism” factors on the 
LOT), but neither is it considered mere measurement noise (as assumed under the method 
variance explanation). Rather, it is of substantive interest because it reflects 
“…characteristics of the individual stable from time to time, [as opposed to] …transient 
sets which can only be regarded as errors in testing rather than personality 
characteristics” (Cronbach, 1946, p. 10). Recently, some researchers have suggested that 
 
52 
 
variation in response styles may occur not only across individuals, but across cultures 
(e.g., Lindwall et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2010).  
 Several studies have found support for the idea that response styles are stable over 
time, evident across measures, and/or related to personality traits. As described earlier, 
Horan et al. (2003) used national longitudinal data to investigate the factor structure of 
three brief attitude/affective instruments (including a 7-item version of the RSE) with 
varying proportions of negatively-keyed items. Results favored a model with three 
substantive factors (intercorrelations ranged from .38 to .76) and three correlated method 
factors defined by negative keying (intercorrelations ranged from .31 to .43). In their 
interpretation of a separate structural model based on RSE data from three time points 
(two-year intervals), the authors argued that wording/keying effects (which could not be 
disentangled) were also stable over time, as stability coefficients ranged from .435 (time 
1-2) to .438 (time 2-3). Horan et al. (2003) concluded that the findings were 
“…consistent with the response-style hypothesis that…response effects represent a 
personality trait of the respondent rather than a methodological artifact” (p. 449). The 
possibility that methodological artifacts could also be stable over time was not addressed. 
 Similar results were reported by DiStefano and Motl (2006), who investigated 
(simultaneously) the dimensionality of the RSE and the SPAS based on data from 
students at two southeastern universities (N = 757). A CTCM model with two substantive 
factors and two negative-wording method factors (intercorrelation = .37) fit the data 
better than models with one or no method factors. In addition, scores from several 
personality measures (based on summed responses to positively-worded items only) were 
used to predict method effects in a series of structural path models. Most predictors (e.g., 
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social desirability) had nonsignificant relationships with the negative method factor; 
however, significant (negative) relationships were found for both fear of negative 
evaluation and self-consciousness (path coefficients ranging from -.14 to -.20). Thus 
there was evidence that response styles were both stable across content areas and related 
to personality traits. Other studies using a similar analytic approach have also found 
significant (if relatively weak) relationships between wording-based method effects and 
personality traits such as emotional stability and conscientiousness (Quilty, Oakman, & 
Risko, 2006) and fun seeking (DiStefano & Motl, 2009).  
An alternative methodological approach was used by DiStefano, Morgan, and 
Motl (2012), who analyzed responses to the RSE and seven personality scales from 752 
students at two southeastern universities (it was not clear whether these were the same 
data analyzed in DiStefano & Motl [2006]). A Rasch partial credit model, which assumes 
unidimensionality, was employed to detect possible method effects. In addition, in a 
variation on a long-established technique (e.g., Couch & Keniston, 1960), an RSE 
acquiescence score was calculated for each participant (computed as the sum of all 
responses, before reverse-coding, linearly transformed to a 1-100 scale). Positive RSE 
items generally had higher means, more negative skewness, and more positive kurtosis, 
providing “…initial evidence of agreement bias” (p. 48). The correlation between 
acquiescence and global RSE scores was -.28, indicating that people with higher reported 
self-esteem had lower acquiescence (i.e., yea-saying) scores. Correlations between 
personality measures and RSE acquiescence scores were generally weak, though several 
reached statistical significance at the .01 level (e.g., public self-consciousness: .17; fun 
seeking: .12). Some correlational patterns differed by gender; for example, the correlation 
 
54 
 
between fun seeking and acquiescence was significant among males (.23) but not females 
(.04). One shortcoming of the personality-based explanations reviewed here is the lack of 
theoretical underpinnings—for example, why would fun seeking be associated with 
acquiescence? In the next section, explanations based on cognitive theory are explored.  
 The Individual Differences in Cognition/Reading Explanation. As detailed 
earlier, cognitive/psycholinguistic studies have consistently found that responding to 
negated statements is more difficult than responding to affirmative statements. 
Measurement researchers have provided evidence that, in addition, respondents with 
lower levels of cognitive ability, reading skill, and/or education may be less able to cope 
with the processing demands of negated or reversed scale items. These individual 
differences may, like careless responding, affect item response distributions and lead to 
wording/keying-based method factors. Aberrant responding to negative items is thought 
to occur in (at least) two different ways. One is based on the satisficing theory of 
Krosnick (e.g., 1991), who has consistently found that those with less education, need for 
cognition, and perceived value of the measurement instrument/process are more likely to 
satisfice. The second is that those with less cognitive skill are simply less able to 
comprehend/respond to more complex syntactic structures.  
  In two studies of elementary schoolers’ responses to the Self Description 
Questionnaire (SDQ; Shavelson & Marsh, 1986), Marsh (1986) investigated the extent to 
which negative items (about one-sixth of the SDQ items) were associated with method 
effects. Most of these items were negatively keyed but not negatively worded (e.g., “I 
hate reading”). Marsh argued that in order to respond appropriately to negative items, 
“…respondents may have to invoke a double negative logic that requires a higher level of 
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verbal reasoning than that required by positive items” (p. 37). Consistent with 
expectations drawn from cognitive-developmental research, grade 2 students had much 
more trouble with negative wording (near-zero correlations between positive and 
negative items) than did older students (e.g., r = .60 for grade 5). At all grade levels, at 
least some students appeared to respond aberrantly to negative items.  
In a second study, Marsh (1986) conducted a series of CFAs based on SDQ 
responses from a separate sample of fifth-graders (N = 559). Results supported a model in 
which negative items were allowed to load on a method factor as well as their respective 
substantive factors. When a reading ability factor (based on additional measures) was 
added to the model, it correlated substantially (r = .42) with the method factor. Thus 
children with weaker reading skills were more likely to have difficulty with negatively-
keyed items. Marsh advised that such items should not be counted in scoring because, at 
least for children, “the variance in responses to negative items that is valid cannot easily 
be separated from variance attributable to the bias” (p. 45). In subsequent studies, Marsh 
(1996) found additional evidence that children and adolescents with less well-developed 
reading skills tend to have difficulty responding accurately to negative items. The results 
of Marsh (1996) were largely replicated by Dunbar, Ford, Hunt, and Der (2000), whose 
research sample consisted of 812 Scottish adults.  
Corwyn (2000), based on factor analysis of RSE data from five adolescent and 
adult samples, reached a similar conclusion while investigating the factor structure of the 
full, 10-item RSE based on five data sets. This version of the measure was balanced (five 
negatively-keyed items, two of them negatively worded) and included a four-point Likert 
scale (Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree). Consistent with prior studies of the RSE, all 
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models incorporating method effects related to keying direction fit the data better than 
did models without method effects. The best-fitting model was a full bifactor model that 
included one substantive factor (self-esteem) and two method factors (positive and 
negative keying). In the standardized solution for this model, substantive factor loadings 
were consistently higher for the positive items whereas uniquenesses (i.e., error 
variances) were consistently higher for the negative items.  
Corwyn (2000) tested the claim that wording-based method effects decrease with 
increasing verbal ability. Analyses involved a two-factor RSE model (positive versus 
negative items) that demonstrated acceptable fit to five data sets. Based on a measure of 
verbal ability that had been administered to the largest of the samples (several thousand 
women aged 15-23 who participated in a national longitudinal study), cases were 
separated into quartiles and the two-factor model was estimated for each subgroup.  
Marsh’s finding was replicated: “As predicted, the correlation between the positive self-
esteem and negative self-esteem factors was higher with each consecutive increase in 
verbal ability (.71, .76, .85, and .87 respectively)” (p. 367). Thus there is evidence that 
among both adolescents and adults, individuals with stronger reading/verbal ability tend 
to respond more consistently across positive and negative items.  
One might consider educational level to be a proxy for cognitive, verbal, or 
reading ability. Results from studies investigating the comparability of negative-item 
responding across respondents of different educational levels have generally been 
consistent with the results described above. For example, Cordery and Sevastos (1993) 
investigated the dimensionality and reliability of two versions of the Job Diagnostic 
Survey (JDS; Idaszak & Drasgow, 1987): the original version (15 items, five negatively 
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worded), and an all-positive revision. A form combining the two versions (the original 15 
items followed by the reworded, positive versions of the five negative items) was 
administered to a sample of Australian government employees (N = 3,044). 
Approximately 40% of the participants had not completed high school, while the 
remainder had a high school education or beyond. Data from 1,000 randomly selected 
members of each subsample were analyzed. One-factor CFA results for both groups 
favored the all-positive version of the JDS, which also yielded higher subscale-level 
internal consistency estimates than did the original version. Analysis of consistency 
scores (based on the five pairs of original-reworded items) indicated that the lower-
education group gave significantly more discrepant (i.e., incongruent) responses than did 
the group with more education.  
As described earlier, Melnick and Gable (1990) examined parents’ responses to 
pairs of parallel items with opposite keying. They found that for all item pairs, 
“consistent responders” had higher levels of education than did respondents who gave 
seemingly incongruent responses. Juni et al. (1996) reported that negatively-keyed items 
were problematic for a sample of inner-city clinical patients (N = 70 males; mean years of 
education = 11) completing the Weak Opiate Withdrawal Scale (Haertzen, Meketon, & 
Hooks, 1970). Item-total correlations were .10 or lower for 15 of 26 reversed items; for 
seven of those items, item-total correlations were strongly negative (i.e., below -.15). It 
was noted that “…the items with poor item-total correlations featured negative item 
stems, forcing respondents to conceptualize double-negatives when choosing the ‘false’ 
option (Juni et al., 1996).  
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Finally, based on meta-analyses of numerous studies conducted by Schuman and 
Presser (1981), Krosnick et al. (1996) found strong support for the idea that individuals 
with low levels of formal education are more susceptible to acquiescent response patterns 
(effect sizes for low, medium, and high levels of education: .33, .19, .18). In addition, 
acquiescence effects (i.e., incongruent responding across positive and negative items) 
were more prevalent among people who scored lower on a measure of nonverbal 
reasoning. As noted earlier, the process of giving carefully-considered, accurate 
responses on a measurement instrument requires cognitive effort (Tourangeau & 
Rasinski, 1988). Individuals with lower levels of education and/or cognitive ability may 
be less willing or able to expend the mental effort required; said differently, such 
individuals may be more likely to satisfice. Recognition of this tendency no doubt 
prompted Bass’s (1956) suggestion that researchers obtain higher-quality data by 
sampling “more intelligent and critical” participants.  
Evidence from Qualitative Studies 
Given the variety of competing explanations posited for the differential 
functioning of positive and negative items, surprisingly little research has been published 
related to the cognitive processes in which respondents engage while completing 
balanced attitude/affective scales. Wason (1959) reported that participants in his study 
said they found negated statements more difficult to process than equivalent affirmative 
statements, but this information was anecdotal in nature. Some construct validation 
studies have used a think-aloud protocol with children (e.g., Cremeens, Eiser, & Blades, 
2006; Gadermann, Guhn, & Zumbo, 2011), but these studies yielded little or no 
information related to wording/keying effects. Certainly, scale developers use qualitative 
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approaches to explore response processes as they relate to the functioning of items; 
however, it may be the case that such data do not make their way into publications. Thus 
there is a need for formal qualitative research on the topic of wording/keying effects.     
Study 1 Research Questions 
 The purpose of Study 1 is to investigate the psychometric consequences of using 
negatively-worded and/or negatively-keyed items on attitude scales. Most prior studies 
have neglected to distinguish between wording and keying, leaving critical measurement 
questions unanswered. Is the oft-reported differential functioning of positive and negative 
items related to wording direction, keying direction, or both? Specific research questions 
are as follows:  
• RQ#1: Do balanced scales exhibit the same psychometric properties as scales 
where all items are keyed and worded in the same direction? Based on the 
existing literature, it is expected that balanced scales will exhibit weaker 
psychometric properties than non-balanced scales.  
• RQ#2: Are there differences in the psychometric properties of balanced scales 
that reverse items through the use of negative wording and keying and balanced 
scales that do not? This question is important because it begins to address the 
issue of whether statements such as “I feel calm,” “I do not feel calm,” and “I do 
not feel anxious” elicit comparable responses from respondents. Based on the 
existing literature related to balanced scales and the cognitive/linguistic 
processing of grammatically negative statements, it is expected that balanced 
scales using negative wording and keying will exhibit weaker psychometric 
properties than balanced scales that use only one of those strategies.   
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• RQ#3: Are there differences in the psychometric properties of scales that are 
balanced in terms of keying and scales that are balanced in terms of wording? 
Again, this question addresses the issue of wording versus keying. Do statements 
such as “I feel calm” and “I do not feel calm” elicit comparable responses? Given 
the existing literature related to the cognitive/linguistic processing of 
grammatically negative statements, it is expected that scales balanced in terms of 
wording (but not keying) will exhibit weaker psychometric properties than scales 
balanced in terms of keying (but not wording).    
• RQ#4: To what extent are method effects associated with negative keying 
apparent across instruments? This question can be answered for participants 
completing balanced versions of multiple attitude surveys. Responses to the two 
measures administered in this study will be modeled simultaneously (for a certain 
subsample) in order to estimate the correlation between negative-keying method 
factors across instruments. Specifically, the ODCS and SEE-R will be included in 
a single confirmatory factor analytic model: The ODCS responses will be 
represented by one substantive factor and one method factor based on negative 
keying; the SEE-R responses will be represented by four correlated substantive 
factors and one negative-keying method factor; and the two method factors will 
be allowed to correlate. This approach has previously been used to estimate the 
across-instrument effects of negative wording (e.g., DiStefano & Motl, 2006), but 
not of negative keying. Based on prior linguistic studies demonstrating the relative 
difficulty of processing grammatically negative constructions (e.g., Sherman, 
1973, 1976; Wason, 1959, 1961), it seems likely that negative wording poses 
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more of a challenge to respondents than does negative keying. Thus it is expected 
that the association of  keying-based method effects across instruments will be 
weaker than that reported by DiStefano and Motl (2006) for wording-based 
method effects (.37).  
Questions involving psychometric properties (research questions 1-3) will be addressed 
for each of two attitude scales through analyses of dimensionality (i.e., how many factors 
are supported in CFA analyses) and reliability (i.e., internal consistency) across four 
wording/keying conditions. Based on the results of previous studies, it is hypothesized 
that the various balanced configurations (where keying and/or wording are systematically 
varied) will yield different CFA solutions (i.e., with method factors) and lower reliability 
estimates than will the non-balanced configurations.  
Study 2 Research Question  
Why do measurement items with negative wording and/or keying elicit 
differential response patterns than items that are positively worded/keyed? Given the 
number of posited explanations for the differential functioning of negative and positive 
items, it would be naïve to argue for a single explanatory mechanism. However, it seems 
likely that response processes constitute a contributing factor. Thus the response 
processes involved in completing balanced attitude scales will be explored using a think-
aloud protocol with college students. Based on the results of previous (quantitative) 
cognitive/psycholinguistic studies, it is hypothesized that participants will report that the 
process of responding to reversed/negated items is somehow different than the process of 
responding to affirmative items. Regarding other posited explanations for the differential 
functioning between positive and negative items, it seems possible that the qualitative 
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study may yield evidence related to careless responding, style/personality factors, 
substantive differences between negative and affirmative items, and/or individual 
differences in cognitive/reading skills (particularly given the selection criteria described 
in the following section). It seems less likely that participant responses will provide 
insight into such proposed phenomena as method variance and item extremity. However, 
one of the benefits of qualitative research is that themes are permitted to emerge 
organically, regardless of a priori expectations (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 207).    
 
 
 
 
III. Study 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants were incoming freshmen at a mid-sized university who 
took part in mandatory, low-stakes, university-wide assessment activities in August of 
2012. The measures pertinent to this study were administered to a total of 2,113 students. 
Test forms were spiraled throughout testing rooms to ensure randomly representative 
subsamples of comparable size. Demographic characteristics for each subsample (based 
on four test conditions that will be described in detail) are presented in Table 1 below. 
Materials. Two attitude measures were selected for use in the study: the 8-item 
Openness to Diversity/Challenge Scale (ODCS; Pascarella, Bohr, Nora, Ranganathan,  
Desler, & Bulakowski, 1994; Pascarella, Edison, Nora, Hagedorn, & Terenzini, 1996) 
and a revised, 19-item version of Wang et al.’s (2003) Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy 
(SEE-R; Gerstner, 2012). The ODCS, which has previously been shown to have a one-
factor structure and adequate reliability (.83) with college students, measures “…an 
orientation toward enjoyment from being intellectually challenged by different ideas, 
values, and perspectives as well as an appreciation of racial, cultural, and value diversity” 
(Pascarella et al., 1996, p. 179). All eight ODCS items are positively keyed/worded.  
The SEE, developed using a PCA approach, was designed to measure 
“…empathy toward people of racial and ethnic backgrounds different from one’s own” 
(Wang et al., 2003, p. 221). The SEE-R, modified by Gerstner (2012) using a CFA 
approach, includes 19 of the original 31 items and has been shown to have four related 
substantive factors (Acceptance of Cultural Differences; Empathic Perspective Taking; 
Empathic Awareness; and Empathic Feeling and Expression) as well as a method factor
 
 
 
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics by Subsample 
 
Subsample / 
Test Condition 
 
n 
Mean 
Age 
% 
Female 
% by Racial Identity Categorya 
White Asian Black Hispanic Amer. 
Indian 
Pacific 
Islander 
Not 
Specified 
1. SEE-R-1 / ODCS-2 540 18.4 60.6 88.7 7.0 3.9 5.4 1.3 0.9 2.6 
2. SEE-R-2 / ODCS-3 532 18.4 63.9 88.4 4.5 4.7 4.3 2.3 0.6 2.8 
3. SEE-R-3 / ODCS-4 527 18.5 64.9 86.3 5.1 7.4 5.1 1.3 0.6 1.9 
4. SEE-R-4 / ODCS-1 514 18.4 59.1 87.7 4.5 5.6 4.7 1.8 1.2 3.1 
Note.  N = 2,113. In the SEE-R-1 and ODCS-1, all items were positively worded and keyed; in the SEE-R-2 and ODCS-2,  
half of the items were negatively worded and keyed; in the SEE-R-3 and ODCS-3, half of the items were positively worded  
and negatively keyed; in the SEE-R-4 and ODCS-4, all items were negatively keyed and half were negatively worded.   
aSum of percentages by subsample may exceed 100 because respondents could identify themselves as belonging to more than  
one category.  
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associated with negative keying (eight items). The ODCS and SEE-R were chosen for 
this study partly because they differ in length and factor structure, and it was of interest to 
explore keying/wording effects across such conditions.   
For both the ODCS and the SEE-R, four adaptations were created based on the 
following wording/keying conditions:  
 (1) all positive wording/keying (e.g., “I am happy”);  
 (2) half positive wording/keying (e.g., “I am happy”) and half negative wording/  
 keying (e.g., “I am not happy”);  
 (3) half positive wording/keying (e.g., “I am happy”) and half positive  
 wording/negative keying (e.g., “I am sad”);  
 (4) half positive wording/negative keying (e.g., “I am sad”) and half negative  
 wording/keying (e.g., “I am not happy”). This condition was balanced in terms of  
 wording rather than keying.  
The “balanced” versions of the ODCS (conditions 2, 3, and 4 above) were created by 
modifying four of the eight items (1, 4, 6, and 8) and, in condition 4, the other four items 
as well; the placement of two items (5 and 6) was reversed to establish a near-alternating 
(positive/negative) order so that potential confounds between item keying and item order 
would be reduced.  
Because the SEE-R contains an odd number of items (19), balanced versions were 
created using a 10-9 split (in favor of positive items). The original sequence of the items 
was retained, yielding a near-alternating order for the balanced conditions; the wording of 
the same nine items (1, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, 17, 18, and 19) was altered across all conditions, 
and for condition 4 the wording of the remaining items was altered as well. The four 
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administered versions of the ODCS and the SEE-R can be found in Appendix A and 
Appendix B, respectively. All measures were modified to include the same 7-point 
response scale (Strongly Disagree; Disagree; Slightly Disagree; Neither Agree nor 
Disagree; Agree; Slightly Agree; Strongly Agree). The justification for this approach was 
twofold. First, it was desirable to put all measures on the same response scale. Second, it 
has been suggested that while categorical data cannot be normally distributed, ordinal 
scales with at least 6-7 response points may elicit data that function as coarsely 
continuous (Bollen, 1989; Finney & DiStefano, 2006; Rhemtulla, Brosseau-Liard, & 
Savalei, 2012).  
Procedure. Students were randomly assigned to assessment rooms based on the 
last two digits of their student ID numbers. The number of seats in the rooms ranged from 
approximately 50 to 300. In each room, students were asked to complete two to three 
hours’ worth of cognitive and attitude measures, which were partitioned into four or five 
separate “tests.” Upon arrival, proctors oriented students to the assessment activities and 
obtained informed consent. The tests were then administered in a predetermined sequence 
by experienced proctors who read standardized instructions, maintained a quiet testing 
environment, and observed specified time limits. Participants completed only one version 
of the ODCS and one version of the SEE-R.  
The ODCS and SEE-R were administered in several of the larger assessment 
rooms as part of a longer test (SDA7) that included a total of five measures. The first 
measure was a 29-item multiple-choice test of student knowledge about social science 
research methods, and the remaining four were Likert-based attitude scales containing 
fewer than 20 items each. The total time allotted for completion of the SDA7 was 40 
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minutes; general SDA7 instructions were read aloud, but the brief instructions 
introducing each measure within the SDA7 were not. In order to ensure a balanced 
design, the versions of the SEE-R and the ODCS were combined such that no participant 
received the same version (e.g., all-positive) of both scales. The specific combinations 
were as follows: SEE-R-1 with ODCS-2; SEE-R-2 with ODCS-3; SEE-R-3 with ODCS-
4; and SEE-R-4 with ODCS-1. In addition, to control for possible fatigue effects, 
placement of the measures within the SDA7 was varied so that the SEE-R and ODCS 
appeared sometimes in the second and third positions and sometimes in the fourth and 
fifth positions. The SEE-R, the longer of the two measures, always preceded the ODCS. 
An order-balanced presentation of the two scales within each condition might have been 
preferable from a design standpoint but would have necessitated doubling the number of 
different forms to 16, which would have exceeded constraints imposed by the larger 
(assessment-driven) data collection plan. The adopted configurations yielded eight 
versions of the SDA7 (labeled A through H) that were spiraled throughout all testing 
rooms in order to ensure randomly representative subsamples and mitigate possible 
room-specific administration effects. Each test condition (e.g., Condition 1: SEE-R-1 
with ODCS-2) was implemented in two SDA7 versions (e.g., A and E); once 
comparability of subsamples on demographic variables was established, data were 
aggregated by test condition. On all versions of the SDA7, the first question asked 
students to indicate which form they had received. Item responses were recorded on 
scantron forms that were collected at the end of the testing session. Additional variables 
(e.g., gender and ethnicity) were obtained from the university database.  
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Analyses. Data were screened using SAS 9.2 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC); CFA 
models were estimated using Mplus 7 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). For each of the four 
versions of both the ODCS and the SEE-R, a parallel series of models was estimated in 
order to address research questions 1-3. The ODCS models were as follows:  
• ODCS Model 1: a one-factor model in which all eight items load on a single, 
substantive factor (Openness to Diversity/Challenge). This model assessed the 
unidimensionality of each scale version.  
• ODCS Model 2: a two-factor model with the (correlated) factors defined by item 
keying/wording (the four positive/affirmative items loading on one factor, and the 
four negative/reversed items loading on the other). This model assessed the extent 
to which balanced versions of the scale yielded two substantively distinct factors.  
• ODCS Model 3: a model with one trait factor (Openness to Diversity/Challenge) 
and one method factor defined by positive keying/wording. This model assessed 
the extent to which positively-keyed/worded items shared systematic variance 
above and beyond estimated construct-relevant variance.  
• ODCS Model 4: a correlated uniquenesses (CU) model positing a single 
substantive factor and allowing correlated error terms for items with positive 
keying/wording. This model assessed the extent to which positively-
keyed/worded items shared systematic variance above and beyond estimated 
construct-relevant variance.  
• ODCS Model 5: a model with one trait factor (Openness to Diversity/Challenge) 
and one method factor defined by negative keying/wording. This model assessed 
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the extent to which negatively-keyed/worded items shared systematic variance 
above and beyond estimated construct-relevant variance.  
• ODCS Model 6: a correlated uniquenesses (CU) model positing a single 
substantive factor (Openness to Diversity/Challenge) and allowing correlated 
error terms for items with negative keying/wording. This model assessed the 
extent to which negatively-keyed/worded items shared systematic variance above 
and beyond estimated construct-relevant variance.  
These six models are depicted graphically in Figure 1 (below).  
As noted earlier, a parallel set of models was estimated for the SEE-R versions. 
However, the SEE-R models differed from the ODCS models due to the more complex 
structure of the SEE-R (four subscales):  
• SEE-R Model 1: a four-factor model in which each of the 19 items loads on one 
of four substantive (subscale) factors (Acceptance of Cultural Differences; 
Empathic Perspective Taking; Empathic Awareness; Empathic Feeling and 
Expression). This model assessed the extent to which data fit the “intended” (i.e., 
subscale-unidimensional) SEE-R structure. No cross-loadings were permitted.  
• SEE-R Model 2: a two-factor model with the (correlated) factors defined by item 
keying/wording (the ten positive/affirmative items loading on one factor, and the 
nine negative/reversed items loading on the other). This model, which ignored 
subscale designations, assessed the extent to which balanced versions of the scale 
yielded two distinct factors defined solely by keying/wording direction. It was not 
possible to assess this at the subscale level (i.e., by modeling a positive and a 
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negative factor within each subscale) because one SEE-R subscale consists of 
only positive items and another consists of only negative items. 
• SEE-R Model 3: a correlated traits, correlated methods (CTCM) model with four 
correlated trait factors (one for each subscale) and one method factor defined by 
positive keying/wording. This model assessed the extent to which positively- 
keyed/worded items shared systematic variance above and beyond estimated 
construct-relevant variance.  
• SEE-R Model 4: a correlated traits, correlated uniquenesses (CTCU) model 
positing four substantive factors (one for each subscale) and allowing correlated 
error terms for items with positive keying/wording. This model assessed the 
extent to which positively-keyed/worded items shared systematic variance above 
and beyond estimated construct-relevant variance.  
• SEE-R Model 5: a correlated traits, correlated methods (CTCM) model with four 
correlated trait factors (one for each subscale) and one method factor defined by 
negative keying/wording. This model assessed the extent to which negatively- 
keyed/worded items shared systematic, non-subscale-driven variance.  
• SEE-R Model 6: a correlated traits, correlated uniquenesses (CTCU) model 
positing four correlated substantive factors (one for each subscale) and allowing 
correlated error terms for items with negative keying/wording. This model 
assessed the extent to which negatively-keyed/worded items shared systematic 
variance above and beyond estimated construct-relevant variance.  
SEE-R Models 1 and 5 are depicted graphically in Figures 2 and 3 (below). To save 
space, the remaining SEE-R models are not depicted.  
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 Model 1       Model 2 
    
 Model 3       Model 4 
      
 Model 5       Model 6  
Figure 1. ODCS Models: Model 1 = one factor; Model 2 = two factors (Positive and 
Negative); Model 3 = one trait factor (ODC) and one method factor (Positive);  
Model 4 = one trait factor (ODC) and correlated uniquenesses (CU) among positive 
items; Model 5 = one trait factor (ODC) and one method factor (Negative); Model 6 = 
one trait factor (ODC) and correlated uniquenesses (CU) among negative items. For 
simplicity of presentation, error variances are not depicted. For all models, factor scaling 
was accomplished by setting the variance of the factors to a value of 1.0.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. SEE-R Model 1 = four (correlated) substantive factors (ACD, EPT, EA, and EFE). For simplicity of presentation, error 
variances are not depicted. Factor scaling was accomplished by setting the variance of the factors to a value of 1.0. 
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Figure 3. SEE-R Model 5 = four (correlated) substantive factors and one method factor (Negative). For simplicity of presentation, 
error variances are not depicted. Factor scaling was accomplished by setting the variance of the factors to a value of 1.0.   
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Figure 4. Combined ODCS/SEE-R Model 7B = five substantive factors plus two correlated method factors (Negative Keying). For 
simplicity of presentation, error variances are not depicted. Factor scaling was accomplished by setting the variance of the factors to a 
value of 1.0. 
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Model fit was assessed through examination of several global fit indices including 
the chi-square statistic (χ2), the robust root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), and the robust 
comparative fit index (CFI). Because the assumption of multivariate normality was 
violated for all subsamples (details can be found in the Results section), a robust scaling 
method—maximum likelihood with robust standard errors (MLR; Muthén & Muthén, 
2012) was used. The following researcher-recommended values were used as indicators 
of adequate model fit for the robust fit indices: RMSEA values of .08 or less (Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993), SRMR values of .08 or less (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and CFI values of .95 
or greater (Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
Regarding reliability, a version of coefficient omega was calculated for every 
ODCS model (most of which included a single substantive factor) and every SEE-R 
model (most of which included four substantive factors). Based on approaches 
recommended or used in Green and Yang (2009), Johnston and Finney (2010), Raykov 
and Shrout (2002), and Yang and Green (2011), one of three equations was used in each 
calculation. For models in which no method factor was hypothesized (i.e., Models 1, 2, 4, 
and 6), the following equation was used to calculate coefficient omega for each subscale:  
   
( )
( )
2
2
i
i i
b
b e+
∑
∑ ∑
     (1) 
where bi represents the unstandardized pattern coefficient and ei represents the 
unstandardized error variance of the items loading on the substantive factor (McDonald, 
1999).  
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For Models 3 and 5, in which a method factor was hypothesized, the following 
equation was used to calculate coefficient omega for each subscale: 
( )
( ) ( )
2
22
i
i i j
b
b e b+ +
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
      (2) 
where bi represents the unstandardized pattern coefficient, ei represents the 
unstandardized error variance of the items loading on the substantive factor, and bj 
represents the unstandardized pattern coefficient reflecting the relationship between the 
“reversed” item on the subscale and the negative wording/keying method factor (Bentler, 
2009). The advantage of this approach is that it takes into account (in the denominator) 
the systematic variance associated with the method effect.  
 A similar equation was used to calculate reliability for Models 4 and 6, in which 
correlated error terms were allowed:  
( )
( ) ( )
2
2
2 ( )
i
i i i k
b
b e Cov e e+ +
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
     (3) 
where bi represents the unstandardized pattern coefficient, ei represents the 
unstandardized error variance of the items loading on the substantive factor, and Cov(eiek) 
represents the unstandardized covariance associated with correlated error terms (Raykov 
& Shrout, 2002; Yang & Green, 2011). Once again, the advantage of this approach is that 
it takes into account (in the denominator) the systematic variance associated with shared 
variance presumed to be related to wording/keying. 
Regarding research question 4, some participants were administered balanced 
versions of both the ODCS and the SEE-R. Using data from a subset of these 
participants, both measures were modeled simultaneously in a CTCM configuration to 
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estimate the correlation between keying-based method factors across the two instruments. 
The baseline structure of those “combined” models is depicted in Figure 4 (above). Two 
versions of the combined model were estimated: one in which substantive factors were 
permitted to covary across instruments (Model 7A), and one in which they were not 
(Model 7B, shown in Figure 4). Given the similarity of the SEE-R and ODCS target 
constructs (ethnocultural empathy and openness to diversity/challenge), it was anticipated 
that the former model would fit the data significantly better. 
The specific instrument combination involved in the combined models was the 
SEE-R-2 and the ODCS-3. The SEE-R-2 method factor was associated with negatively-
keyed and -worded items, while the ODCS-3 method factor was associated with items 
that were negatively keyed but positively worded. Thus the method factor correlation in 
both models (7A and 7B) represented the association of negative keying effects across the 
two instruments. Because linguistic studies have repeatedly demonstrated the relative 
difficulty of processing/comprehending negatively-worded statements (e.g., Sherman, 
1973, 1976; Wason, 1959, 1961), it seemed likely that negative wording would be a more 
salient factor than negative keying in method effects. It was therefore expected that the 
association of negative keying effects across the SEE-R and ODCS would be relatively 
weak (i.e., less than the .37 reported by DiStefano and Motl [2006] for the association of 
negative wording effects across personality measures).  
  
 
78 
 
Results 
  Item-Level Descriptive Statistics. Descriptive statistics for items from all 
versions of the ODCS and SEE-R (based on all available data) are presented below in 
Tables 2 and 3; correlation matrices can be found in Appendix F. Regarding normality, 
skewness and kurtosis values were within normal limits (absolute values less than 2 and 
7, respectively). However, as noted earlier, data were multivariate nonnormal for all 
subsamples. Mardia’s standardized coefficient for multivariate kurtosis was well above 
the recommended cutoff of 3 in each condition: ODCS-1, 39.91; ODCS-2, 22.51; ODCS-
3, 29.45; ODCS-4, 29.60; SEE-R-1, 51.57; SEE-R-2, 43.14; SEE-R-3, 44.06; SEE-R-4, 
38.69. Thus the Mplus MLR estimator, which is appropriate for datasets that are 
nonnormal and/or incomplete (missingness was estimated at 2% or less for all 
conditions), was used for all CFA models. 
Among positively-keyed ODCS and SEE-R items, means were somewhat above 
the midpoint of the 7-point response scale (indicating a tendency toward agreement with 
those items). Among reversed items (i.e., those with negative keying), a parallel tendency 
toward disagreement was evident. For example, the mean for SEE-R item 1 was 5.38 
when it was positively keyed (condition 1). In the remaining conditions, when it was 
negatively keyed, (raw) item 1 mean values were 2.82, 3.11, and 3.12.  
 Confirmatory Factor Analyses. Six models were estimated for each ODCS and 
SEE-R scale version, even in cases where fit might be expected to be poor. For example, 
it seemed unlikely that any model specifying a method factor (i.e., Model 3 or 5) would 
outperform a substantive-only model for a scale where all items were positively keyed 
and worded. The fit of such a model (with method factor loadings to items that were  
 
 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics for ODCS Items 
Item ODCS-1 ODCS-2 ODCS-3 ODCS-4 M SD Skew Kurt. M SD Skew Kurt. M SD Skew Kurt. M SD Skew Kurt. 
1 5.56 1.18 -0.92 1.24 2.74 1.46 0.79 0.01 2.57 1.40 0.81 0.07 2.49 1.33 0.95 0.53 
2 5.33 1.28 -0.85 0.66 5.05 1.37 -0.57 -0.01 5.26 1.33 -0.78 0.67 3.05 1.41 0.39 -0.15 
3 5.50 1.14 -0.75 0.77 5.38 1.23 -0.95 1.20 5.45 1.20 -0.61 0.25 2.19 1.15 1.10 1.09 
4 5.39 1.28 -0.63 0.12 2.78 1.53 0.87 0.19 2.51 1.49 1.10 0.60 2.48 1.56 1.26 0.97 
5 5.47 1.27 -0.67 0.00 5.26 1.32 -0.57 0.02 5.25 1.40 -0.63 -0.06 3.29 1.87 0.47 -0.91 
6 4.95 1.46 -0.49 -0.31 3.26 1.48 0.29 -0.51 3.07 1.49 0.43 -0.44 2.93 1.55 0.45 -0.67 
7 5.22 1.35 -0.52 -0.14 5.07 1.44 -0.56 -0.10 5.22 1.36 -0.53 -0.05 2.74 1.50 0.81 0.05 
8 5.54 1.23 -0.94 0.85 2.58 1.38 0.77 -0.03 2.33 1.29 1.22 1.41 2.25 1.16 0.95 0.84 
Note.  Kurt. = kurtosis. Values calculated using pairwise deletion. Cases with missing data were utilized for CFA models, since full 
information maximum likelihood can utilize response patterns with missing data. In the ODCS-1 (item-level n range = 500-502), all 
items were positively worded and keyed; in the ODCS-2 (n range = 519-520), four items (1, 4, 6, and 8) were negatively worded and 
keyed; in the ODCS-3 (n range = 515-517), four items (1, 4, 6, and 8) were positively worded and negatively keyed; in the ODCS-4  
(n range = 504-507), all items were negatively keyed and four (2, 3, 5, and 7) were negatively worded. Within the condition-specific 
sub-rows above, negative keying is indicated by italics and negative wording is indicated by boldface type.  
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Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics for SEE-R Items 
Item SEE-R-1 SEE-R-2 SEE-R-3 SEE-R-4 M SD Skew Kurt. M SD Skew Kurt. M SD Skew Kurt. M SD Skew Kurt. 
1 5.38 1.54 -0.88 -0.02 2.82 1.76 0.74 -0.54 3.11 1.70 0.42 -0.97 3.12 1.64 0.37 -0.99 
2 5.27 1.43 -0.88 0.50 5.12 1.45 -0.95 0.80 5.15 1.37 -0.74 0.42 2.33 1.36 1.22 1.23 
3 3.19 2.18 0.58 -1.18 3.10 2.16 0.67 -1.05 3.21 2.18 0.59 -1.16 4.19 2.17 -0.19 -1.47 
4 5.38 1.42 -0.89 0.31 2.21 1.32 1.11 0.59 2.36 1.40 1.07 0.53 2.18 1.29 1.37 1.65 
5 5.15 1.49 -0.82 0.29 4.93 1.57 -0.82 0.14 4.86 1.51 -0.70 -0.04 3.22 1.71 0.47 -0.72 
6 4.67 1.66 -0.31 -0.75 2.68 1.64 0.71 -0.56 2.64 1.65 0.79 -0.47 2.67 1.58 0.78 -0.38 
7 5.52 1.27 -0.75 0.30 5.46 1.28 -0.71 0.33 5.33 1.32 -0.69 0.37 2.08 1.12 1.10 1.10 
8 5.34 1.32 -0.78 0.47 2.19 1.30 1.25 1.46 2.55 1.32 0.61 -0.22 2.30 1.29 1.24 1.61 
9 5.34 1.29 -0.77 0.71 5.25 1.28 -0.48 -0.01 5.10 1.33 -0.73 0.49 1.95 1.03 1.31 2.03 
10 5.80 1.32 -1.53 2.59 5.78 1.32 -1.60 2.94 5.75 1.33 -1.50 2.47 1.85 1.12 1.80 3.62 
11 4.74 1.61 -0.44 -0.46 2.47 1.53 0.89 -0.03 2.61 1.61 0.75 -0.40 2.40 1.44 1.03 0.52 
12 3.86 1.64 0.16 -0.71 3.88 1.74 0.17 -0.88 3.71 1.71 0.24 -0.80 3.67 1.73 0.01 -1.01 
13 4.71 1.45 -0.56 0.16 4.73 1.48 -0.56 -0.12 4.69 1.43 -0.63 0.19 2.91 1.65 0.72 -0.38 
14 5.40 1.53 -0.94 0.41 2.58 1.42 0.84 0.17 2.31 1.37 1.01 0.54 2.18 1.33 1.26 1.16 
15 5.73 1.15 -1.20 2.13 5.66 1.10 -0.96 1.30 5.47 1.21 -1.18 2.04 2.80 1.46 0.81 0.23 
16 5.53 1.14 -0.90 1.31 5.47 1.17 -1.08 1.73 5.37 1.21 -0.95 1.04 2.74 1.41 0.80 0.34 
17 4.60 1.50 -0.43 -0.38 3.35 1.52 0.23 -0.59 3.82 1.57 -0.06 -0.73 3.56 1.64 0.04 -1.06 
18 5.20 1.42 -0.66 -0.06 2.89 1.61 0.53 -0.72 3.18 1.66 0.30 -0.98 2.88 1.66 0.70 -0.45 
19 3.55 1.71 0.24 -0.75 3.90 1.69 -0.09 -0.84 3.98 1.66 -0.16 -0.84 3.89 1.74 -0.17 -0.99 
Note.  Kurt. = kurtosis. Values calculated using pairwise deletion. Cases with missing data were utilized for CFA models, since full 
information maximum likelihood can utilize response patterns with missing data. In the SEE-R-1 (item-level n range = 537-540), all 
items were positively worded and keyed; in the SEE-R-2 (n range = 525-532), nine items (1, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, 17, 18, and 19) were 
negatively worded and keyed; in the SEE-R-3 (n range = 520-524), nine items (1, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, 17, 18, and 19) were positively 
worded and negatively keyed; in the SEE-R-4 (n range = 504-512), all items were negatively keyed and ten (2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 
15 and 16) were negatively worded.  Within the condition-specific sub-rows above, negative keying is indicated by italics and 
negative wording is indicated by boldface type. 
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reversed in other adaptations of the scale) would, however, inform the interpretation of 
results for the same model estimated on data from balanced versions of the scale. 
Imagine, for instance, that a model positing a method effect were to adequately fit data 
from both an all-positive wording/keying condition and a balanced version of the same 
scale. That pattern of results would suggest that the “method” variance might actually be 
substantive, or at least attributable to something other than wording/keying. In short, all 
models were estimated in order to safeguard against overinterpretation of method factors.  
Estimation problems were expected—and encountered—for certain model-data 
combinations (see above paragraph). In these situations, models were re-estimated with 
maximized iterations and (when provided) Mplus-suggested start values. These 
strategies, which never resulted in convergence, were followed by a review of item 
content and statistical results (e.g., correlations and standardized residuals); in cases 
where a minor modification (e.g., the elimination of one correlated residual) was deemed 
justifiable, it was made in an effort to obtain convergence. Occasionally, minor 
modifications were successful. When they were not, statistical results for the models in 
question were not reported. This conservative approach was adopted because the focus of 
the study was not on validation or revision of the administered scales. Rather, the goal 
was to examine the psychometric consequences of certain keying/wording conditions on 
the models that might typically be used to assess their validity/reliability. Thus it was 
important to retain comparability of models across scales and scale versions as much as 
possible.  
In the following paragraphs, CFA results will be delineated by instrument and 
scale version. For each data condition (e.g., ODCS-2), the relative fit of the competing 
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model(s) will be discussed along with reliability estimates. Tables 4 and 5 (below) 
include fit statistics and reliability estimates for all ODCS and SEE-R models, 
respectively. Table 6 includes fit statistics for the combined SEE-R/ODCS models. 
Parameter estimates for selected models can be found in Appendix G. 
 ODCS-1 Models. The ODCS-1 was identical to the published version of the 
ODCS except that the order of items 5 and 6 had been switched. Because all items were 
positively worded and keyed, it was expected that Model 1 (SUB; positing a single 
substantive factor and no correlated errors or method factor) would fit the observed data. 
However, it did not—although all factor loadings were statistically significant and in the 
expected direction. In fact, Table 4 shows that none of the ODCS-1 models exhibited 
acceptable fit (e.g., RMSEA > .10). Model 5 (METH-) yielded similarly poor fit statistics 
to those for Model 1, whereas the CU models (4 and 6) did slightly better in terms of 
most indices. Models 2 (POS/NEG) and 3 (METH+) did not converge. Reliability 
estimates for all converging models ranged from .86 to .88 and were slightly higher than 
the coefficient alpha values (.83-.84) reported by Pascarella et al. (1996) for their one-
factor model.  
A review of standardized residuals for ODCS-1 Model 1 indicated that several 
pairs of items shared significant variance beyond that accounted for by the substantive 
factor. Most of these item pairs were similar in terms of semantic and/or lexical content 
(e.g., #6. I enjoy taking courses that challenge my beliefs and values.; and #8. I enjoy 
courses that are intellectually challenging.). In short, the ODCS-1 results—particularly  
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Table 4  
Fit Indices and Reliability Estimates for ODCS Models  
Model MLR χ2 df SRMR RMSEA CFI Coefficient Omegaa 
ODCS-1, N = 502 (all positive wording/keying) 
 
 
1: SUB 151.71* 20 .055 .115 .879 .88 
2: POS/NEGb -- -- -- -- -- -- 
3: METH+b -- -- -- -- -- -- 
4: CU+ 113.88* 14 .047 .119 .908 .86 
5: METH- 149.62* 16 .051 .129 .877 .86 
6: CU- 123.95* 14 .049 .125 .899 .86 
ODCS-2, N = 523 (half positive wording/keying, half negative wording/keying) 
 
1: SUB 86.38* 20 .050 .080 .898 .79 
2: POS/NEG 58.48* 19 .040 .063 .939 .75 / .65 
3: METH+ 44.57* 16 .036 .058 .956 .72 
4: CU+ 41.54* 14 .035 .061 .958 .72 
5: METH- 44.30* 16 .034 .058 .956 .73 
6: CU- 39.90* 14 .032 .059 .960 .72 
ODCS-3, N = 519 (half positive wording/keying, half positive wording/negative keying) 
 
1: SUB 108.48* 20 .056 .092 .858 .78 
2: POS/NEG 95.01* 19 .052 .088 .878 .76 / .61 
3: METH+ c 143.46* 16 .051 .124 .795 .72 
4: CU+ 83.26* 14 .049 .098 .889 .70 
5: METH- 72.04* 16 .040 .082 .910 .74 
6: CU- 56.33* 14 .037 .076 .932 .73 
ODCS-4, N = 508 (half positive wording/negative keying, half negative wording/keying) 
 
1: SUB 30.92 20 .029 .033 .978 .77 
2: POS/NEG 30.88* 19 .029 .035 .977 .63 / .64 
3: METH+d 21.50 17 .025 .023 .991 .76 
4: CU+ 22.72 14 .024 .035 .983 .75 
5: METH-e 28.07* 17 .028 .036 .978 .76 
6: CU- 26.21* 14 .027 .041 .976 .75 
Note. MLR χ2 = scaled maximum-likelihood chi-square; SRMR = standardized root mean square 
residual;  RMSEA = scaled root mean square error of approximation; CFI = scaled confirmatory 
fit index. For all scale versions, Model 1 included a single substantive factor; Model 2 included 
“positive” and “negative” substantive factors (thus the two reliability estimates); Model 3 
included a substantive factor and a “positive” method factor; Model 4 was the CU equivalent of 
Model 3; Model 5 included a substantive factor and a “negative” method factor; Model 6 was the 
CU equivalent of Model 5.  aFor models with a method factor, estimates of omega were based on 
inclusion of the variance explained by the hypothesized method factor in the total variance. For 
CU models, omega estimates were based on inclusion of the covariance of correlated error terms 
in the total variance. bModel did not converge.  c In Mplus, the MLR scaling correction factor 
makes it possible for a complex model to yield a higher χ2 than a simpler (nested) model.     
dAfter initial convergence problems, the path from the method factor to item 4 was removed.  
eAfter initial convergence problems, the path from the method factor to item 3 was removed.   
* p<.05. 
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those for Model 1—suggest that the instrument lacks unidimensionality. This finding 
may not come as a complete surprise, given that 8-item ODCS was designed to measure 
openness to both diversity (e.g., people from different cultures) and challenge (e.g., 
courses that provide intellectual challenges).  
 ODCS-2 Models. Half of the ODCS-2 items were positively worded and keyed (2, 
3, 5, and 7), while the remaining half were negatively worded and keyed (1, 4, 6, and 8). 
Thus it was expected that the fit statistics for Model 1 (SUB) would be worse than those 
for the other models. Such was the case, as all models exhibited adequate fit other than 
Model 1 (see Table 4). The best fit statistics were obtained with Models 3 through 6 
(positing method effects among positive or negative items), which yielded good fit but 
weaker reliability estimates (.72-.73) than did the parallel ODCS-1 (all-positive 
wording/keying) models (.86). For Models 2 through 6, all factor loadings were 
statistically significant and in the expected direction. For Model 6 (CU-), two of the six 
error covariances did not reach statistical significance. Both involved item 4 (Learning 
about people from different cultures is not an important part of my education.). Based on 
all diagnostic information, the best-fitting models appeared to be those with method 
factors (3 and 5), which were close variants of one another. As noted above, the unique 
variance shared by certain item pairs (e.g., 6 and 8) likely reflected more than “method 
effects” associated with negative wording/keying.  
ODCS-3 Models. Four of the ODCS-3 items were positively worded and keyed 
(2, 3, 5, and 7), while the remaining four were positively worded and negatively keyed 
(e.g., #8. I try to avoid courses that are intellectually challenging.). Said differently, the 
wording was consistent throughout the instrument but the keying was balanced. Thus it 
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was expected that the fit statistics for Model 1, which posited no keying effects, would be 
worse than those for the other models. In fact, the worst fit was obtained with Model 3 
(METH+); Models 1 (SUB), 2 (POS/NEG), and 4 (CU+) did slightly better by most 
statistical criteria but did not fit the data adequately; and Models 5 and 6 (positing 
method effects among negatively-keyed items) did best, exhibiting marginally acceptable 
fit. The factor loadings for Model 5 (METH-) were all statistically significant and in the 
expected direction. For Model 6 (CU-), as was the case with the parallel model in the 
ODCS-2 condition, two of the error covariances involving item 4 did not reach statistical 
significance. Thus Model 5 seemed to provide the best fit to the observed data. Reliability 
estimates for all models were similar to those observed for the ODCS-2 dataset.  
RMSEA estimates were systematically higher across all ODCS-3 models (.076-
.124) than the corresponding values for models in the other balanced conditions (ODCS-2 
and ODCS-4). It is worth noting that the RMSEA is believed to reflect only model 
misspecification and not error due to sampling or other causes (Browne & Cudeck, 
1992). The nature of the misspecification observed for the ODCS-3 models was likely 
related to the manner in which item reversals were accomplished. Rather than the 
simple/direct use of sentence-level negation (e.g., I do not enjoy courses that are 
intellectually challenging.), this condition called for more elaborate alterations (e.g., I try 
to avoid courses that are intellectually challenging.) that varied from item to item and 
may have made the reversed items less cohesive as a group and less distinct from the 
positively-keyed items.  
ODCS-4 Models. In this condition, all items were negatively keyed; half were 
positively worded (1, 4, 6, and 8), while the remainder were negatively worded (e.g.,    
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#2. The real value of a college education does not lie in being introduced to different 
values.). Given that balance, it was again expected that the fit indices for Model 1 (SUB) 
would be worse than those for the other models. However, as can be seen in Table 4, all 
six models exhibited good overall fit (e.g., SRMR < .03; RMSEA ≤ .04; CFI > .97). The 
best fit statistics were obtained with Models 3 and 4 (positing method effects associated 
with negative wording), and reliability estimates for all METH and CU models were 
slightly higher (.75-.76) than parallel estimates based on the other balanced scale versions 
(but still lower than the .86 estimated for those models based on the all-positive 
wording/keying condition). It should be noted that there were initial estimation problems 
with the method-factor models, each of which converged to an admissible solution after 
removal of one nonsignificant path from the method factor (to item 4 in Model 3, and to 
item 3 in Model 5).  
In addition to exhibiting good global fit, all six ODCS-4 models yielded 
substantive factor loadings that were statistically significant and in the expected direction. 
However, examination of Models 3-6 revealed several nonsignificant method factor 
loadings (for the METH models) and error covariances (for the CU models). Given that 
the Model 2 correlation between hypothesized POS and NEG factors was extremely high 
(.96), it would be difficult to endorse any model as being superior to Model 1, which was 
characterized by good global fit and the most parsimonious configuration. As anticipated 
based on the literature, coefficient omega for this model was lower (.77) than for the 
parallel model in the all-positive condition (.88), even though ODCS-1 Model 1 exhibited 
poor fit.  
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SEE-R-1 Models. In this adapted version of the instrument, all 19 items were 
positively worded and keyed. Thus it was expected that Model 1 (SUB; positing four 
substantive factors and no correlated errors or method factor) would fit the observed data. 
As can be seen in Table 5 (below), Model 1 exhibited marginally adequate global fit. In 
addition, all factor loadings were significant and in the expected direction. Model 2 
(POS/NEG) exhibited poor fit, while the CTCU models (4 and 6)—each of which 
included dozens of correlated error terms—did not converge (in fact, this occurred for 
both CTCU models under all SEE-R conditions). The fit statistics for the CTCM models 
(3 and 5) were similar to those for Model 1. However, very few of the method factor 
loadings were statistically significant, and a few were slightly negative. Thus Model 1 
appeared to provide the best fit to the data from the all-positive SEE-R condition. 
Coefficient omega values for that model, by subscale, were as follows: ACD = .77;  
EPT = .78; EA = .75; EFE = .84. The correlation between the ACD and EFE factors was 
more substantial (.83) than those among other factors (.39-.65).  
SEE-R-2 Models. Ten of the SEE-R-2 items were positively worded and keyed (2, 
3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, and 16), while the remaining nine items were negatively worded 
and keyed (e.g., #17. I am not able to put myself in the shoes of someone who is racially 
and/or ethnically different from me.). Thus it was expected that the fit statistics for Model 
1 (which accounted for no wording/keying effects) and Model 2 (which ignored subscale 
designations and was based solely on wording/keying direction) would be worse than 
those for other models. Excluding the CTCU models, which again did not converge, such 
was the case. As Table 5 shows, Model 2 exhibited poor fit; Model 1 yielded marginally 
acceptable fit; and the best fit statistics were obtained with the CTCM models.  
 
88 
 
Table 5  
Fit Indices and Reliability Estimates for SEE-R Models  
Model MLR χ2 df SRMR RMSEA CFI Coefficient Omegaa 
SEE-R-1, N = 540 (all positive wording/keying) 
 
 
1: SUB 361.16* 146 .049 .052 .923 .77 / .78 / .75 / .84 
2: POS/NEG 889.00* 151 .082 .095 .737 .79 / .83 
3: CTCM+ 346.39* 136 .045 .054 .925 .77 / .77 / .69 / .83 
4: CTCU+b -- -- -- -- -- -- 
5: CTCM- 328.62* 137 .046 .051 .932 .75 / .78 / .69 / .83 
6: CTCU-b -- -- -- -- -- -- 
SEE-R-2, N = 532 (half positive wording/keying, half negative wording/keying) 
 
1: SUB 289.36* 146 .051 .043 .920 .70 / .73 / .72 / .72 
2: POS/NEG 717.08* 151 .083 .084 .686 .73 / .75 
3: CTCM+ 243.90* 136 .047 .039 .940 .69 / .72 / .55 / .63 
4: CTCU+b -- -- -- -- -- -- 
5: CTCM- 249.35* 137 .041 .039 .938 .39 / .72 / .72 / .69 
6: CTCU-b -- -- -- -- -- -- 
SEE-R-3, N = 524 (half positive wording/keying, half positive wording/negative keying) 
 
1: SUB 326.62* 146 .055 .049 .896 .77 / .74 / .75 / .69 
2: POS/NEG 790.39* 151 .092 .090 .631 .70 / .77 
3: CTCM+ 264.79* 136 .049 .043 .926 .77 / .71 / .47 / .66 
4: CTCU+b -- -- -- -- -- -- 
5: CTCM- 230.86* 137 .044 .036 .946 .58 / .71 / .69 / .68 
6: CTCU-b -- -- -- -- -- -- 
SEE-R-4, N = 512 (half positive wording/negative keying, half negative wording/keying) 
 
1: SUB 380.77* 146 .052 .056 .911 .77 / .79 / .71 / .81 
2: POS/NEG 949.07* 151 .083 .102 .696 .83 / .76 
3: CTCM+c 318.28* 138 .045 .051 .931 .64 / .79 / .71 / .81 
4: CTCU+b -- -- -- -- -- -- 
5: CTCM- 376.98* 136 .049 .059 .908 .77 / .79 / .55 / .81 
6: CTCU-b -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Note. MLR χ2 = scaled maximum-likelihood chi-square; SRMR = standardized root mean square 
residual;  RMSEA = scaled root mean square error of approximation; CFI = scaled confirmatory 
fit index. For all scale versions, Model 1 included four substantive factors (thus the four 
reliability estimates); Model 2 included only “positive” and “negative” factors (thus the two 
reliability estimates); Model 3 included four substantive factors and a “positive” method factor; 
Model 4 was the CTCU equivalent of Model 3; Model 5 included four substantive factors and a 
“negative” method factor; Model 6 was the CTCU equivalent of Model 5.  aFor models with a 
method factor, estimates of omega were based on inclusion of the variance explained by the 
hypothesized method factor in the total variance. bModel did not converge.  cAfter initial 
convergence problems, the path from the method factor to item 18 was removed.   
* p<.05. 
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All factor loadings were statistically significant and in the expected direction for Models 
1, 3, and 5. In each model, the strongest inter-factor correlation was between ACD and 
EFE (.69, .80, and .75, respectively). Reliability estimates for the converging SEE-R-2 
models were systematically lower than estimates for the comparable models in the all-
positive wording/keying condition (e.g., Model 3: ACD = .77 [SEE-R-1]/.69 [SEE-R-2]; 
EPT = .77/.72; EA = .69/.55; EFE = .83/.63). The reader will observe that for the SEE-R-
2 CTCM model with a “negative” method factor (Model 5), coefficient omega was quite 
low for the ACD subscale (.39). This result was a function of the fact that all four ACD 
items (1, 4, 6, and 18) had (unstandardized) method factor loadings nearly as large as or 
slightly larger than their (unstandardized) substantive factor loadings. Such a pattern 
suggests that including unbalanced subscales within a larger, balanced scale may be a 
suboptimal strategy from a measurement standpoint.  
SEE-R-3 Models. In this condition, ten items were positively worded and keyed 
(2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, and 16), while the remainder were positively worded and 
negatively keyed (e.g., #17. It is difficult for me to put myself in the shoes of someone 
who is racially and/or ethnically different from me.). Put another way, item wording was 
consistently positive and item keying was balanced (10/9). Of the four adaptations of the 
SEE-R administered in this study, the SEE-R-3 was closest to the version advocated in 
Gerstner (2012). Alterations were limited to the wording of three items (8; 11; 14), which 
were modified slightly to meet the condition 3 balancing and wording configuration.  
 Given the above, it was anticipated that Model 5 (CTCM-), the model most 
similar to that endorsed in Gerstner (2012), would best fit the observed data. The fit 
statistics in Table 5 show that this was the case, as the CTCM- model yielded marginally 
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acceptable fit (e.g., SRMR = .044; RMSEA = .036; CFI = .946) and better fit statistics 
than those obtained for Model 3 (e.g., CFI = .926), Model 1 (e.g., CFI = .896), and Model 
2 (which, predictably, fit poorly). Once again, the CTCU models failed to converge. All 
factor loadings for Model 5 and Model 1 were statistically significant and in the expected 
direction; this was also true for Model 3, with one exception (the method factor loading 
for item 10 approached, but did not reach, statistical significance). Coefficient omega 
values for the best-fitting SEE-R-3 model, the CTCM- configuration, remained lower 
(ACD = .58; EPT = .71; EA = .69; EFE = .68) than those for the parallel SEE-R-1 model, 
and inter-factor correlations were also somewhat lower (range: .25-.45) than in conditions 
1 and 2. Finally, the fit statistics and reliability estimates for Model 5 (see Table 5) were 
similar to (if slightly worse than) those reported by Gerstner (2012) for her scalar 
invariance model, which was based on data collected at two time points: SRMR = .047; 
RMSEA = .027; CFI = .953; coefficient omega values (accounting for method variance) 
for time point 1: ACD = .65; EPT = .74; EA = .71;  EFE = .79.  
 SEE-R-4 Models. In this condition, all items were negatively keyed; nine were 
positively worded (1, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19), while the remainder were negatively 
worded (e.g., #16. I do not believe that society differentially treats racial or ethnic groups 
other than my own.). Given that balance, it was again expected that models accounting 
for both substantive and method variance would yield the best fit. The pattern of model-
by-model global results was similar to that observed for the other balanced conditions in 
Table 5 (although most of the SEE-R-4 models exhibited somewhat worse statistics). 
Specifically, Models 4 and 6 did not converge; Model 2 exhibited poor fit; and the SUB, 
CTCM+, and CTCM- models yielded acceptable fit to the observed data in terms of 
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SRMR and RMSEA but not in terms of CFI (after removal of the nonsignificant path 
from the CTCM+ method factor to item 18). For Model 1, all substantive factor loadings 
were statistically significant and in the expected direction. This was true for the CTCM 
models as well; a majority of their method factor loadings, however, did not reach 
statistical significance (though all method factor loadings were in the expected direction). 
As was the case with the ODCS-4 models, it would be difficult to endorse any SEE-R-4 
configuration as being superior to Model 1. In contrast to the results for all other balanced 
scales, reliability coefficients for SEE-R-4 Model 1 (ACD = .77; EPT = .79; EA = .71; 
EFE = .81) were quite comparable to those obtained for the corresponding (all-positive) 
SEE-R-1 model (ACD = .77; EPT = .78; EA = .75; EFE = .84). Thus it appears that the 
consistent (negative) keying in condition 4 may have served to dampen any method 
effects associated with balanced wording among the items.  
Combined SEE-R/ODCS Models. The combined models were based on data from 
students who had been administered the SEE-R-2 (half positive wording/keying, half 
negative wording/keying) and the ODCS-3 (half positive wording/keying, half positive 
wording/negative keying). Models 7A and 7B were CTCM variants in which a method 
factor for negative keying was specified for each instrument, and the two method factors 
were allowed to covary. In Model 7A, correlations were permitted between the 
substantive ODCS-3 factor and the four substantive SEE-R-2 substantive factors. In 
Model 7B, these correlations were not permitted.  
Statistical results for the combined models are presented in Table 6 (below). 
Model 7B failed to converge even after adjustments were made. This was not 
unexpected, given that the model did not specify correlations between conceptually  
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Table 6  
Fit Indices for Combined SEE-R/ODCS Models  
Model MLR χ2 df SRMR RMSEA CFI Method Factor Correlation 
SEE-R-2/ODCS-3, N = 532 
 
    
Model 7Aa 498.85* 304 .044 .035 .932 .40 
Model 7Bb -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Note. MLR χ2 = scaled maximum-likelihood chi-square; SRMR = standardized root mean square 
residual;  RMSEA = scaled root mean square error of approximation; CFI = scaled confirmatory 
fit index; Method Factor Correlation = the estimated correlation between the ODCS and SEE-R 
method factors. In Model 7A, the single substantive ODCS factor was allowed to covary with the 
four substantive SEE-R factors; in Model 7B, it was not.  aAfter initial convergence problems, 
two of the SEE-R subscales (ACD and EFE) were collapsed into one factor due to a very high 
correlation between them.  bModel did not converge.   
* p<.05. 
 
similar substantive factors. Initial estimation problems were also encountered with Model 
7A, but it converged to an admissible solution after two SEE-R subscales (ACD and 
EFE) were collapsed into a single factor. In both the current study (adequately-fitting 
models for the four adaptations of the SEE-R) and Gerstner’s (2012) longitudinal study, 
high correlations (.65-.83) were consistently observed between the ACD and EFE factors. 
As can be seen in Table 6, the modified version of Model 7A yielded a CFI value slightly 
below .95 but otherwise acceptable fit statistics. With one exception (a nonsignificant and 
negative loading from the ODCS method factor to ODCS item 4), all factor loadings 
were statistically significant and in the expected direction. Correlations among the SEE-R 
subscale factors ranged from .27 to .57; correlations between those factors and the ODCS 
substantive factor ranged from .30 to .72. Finally, the correlation between the two method 
factors (.40) indicated an association of medium strength between negative keying 
effects.  
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Discussion of Study 1 
The goal of Study 1 was to investigate the psychometric consequences of 
balancing attitude scales by including negatively-worded and/or negatively-keyed 
measurement items. Prior studies have generally reported differential functioning (in 
terms of validity, dimensionality, and reliability) for positive and negative items on 
balanced scales. However, previous research designs have not typically made any 
distinctions between negative wording and negative keying, leaving important 
measurement questions unanswered. In the current study, several adaptations of two 
attitude scales (the ODCS and the SEE-R) were used to investigate the effects of 
balancing via wording direction, keying direction, or both. Below, the four research 
questions posed at the outset of the study will be addressed in turn. The reader is 
encouraged to review Tables 4, 5, and 6 as needed.  
 Research Question #1. The first research question concerned balanced scales 
(conditions 2, 3, and 4) and whether they would exhibit psychometric properties 
comparable to those of scales where all items were keyed and worded in the same 
direction (condition 1). The properties examined were dimensionality (assessed via 
confirmatory factor analysis) and reliability (estimated using model-appropriate equations 
for coefficient omega). Based on prevailing trends in the measurement literature, it was 
hypothesized that all-positive (i.e., unbalanced) versions of the ODCS and SEE-R would 
yield better psychometric properties than balanced adaptations.  
 In terms of reliability, the hypothesis was generally confirmed. Regarding the 
ODCS, coefficient omega was systematically higher for the all-positive version of the 
scale (.86-.88 across converging models) than for any of the balanced adaptations (.70-
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.79 across models positing a single substantive factor with or without method effects). 
Regarding the SEE-R, which includes four subscales, the trend was similar. Subscale 
reliability estimates were usually highest in the all-positive condition (e.g., SEE-R-1 
Model 1: .77 / .78 / .75 / .84), although similar estimates were obtained in the condition 
where keying was consistently negative and wording was balanced (SEE-R-4 Model 1: 
.77 / .79 / .71 / .81). It should be noted that the apparent internal consistency advantage 
for all-positive wording/keying may be somewhat illusory. Given the low-stakes data 
collection context, for example, each dataset no doubt included careless responders (i.e., 
satisficing students who, in an effort to finish as quickly as possible, consistently agreed 
[or disagreed] with items without actually reading them). In the all-positive condition—
and condition 4, where keying did not change—such response patterns likely contributed 
to internal consistency; in the balanced keying conditions, they likely detracted from it.  
 The pattern of dimensionality results provided mixed support for the RQ#1 
hypothesis. Of the four ODCS adaptations, the all-positive version (ODCS-1) yielded the 
worst fit statistics in all model configurations. In fact, no model—including the simple 
one-factor model championed by Pascarella et al. (1994)—provided acceptable fit to the 
ODCS-1 data. By contrast, and contrary to expectations, Model 1 fit the ODCS-4 data 
(all negative keying, half negative wording) very well. Standardized residuals for the 
ODCS-1 Model 1 suggested that several pairs of items shared significant variance beyond 
that accounted for by the substantive factor. The ODCS-1 CU models fit the data 
marginally better than did the SUB model, perhaps because the correlated error terms 
“capitalized” on the variance shared by certain item pairs (e.g., items 6 and 8) that 
happened to be chosen for reversal in conditions 2-4. Regardless, the poor ODCS-1 fit 
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statistics (and the pattern of results among the balanced conditions) indicated that the 
original instrument, which is nearly identical to the ODCS-1, may not function well as a 
unidimensional measure without revision. This finding may stem from the nature of the 
scale, which was designed to assess both openness to diversity and openness to challenge; 
it seems probable that given individuals may possess more of one of those traits than the 
other. In short, the all-positive version of the ODCS did not show an advantage over 
balanced versions in terms of dimensionality.  
 The dimensionality story was generally similar for the SEE-R adaptations. One 
notable difference was that in the all-positive condition, Model 1 (positing four 
substantive factors and no method effects) did fit the data reasonably well—and better 
than the competing models in that condition. However, the fit statistics for that model 
were only slightly better than those of the comparable (and best-fitting) model in the 
SEE-R-4 condition (where keying was consistently negative and wording was balanced). 
Across all conditions, the best-performing models appeared to be the SEE-R-3 Model 5 
(whose CTCM- configuration that was very close to that endorsed in Gerstner [2012]) 
and the SEE-R-2 CTCM models. As is evident from a review of the best-fitting model(s) 
by dataset in Table 5, conditions 2 and 3 resulted in a better fit for models specifying 
method variance than did conditions 1 and 4. Thus the dimensionality results for the 
SEE-R models showed an advantage (in terms of model fit) for the all-positive 
wording/keying condition over the balanced conditions, though the advantage over 
condition 4 (balanced via wording only) was minimal.    
 In summary, results were mixed with regard to the RQ#1 hypothesis. Estimates of 
reliability (coefficient omega) were generally higher for the all-positive versions of the 
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ODCS and SEE-R than for the balanced versions, in keeping with expectations. 
Regarding dimensionality, the SEE-R results indicated that balanced conditions 2 and 3 
were more conducive to method effects than were conditions 1 and 4 (whose results 
favored substantive-only models). For the ODCS, no advantage was evident for condition 
1 because no model adequately fit the data from the ODCS-1. This finding indicates that 
the canonical version of ODCS may lack unidimensionality.  
Research Questions #2 and #3. The next research questions will be addressed 
together because both concerned the utility of competing approaches to balancing 
measurement scales. Specifically, were there differences in the psychometric properties 
(i.e., dimensionality and reliability) of balanced scales that reversed items through the use 
of negative wording and keying (condition 2), those that created reversals only via 
negative wording (condition 4), and those that created reversals only via negative keying 
(condition 3)? Based on trends in the measurement literature, two hypotheses were 
generated:  
• RQ#2: Balanced scales with items characterized by negative wording and keying 
would exhibit weaker psychometric properties than balanced scales using only 
one reversal strategy.    
• RQ#3: Among balanced scales using only one reversal strategy, those with 
balanced wording would exhibit weaker psychometric properties than those with 
balanced keying.  
 Regarding reliability, trends were fairly consistent across the ODCS and SEE-R. 
Coefficient omega values tended to be highest in condition 4 (which had consistent 
keying) and somewhat lower in the other balanced conditions (which did not). Among 
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ODCS models positing method effects, for example, reliability estimates were slightly 
higher in condition 4 (range: .75-.76) than in condition 2 (range: .72-.73) or condition 3 
(range: .70-.74). A similar (if slightly muddier) pattern was observed for the SEE-R, as 
conditions 3 (half negative keying) and 4 (half negative wording) tended to yield higher 
reliability estimates than did condition 2 (half negative wording/keying). This trend was 
evident for both substantive-only and CTCM models, as exemplified by the Model 1 
reliability coefficients (SEE-R-4: .77 / .79 / .71 / .81; SEE-R-3: .77 / .74 / .75 / .69;    
SEE-R-2: .70 / .73 / .72 / .72). In short, across balanced ODCS and SEE-R conditions, 
coefficient omega tended to be highest in condition 4 (all negative keying, half negative 
wording) and lowest in condition 2 (half positive wording/keying, half negative 
wording/keying).  
 Regarding dimensionality, results varied somewhat by instrument. The strongest 
fit statistics for the ODCS were clearly obtained under condition 4, where the best-fitting 
model had a simple, one-factor structure (Model 1: SRMR = .029; RMSEA = .033; CFI = 
.978). Under conditions 2 and 3, the best-fitting ODCS models posited method effects; fit 
statistics were consistently better for the ODCS-2 (Model 5: SRMR = .034; RMSEA = 
.058; CFI = .956) than for the ODCS-3 (Model 5: SRMR = .040; RMSEA = .082; CFI = 
.910). Thus method effects were more apparent in conditions 2 and 3 (where keying 
varied) than in condition 4 (where it did not).  
 Among balanced SEE-R datasets, the best-fitting models for condition 2       
(SEE-R-2 Model 5: SRMR = .041;  RMSEA = .039; CFI = .938) and condition 3     
(SEE-R-3 Model 5: SRMR = .044;  RMSEA = .036; CFI = .946) yielded better statistics 
than the best-fitting model for condition 4 (SEE-R-4 Model 1: SRMR = .052;  RMSEA = 
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.056; CFI = .911). However, the dimensionality trend was the same as for the ODCS: 
Method effects were less apparent when only wording was balanced (SEE-R-4) than 
when only keying was balanced (SEE-R-3) or when both wording and keying were 
balanced (SEE-R-2).  
In summary, results were informative with regard to the second and third research 
questions. ODCS and SEE-R estimates of reliability (coefficient omega) were generally 
lowest in condition 2 (where wording and keying were balanced) and highest in condition 
4 (where only wording was balanced). Regarding dimensionality, across both instruments 
the condition 4 data supported a substantive-only model (one factor for the ODCS; four 
factors for the SEE-R), while the data for conditions 2 and 3 supported models with 
method factors. The above findings supported the RQ#2 hypothesis (that condition 2 
would yield the worst psychometric properties among the balanced scales), but not the 
RQ#3 hypothesis (that condition 4 would yield weaker psychometric properties than 
condition 3). Thus it appears that among balancing strategies, the use of balanced 
wording (with consistently negative keying) may be preferable to the use of balanced 
keying (with consistently positive wording), which may be preferable to the use of both 
strategies (half positive wording/keying, half negative wording/keying).  
Research Question #4. The final research question addressed the extent to which 
method effects associated with negative keying might be evident across instruments. This 
question could be answered for participants completing the SEE-R-2 and the ODCS-3 
(both balanced adaptations). Responses to the two measures were modeled 
simultaneously (using two CTCM- configurations) in order that the correlation between 
negative-keying method factors across the instruments could be estimated. It was 
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hypothesized that the association of keying-based method effects across the SEE-R-2 and 
the ODCS-3 would be weaker than that reported by DiStefano and Motl (2006) for 
wording-based method effects (.37).  
As noted in the results section, Model 7B (which did not permit the substantive 
ODCS-3 factor to covary with the substantive SEE-R-2 factors) did not converge to an 
admissible solution. Initial estimation problems were also encountered with Model 7A 
(which did allow those substantive covariances); convergence was reached after the two 
of the SEE-R-2 factors—ACD and EFE, which exhibited high correlations in simpler 
SEE-R models—were combined. The final model fit the observed data fairly well 
(SRMR = .047; RMSEA = .032; CFI = .938). Correlations between the (three) SEE-R 
substantive factors and the ODCS substantive factor ranged from .30 to .72.  
 The parameter of interest to the research question, the correlation between the two 
method factors in the combined model, was estimated at .40. Thus the RQ#4 hypothesis 
was not supported; the moderate association of negative keying method effects observed 
across the ODCS and SEE-R was comparable in strength to the association reported (for 
a different pair of self-report instruments) by DiStefano and Motl (2006) for negative 
wording method effects (.37). This finding suggests that scales balanced via keying and 
scales balanced via wording may be similar in their susceptibility to method variance.  
Study 1 Limitations. There are several aspects of Study 1 that may limit the 
generalizability of its results. First, the participants were quite homogeneous in terms of 
age and educational level/status. Thus the psychometric trends reported here might differ 
for data from other populations. Second, as even a cursory review of Appendix A and 
Appendix B will demonstrate, the adapted instruments administered in this study 
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included many lengthy, grammatically complex items. Among the ODCS items, for 
example, only one (item 8) was less than ten words long; and a majority of SEE-R items 
included at least 15 words (and often 20 or more). To the extent that such item 
characteristics are not typical of attitude measures, the study results may not generalize to 
other instruments. Furthermore, the participants were all first-year college students—a 
population whose ability to comprehend complex language structures is likely stronger 
than that of the general population.  
The two measures adapted for the study differed in length and (presumed) factor 
structure. However, as the instrument names imply and the results for Model 7A suggest, 
there appears to be substantial overlap among their ODCS and SEE-R target constructs 
(range of cross-instrument substantive factor correlations: .30-.72). Given the nebulous 
nature of method factors (i.e., it is difficult to know what they really represent), a 
research design using more conceptually distinct measures might provide “cleaner” 
answers to some research questions (e.g., RQ#4). Additionally, results from the ODCS-1 
(all-positive wording/keying) condition raise questions about the unidimensionality and 
robustness of the canonical ODCS, given that a simple, one-factor model did not fit the 
observed data for the all-positive wording/keying condition (in contrast to the findings of 
Pascarella et al., 1994). By contrast, CFA results for the SEE-R-3 adaptation (which was 
very close to the original SEE-R) supported the CTCM- factor structure endorsed by 
Gerstner (2012). Finally, it seems possible that for multi-factor scales like SEE-R, 
multidimensionality could interact with (potential) method effects.  
 
 
 
IV. Study 2 
Method 
Participants. As in Study 1, participants were incoming freshmen who took part 
in mandatory, low-stakes, university-wide assessment activities in August of 2012. A 
qualitative think-aloud protocol was employed individually with a total of 8 randomly-
selected students who were given the option to fulfill their assessment requirement by 
participating in this study rather than taking part in the activities conducted in their 
(randomly-assigned) assessment rooms. All participants were traditional (i.e., 18-year-
old) freshmen; half were female, and all were white. Regarding reading skills, three 
participants had “high” documented SAT Critical Reading scores (650 or above) and five 
had “average” documented scores on the same measure (between 440 and 550).  
Materials. The ODCS was adapted to create a 12-item version incorporating a 
combination of the four wording/keying conditions employed in Study 1 (positive 
keying/wording; positive keying/negative wording; negative keying/positive wording; 
negative keying/negative wording). The same three items were presented four times each, 
once in each keying/wording condition. This design was used to facilitate the elicitation 
of participant verbalizations pertinent to the research question (i.e., the nature of 
differential functioning of positive and negative items within balanced scales). The Study 
2 version of the ODCS, which included the same printed instructions and response scale 
used in Study 1, can be found in Appendix C.   
Procedure. Students assigned to certain (larger) assessment rooms were 
randomly selected in advance as potential participants. Once these individuals had 
reported to their assigned rooms, been oriented to the nature of general assessment 
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activities at the university, and given informed consent, they were asked to come to the 
front of the room. The lead proctor then provided them with brief written offers (“golden 
tickets”) giving them the option to take part in a research study (see Appendix E). Of the 
8 students who received the offer, all accepted and were directed to another room where 
they were oriented to the nature of the study. It was explained that the research would be 
conducted with one participant at a time in a nearby room; participants were provided 
with a series of university-based assessment instruments unrelated to this study (pilot 
measures of critical thinking) and instructed to work on these before and after their turn. 
This approach was adopted to ensure that study participants spent an equivalent amount 
of time (two to three hours) engaged in assessment activities as their peers who did not 
receive a golden ticket. After the completion of study-specific consent forms (on which 
permission to record verbal responses was requested), data collection commenced.  
Each session began with a brief training module that included scripted 
instructions and a researcher-illustrated example (these materials are included in 
Appendix D). In order to enhance levels of comfort/confidence with the procedure (and 
screen for potential confusion about instructions), the researcher first administered a few 
(two to three, as necessary) practice items using a brief set of measurement items related 
to attention and organization skills. For both the practice measure and the research 
version of the ODCS, participants were asked to “think aloud” (i.e., verbalize their 
thoughts) as they processed and responded to individual items. As advised by Sudman, 
Bradburn, and Schwarz (1996), spoken cues were used as needed to encourage complete 
verbalizations (e.g., “Remember to tell me everything you’re thinking”).  
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Following completion of the ODCS think-aloud, a brief structured interview was 
conducted (again, individually) to ascertain retrospective participant opinions about the 
relative difficulty of certain oppositely-keyed item pairs. This was planned in case the 
procedure did not elicit (unprompted) information specifically related to the processing of 
different types of item wording/keying. As noted by Van Someren et al. (1994), think-
aloud protocols can yield invalid or incomplete data for a variety of reasons including 
disturbance of the cognitive process (i.e., the added requirement to think aloud causes 
participants to complete the task differently than they would otherwise), synchronization 
problems (i.e., verbalization is slower than the cognitive processes being described), and 
working memory errors. All participant verbalizations (prompted and unprompted) were 
audio-recorded; sessions lasted approximately 20 minutes each.  
Analyses. Participant audio files were transferred to a computer and transcribed. 
The think-aloud and interview portions of the transcriptions were subsequently analyzed 
using a thematic networks approach (Attride-Stirling, 2001). This approach typically 
entails six steps: (1) development of codes and dissection of data into discrete text 
segments; (2) identification of themes; (3) construction of thematic networks, which are 
“…web-like illustrations…that summarize the main themes constituting a piece of text” 
(Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 386); (4) description of thematic networks; (5) summarizing of 
thematic networks; and (6) interpretation of patterns. The thematic networks approach 
was chosen because of its rigor as well as its suitability for analysis of think-aloud data.  
Regarding the first step of the analysis (dissection/coding of text), Attride-Stirling 
(2001) notes that a coding framework is typically developed “…on the basis of the 
theoretical interests guiding the research questions, on the basis of salient issues that arise 
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in the text itself, or on the basis of both” (p. 390). In this case, codes were developed in 
both ways. First, six codes were established to reflect literature-based explanations 
(described in Chapter 2) for the differential functioning of negative and positive scale 
items: (1) careless responding; (2) individual differences in response style/personality; (3) 
individual differences in cognitive/reading skills; (4) substantive differences between 
positive and negative items; (5) method variance due to use of negative items; and (6) 
item extremity. Then, based on an initial review of participant responses, ten additional 
codes were established: (7) item does not apply to respondent; (8) misread of item; (9) 
partial read of item; (10) item causes reread/confusion; (11) comment about repetition of 
items; (12) respondent referring back to a prior item; (13) mapping/refining of response; 
(14) apparent disparity between observed and reported behavior (i.e., the participant 
reports doing/saying one thing but the researcher observes something different); (15) 
comment reflecting participant’s attitude toward scale/task; and (16) comment related to 
maintaining response consistency across items (e.g., wanting to give congruent responses 
for similarly-worded items). All text segments (i.e., participant statements) deemed to be 
related to any of the 16 codes and/or the larger Study 2 research question (Why do 
measurement items with negative wording and/or keying elicit differential response 
patterns than items that are positively worded/keyed?) were selected for further analysis, 
regardless of the terminology used by participants. The text segments were then assigned 
codes based on the above framework.  
Once the coding process (step 1) had been completed, salient/common themes 
were extracted from the text segments (step 2). Continuing with the analysis as delineated 
by Attride-Stirling (2001), identified themes were then organized into a visual network 
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that was subsequently reviewed and refined (step 3). In step 4, the components of the 
thematic network were described verbally and exemplified with supporting text 
segments. Finally, the thematic network was summarized (step 5) and its patterns 
interpreted (step 6). Responses to the brief structured interview were analyzed along with 
the think-aloud data, since there was a great deal of thematic overlap among them.  
Results 
 As summarized above, a thematic network typically consists of basic themes, 
organizing themes, and one or more global themes. Although the network results from a 
bottom-up construction (i.e., coding and categorization of discrete text segments), the 
reader may benefit from a top-down orientation to its hierarchical structure. In the present 
study, analysis of the think-aloud/interview data suggested the inclusion of what could be 
termed a “universal” theme at the level above that of the global themes. The universal or 
overarching theme that emerged from the data was Individual Differences. In short, 
participants varied in their processing of, style of responding to, and comments about the 
12-item, think-aloud adaptation of the ODCS (Appendix C). The nature of the individual 
differences suggested the presence of variability that seemed independent of participants’ 
professed levels of the target construct (openness to diversity).  
The main sources of individual differences, classified as global themes, were 
based on groupings of the organizing themes at the next level down. There were a total of 
three (arbitrarily-numbered) global themes: (1) Reading Skill; (2) Personality; and (3) 
Style of Responding. Each global theme was based on two organizing themes (identified 
below), each of which encapsulated a number of the basic themes that had emerged from 
the text segments. The resulting thematic network is described in the following sections 
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(which delineate and exemplify the organizing and basic themes associated with each 
global theme) and presented in Figure 5 (below). It should be noted that basic themes 
have been omitted from the figure.   
 Global Theme 1: Reading Skill 
The first global theme involved individual differences in participant reading 
skill/behavior. Within the think-aloud procedure, all participants save one elected to read 
the adapted ODCS items aloud before giving their responses. Thus it was possible to 
directly observe instances when participants made reading errors and/or experienced 
confusion regarding individual items. During the follow-up structured interview, 
participants were asked to identify any items that had been confusing or difficult to 
process. In addition, they were asked to gauge the comparability of a specific pair of 
items (numbers 1 and 4) in terms of meaning and extremity. Taken together, these data 
highlighted individual differences in reading skill/comprehension (particularly with 
regard to negatively-worded statements) as well as differences in how items were 
interpreted (i.e., meaning/semantics).  
 Organizing Theme: Negative Wording  
This organizing theme pertained to participant processing of negatively-worded 
items on the adapted ODCS. Encapsulated basic themes included misreads, rereads, self-
corrections, comprehension difficulties, and resulting response errors. These behaviors  
were observed (and reported) primarily on items that featured negative wording. 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Sherman, 1976; Wason, 1961), the statements that  
participants found most challenging to process were those that had high complexity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Thematic network resulting from the qualitative study. The highest level includes the universal theme (Individual 
Differences), the next level includes the global themes (Reading Skill; Personality; Style of Responding), and the lowest level includes 
the organizing themes (Negative Wording; Semantic Interpretations; Attitude/Effort; Frustration Tolerance; Desire for Consistency; 
Use of Midpoint). For simplicity of presentation, the basic themes encapsulated by the organizing themes are not depicted here. 
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and/or included multiple negative particles (e.g., #11. Learning about people from 
different cultures is not an unimportant part of my education.). Some misreads were 
minor (e.g., omitting an article; saying “culture” rather than “cultures”), but others had 
the potential to alter meaning in a substantial way. In the following example, which 
involves item 11, the participant caught and corrected one reading mistake but not 
another (P2 refers to participant 2; quotation marks indicate an item being read aloud; 
capital letters denote participant emphasis; editorial notes are in brackets):  
P2: “Learning about people from different cultures is [not omitted] an 
important—UNimportant part of my education.”  
In other cases, participants avoided significant reading mistakes but experienced 
comprehension difficulties. The example below (involving item 9) illustrates the 
confusion sometimes caused by complex sentences with negative wording:  
P5:  “The courses I enjoy the least are NOT those that make me think about 
things from a different perp—perspective.” Alright, it’s getting more  
complicatedly worded, I can see that! [pause] “…I enjoy the least are  
not…” [laugh] Oh my gosh, I have to think—OK, ah…oh my god, I’m  
actually really confused. That’s annoying [laugh].  
Occasionally, participants used what might be called a verbal reduction strategy to 
process negatively-worded items they found confusing:  
 P4:  “Learning about people from different cultures is NOT an unimportant  
  part of my education.” Is…not an unimportant part, so that would be—IS  
  an important part. Got it, alright. Number 11, I would agree with that,  
  definitely. 
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Complex items like those referenced above (e.g., 9 and 11) seemed to consistently 
tax participants’ working memory skills. In several cases, the processing demands of such 
items resulted in apparent response errors: 
 P6: “The cois—courses I enjoy the least are not those that make me think  
  about things from a different perspective.” OK, kinda confusing. “The  
  courses I enjoy the least are not those...” [pause] “The courses I enjoy the  
  least are NOT those...” Um, I’ll have to, disagree with that, I think?  
  [laugh] That’s a confusing question! Yeah, I’d be a 3 with that one. It’s a  
  tough question to understand. 
In the above excerpt, the participant became confused by item 9 and responded “3” 
(Slightly Disagree) when her likely intent, based on previous responses and comments, 
was to indicate agreement with the underlying sentiment of the statement (i.e., that such 
courses are enjoyable). Consistent with expectations based on prior studies (e.g., Marsh, 
1996), participants with lower SAT Critical Reading scores seemed somewhat more 
susceptible to confusion (e.g., misreads, rereads, response latencies, response errors) than 
did their peers with higher SAT Critical Reading scores. This was true in terms of both 
frequency (i.e., the number of items on which processing difficulties were observed) and 
severity (i.e., degree of confusion; amount of time needed to process items).  
In both the think-aloud and interview portions of the study, participants identified 
confusing items and provided insight into the nature of the processing difficulties they 
experienced. As noted earlier, “problem” items tended to be complex and contain 
grammatical negation. The two items most often described as confusing were items 9 and 
11, both of which were negatively worded but positively keyed. Several students offered 
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the (unprompted) suggestion that one or both of these items should be reworded. Items 6, 
10, and 12 were also cited by at least one student each as being difficult to process. 
Participants often used terms like “double negatives” or “contradictory” when explaining 
why such items confused them (R denotes the researcher):  
P5:  Almost the last half [were confusing or difficult to process]. Number 9, 
number 12, and number 11. And number 10. So I guess, 9 through 12.  
R:  Why?  
P5: Um, I guess there’s some contradictory wording, with “enjoy” and “the 
least” in number 9. 10, “I do not mind” was just kind of like a wishy-
washy statement. And then, 11 had “not” AND “unimportant.” So that 
kind of like, switched things around in my mind. And the same thing with 
12, “enjoy the least.”  
Finally, aspects of sentence structure were occasionally mentioned as factors in 
comprehensibility. For example, one participant noted that the (syntactic) location of 
negative wording tended to make a difference:  
P4:  If the NOT, like the negative—I guess it would be a negative—is in the  
 beginning part, it kind of sets the precedent for the rest of the statement,  
 that it’s going to be an opposite, as opposed to the previous statement [#6].  
This observation was insightful, as participants did not generally exhibit or report 
difficulty comprehending negatively-worded statements in which the structure was 
relatively straightforward and the polarity was established early on (e.g., #7. I do not 
enjoy having discussions with people whose ideas and values are different from my 
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own.). By contrast, the more complex items with negative wording, and particularly those 
with multiple negative particles, were conducive to confusion and response errors:  
P8:  Once I started getting into some of these I feel like I was crossing  
 myself, I guess I was getting confused, and I didn’t really understand some  
 of the questions—I was probably going back and, one of them I would say  
 Strongly Agree and the other [comparable item with the same keying] 
would be like, Disagree or something.  
In short, some adapted ODCS items with negative wording were consistently difficult for 
participants to process. Misreads, self-corrections, rereads, and response errors were 
observed on these items. Such behaviors were more frequent, and severe, among 
participants with lower SAT Critical Reading scores.  
Organizing Theme: Semantic Interpretations  
 This organizing theme related to participants’ perceptions of the meaning of items 
on the adapted ODCS. It emerged primarily from data obtained during the structured 
interview, which included a series of questions about two similar items: #1. I enjoy 
having discussions with people whose ideas and values are different from my own.; and 
#4. I try to avoid having discussions with people whose ideas and values are different 
from my own. The second of those items was designed to be parallel to the first but keyed 
in the opposite direction. Participants were asked whether items 1 and 4 (which were not 
“problem” items in terms of comprehension) were equivalent in meaning or extremity 
(i.e., strength). Some favored the former interpretation, some favored the latter 
interpretation, and some reported finding the items to be equivalent in meaning and 
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extremity. It should be noted that a few participants asked for clarification of the 
questions, while others struggled to articulate their thoughts on semantic issues.  
Participants who reported finding a substantive difference in meaning between 
items 1 and 4 generally described that difference as subtle:  
R:  Do you feel like [items 1 and 4] mean the same thing? 
P5:  Um, kind of but not exactly because, if they did mean the same thing— 
 like you know, for me strongly agreeing or disagreeing, I’d rather have,  
 instead of “try to avoid,” I would say, like, “I DISlike having discussions.”  
 Cause “try to avoid” doesn’t necessarily mean that you dislike it, it’s just  
 that it [pause] makes you feel more uncomfortable. Well it’s slightly  
 different, not a whole lot different.  
Given that the items in question included different verbs, it was not surprising that some 
participants perceived a distinction in meaning. Other participants couched perceived 
distinctions between the two items in terms of extremity:  
P6:  I think number 4 is more extreme, because most people, they see the  
 question “I enjoy having discussions with people,” [and] they’re pretty  
 much just gonna agree. But you’re gonna have to—“I try to avoid having  
 discussions”—people who…try to avoid having discussions, someone  
 really has to [pause] not like having discussions to agree with that.  
It may not be of critical importance whether participants described perceived differences 
between items 1 and 4 in terms of meaning or extremity (as noted earlier, the students 
had some trouble articulating the nature of distinctions they perceived). The main point is 
that for some participants, the two items were not equivalent.  
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The following excerpt would appear to reflect the alternative point of view: that 
items 1 and 4 constitute polar reversals, like the numbers positive 3 and negative 3—that 
is, opposite but equal in meaning/extremity:  
R: Do you feel like [items 1 and 4] mean the same thing? 
P1:  Well, I think one of them’s the opposite. So, not really.  
R:  So they’re reversed?  
P1:  They relate but they’re not the same thing.  
R:  Does one seem more extreme than the other?  
P1:  No, cause they’re the same.  
Other participants also expressed the opinion that the two items were comparable 
opposites. Thus there were two “camps” on the equivalence issue; and each camp was 
mixed in terms of reading skill (based on SAT Critical Reading scores).  
One possible explanation for the interpretive differences described above is that 
some participants conducted a more nuanced reading of items 1 and 4 than did others. For 
instance, one of the participants who reported a difference in their meanings had provided 
the following comments about item 10 during the think-aloud session:   
P5: “I do not mind having discussions with people whose ideas and values are  
 different from my own.” That’s a little more confusing just cause it said  
 “I do not MIND.” Um, cause I—it’s hard to agree with it—I guess I’d  
 strongly agree with it, even though—it’s not that I don’t mind, it’s that I 
actually LIKE having them.  
Item 10 was a variation on items 1 and 4, written to be negatively worded but positively 
keyed. The nuanced reading of Participant 5 highlights another pertinent semantic 
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question: Is “I do not mind” comparable in meaning and extremity to “I enjoy” (or “I 
like”)?  
In fact, the answers to such questions are likely to be subjective. Even if all 
respondents to an attitude measure give optimal attention to item wording (i.e., nuanced 
readings), they will vary in their judgments about item meaning and extremity. The 
individual differences observed in this study suggest that perceptions of words are, like 
perceptions of the world, idiosyncratic. It follows that two respondents with the same 
underlying level of a target construct (e.g., openness to diversity) could differ in their 
item-level interpretations and responses. Thus the measurement medium itself 
(language/reading) introduces a certain amount of construct-irrelevant variance.   
 Global Theme 2: Personality 
The second global theme encapsulated individual differences in how participants 
engaged in the research tasks. It should be noted that no personality measures were 
administered, nor was there an intent to identify “personality features” per se. Rather, the 
label Personality was chosen because the measurement literature suggests that 
personality-based factors are relevant to response behaviors (e.g., Cronbach, 1946, 1950; 
DiStefano & Motl, 2009). For instance, some individuals may be more conscientious than 
others; some may be more willing to assist in research endeavors than others; and some 
may be more likely to satisfice (e.g., Krosnick, 1991) than others when completing an 
attitude measure. In the present study, there were numerous instances when participants 
exhibited and/or reported issues related to effort, annoyance, and frustration. Taken 
together, the data highlighted individual differences in engagement and response 
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behavior that may have been related to personality factors (in the context of the research 
session).  
 Organizing Theme: Attitude/Effort  
All participants in the qualitative study presented as cooperative, alert, and 
euthymic. One student preferred not to read the adapted ODCS items aloud, but 
otherwise the participants complied with all task demands in a polite manner. Despite this 
agreeable state of affairs, the data suggested the presence of variation in terms of 
participant attitude (e.g., about the importance of the study) and effort (e.g., time spent on 
items; thoroughness in thinking aloud) regarding the research tasks.  
The think-aloud protocol was not conducive to extreme satisficing (e.g., 
responding without having read items), but most participants exhibited at least a 
modicum of satisficing on some items. Recall that satisficing is defined by Krosnick 
(1991) as suboptimal effort in (1) reading/interpreting an item, (2) retrieving pertinent 
feelings/memories, (3) making a judgment, or (4) mapping that judgment onto the 
response scale. Participant responses often gave insight into at least some stages of the 
response process. The following excerpt, which involves item 2 from the adapted ODCS, 
reflects an apparently impulsive response style:  
P3: Um, “Learning about people from different cultures is not an”—no no no,  
 no no no. I want to study abroad so much and learn about different  
 cultures, so that is a Strongly Disagree [laugh]. 
The participant seemingly did not read the entire item, arrived at an emphatic judgment 
before retrieving (or at least before describing) her feelings, and executed an immediate 
and decisive mapping. Her speediness was unusual, particularly compared with other 
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students’ speed in responding to the first three items on the measure (i.e., before the item 
stems began to be repeated).  
By contrast, the excerpt below suggests a much more thorough and deliberate 
treatment of the same item:  
P7: “Learning about people from different cultures is not an important part of  
 my education.” Um, I definitely think it is a part of my education, because  
 learning about other people—I might…encounter them in my career? So, I  
 have to either say like, between a 1 and a 3, so I’m like in the Disagree  
 side. And I’m thinking that—“…important to my education”—I would  
 say, like, it is not that strong. I mean, I have other classes to worry about  
 too for my education? But it’s—so I’m pretty sure it’s between a 3—but  
 [pause] well, um, I’m just between a 2 and a 3.  
This participant was on the other end of the spectrum in terms of the amount of thought 
and time she devoted to making judgments and mapping her responses. In fact, as 
exemplified above, she sometimes had difficulty arriving at a final decision and would 
have liked to place her response between two scale points.  
Participants were told in advance that some of the adapted ODCS statements 
would appear several times with slightly different wording. Once the item stems did start 
to recur (beginning with item 4), some participants adopted (at least intermittently) a 
“shortcut” way of responding that included references to one or more previous items. The 
excerpt below involves item 5, which was a slight variation on item 2:  
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P5: OK, “Learning about people from different cultures is an important part of  
 my education.” So I guess I’d strongly agree with that, just because that’s  
 the opposite of number 2.  
Rather than processing item 5 as a stand-alone unit, the participant recognized it as “the 
opposite” of item 2 and simply reversed the answer she had given previously. Even 
though this strategy (which will be discussed further under the Desire for Consistency 
organizing theme) yielded an apparently congruent response, it still constituted a 
substantial form of satisficing.  
In fact, almost all participants gradually began to give quicker responses (relative 
to their “baseline” speeds) as they progressed through 12 think-aloud items. This may 
have been partly attributable to the high degree of repetition inherent in the measurement 
instrument, but it likely also reflected a more general behavioral trend in attitude 
measurement situations: Respondents may give good attention/effort on initial items, 
orienting themselves to the target construct(s), their own pertinent feelings/memories, and 
the response scale; after that, they proceed more efficiently—through increased 
satisficing. As one participant (P3) remarked, “I remember certain words from questions 
and [when] I see [them] again I’m like, ‘Oh, I could use that question to maybe help me 
with the next one’.”  
While discussing “confusing” items in his interview session, another participant 
described the motivation to work as quickly as possible. He observed that for students 
completing research measures or academic tests, confusing items are undesirable 
specifically because they interfere with the prime directive, efficiency:  
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P4: …I mean, you’re also going faster [than usual], just trying to finish the  
 questionnaire. And then you have this [confusing item], it throws you for a  
 loop, and then  you feel kind of rushed, and like, “Oh no, I’m losing  
 time” cause of the whole test-taking syndrome: “I need to finish.”  
In summary, participants varied in their use of satisficing behaviors during the 
think-aloud task. Some approached the items in a reflective, conscientious way, while 
others gave quick and seemingly impulsive responses. Finally, there was a general 
tendency for participants to gradually give faster/less thorough think-aloud responses as 
they moved through the research instrument. One participant attributed this trend to the 
“test-taking syndrome,” while another (P3) suggested that some people “just go through 
the motions” when completing attitude measures.  
 Organizing Theme: Frustration Tolerance  
 This organizing theme centered on reactions to aspects of the think-aloud task that 
were identified as annoying or frustrating. Participant comments (and researcher 
observations) suggested that individuals varied in their ability to tolerate frustration, 
regulate their emotions, and remain patient/focused. Again, the data were context-specific 
but may have reflected more general personality factors that can impact response 
behavior.  
One potential source of frustration was the degree of repetition in the ODCS 
adaptation. Simply put, questionnaire respondents tend to become impatient or 
exasperated when they feel they are being asked to answer “the same question” again and 
again. During the present study, participants were alerted in advance to the fact that 
statements would be repeated with slightly different wording. This warning was 
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incorporated into the research design with the hope that participants would not become 
hyperfocused on the repetition of content, and it seemed to be successful. However, basic 
themes related to repetition emerged nonetheless (i.e., recognition of, annoyance with, 
and questions about repeated content). The following excerpt came from the end of an 
interview, when the participant was given the chance to ask questions about the study:   
 P2: Why are [the items] so similar? [laugh] I’m sure you probably know— 
  like, you did it on purpose, but… 
R: Is it annoying that they’re so similar?   
P2: Yeah. [pause] It was kind of annoying, but it’s probably a good tool for  
 you to analyze, like, what does one word do?  
Most participants commented on item similarity during the think-aloud task, the 
interview, or both. Their remarks often suggested a combination of mild annoyance and 
amusement, the relative proportions of which seemed (based on the researcher’s 
impressions) to depend on factors such as investment level and frustration tolerance.  
Another potential source of frustration was the difficulty of processing certain 
items. As detailed earlier, complex items with negative wording (e.g., items 9 and 11) 
often confused participants. Frustration over confusing items, which may have been 
exacerbated by feelings of embarrassment (since participants were reading and thinking 
aloud in the presence of the researcher), tended to be stronger than reported frustration 
associated with content repetition. The following excerpt involved item 9:  
P1: “The courses I enjoy the least are not those that make me think about  
 things from a different perspective.” Ah, these are making my head hurt!  
How is that different than the other one?  
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There also appeared to be an interaction between (1) the tendency of participants 
to increase their work speed and (2) the location of the items that were reported to be 
confusing. Nearly all items identified as difficult to process were located in the latter half 
of the measure, when participants had “established set” (i.e., oriented themselves to the 
measure) and appeared to want to proceed more efficiently. The following interview 
excerpt suggests that for at least some respondents in measurement situations, frustration 
can lead to satisficing:  
 P5:  Um, I guess just that [laugh] the complicated wording really messed with  
  me. And it would probably frustrate me more in a test, and it wouldn’t  
  really make me want to [laugh] answer them as much, if I had to go back  
  and keep on thinking about ONE item, in a test when I want to keep on  
  taking the test.  
R: You would lose patience?  
P5: Yeah. So that might affect my answers for the other ones.  
Not all participants became this frustrated. Some were remarkably patient—particularly 
one of the weaker readers (according to SAT Critical Reading scores), who reviewed 
certain items multiple times in an effort to comprehend them. It was clear that individual 
differences in frustration tolerance represented a potential source of measurement error.  
Finally, it seems likely that extent of respondent frustration would be greater, and 
tolerance/patience less, in more typical (i.e., non-think-aloud) measurement contexts 
where respondents have little or no direct interaction with the researcher(s).  
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 Global Theme 3: Style of Responding 
The third global theme involved individual differences in how the response scale 
was used. Specifically, there were certain situations in which some participants adopted 
unorthodox strategies for arriving at judgments and mapping those judgments onto the 
response scale. First, some students made an effort to ensure consistency (i.e., congruent 
responses) across similarly worded items. Second, there were instances of participants 
choosing the midpoint response (Neither Agree nor Disagree) because they found an item 
lacking in applicability or clarity. Both issues were observed during the think-aloud task 
and explored further in the interview portion of the study. Taken together, the data 
highlighted additional sources of potential measurement error.   
Organizing Theme: Desire for Consistency 
  The think-aloud instructions, which were read aloud by the researcher, alerted 
participants to the fact that some statements on the adapted ODCS would be repeated in a 
slightly varied form. The instructions also advised, “Don’t worry about trying to be 
consistent.” Once the item stems did start to recur, however, it was clear that some 
participants wanted to provide consistent (i.e., congruent) responses to parallel items. For 
example, items 3 and 6 were syntactically identical but for one word (“not”) that made 
the latter item a reversal of the former. Participants exhibiting a desire for consistency, 
upon recognizing an oppositely-keyed item like number 6, would process the item but 
then make sure they gave the opposite response they had given for item 3. 
This behavior was similar to the “shortcut” approach described earlier in the 
context of efficiency. However, the desire for consistency seemed fundamentally 
different—motivated not by efficiency (i.e., trying to complete the measure quickly as 
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possible), but by conscientiousness or compulsiveness. The interview responses of 
participants suggested a certain response style dimension or spectrum bounded by two 
extreme approaches, holistic and analytic. The “holistic” approach, as illustrated in the 
following interview excerpt related to items 3 and 6 (final prompt), could be 
characterized by a desire for consistency within all similarly worded items on a measure:  
 P5: Yeah, if I agreed with that one, I would disagree with this one. Or if I  
  strongly agreed with that one, I would strongly disagree with that [other]  
  one. I would definitely do that.  
By contrast, proponents of the “analytic” approach (which the instructions advocated) 
attempted to treat each item as its own entity, independent of any preceding items:  
P1: …I wouldn’t do that [try to establish consistency], but I think most people  
would… I personally would just be difficult and say whatever I thought 
for [each] one.  
Another participant (P8) argued that there is “no point [taking a] survey” if the items are 
not treated independently.  
In fact, the responses of most participants suggested that their approaches were 
somewhere between the holistic and analytic extremes. One student (P4) opined that 
consistency efforts might depend on how far down the measure a “repeated” item 
appeared (“If you had it further down in the questionnaire, I feel like it would be more of 
a different, whole new statement”). In summary, individual differences were apparent in 
the desire to provide consistent (i.e., congruent) responses across similar items; such 
variation would likely be unrelated to the target construct on an attitude measure.  
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 Organizing Theme: Use of Midpoint  
 This relatively narrow organizing theme encapsulated measurement issues related 
to use of the midpoint response (Neither Agree nor Disagree). In certain instances, 
participants opted for the midpoint (“4” on the 7-point scale) because they found an item 
lacking in either applicability or clarity. Regarding the former situation, one participant 
enlisted this strategy for item 3 and all its variants:  
P3: “The courses I enjoy the most are those that make me think about things  
 from a different perspective.” Well, hmmm [pause]. I don’t really think  
 I’ve had much experience with courses that have made me think about  
 things from a different perspective, so I’m probably gonna have to go with  
 Neither Agree nor Disagree. 
The above strategy, while understandable given the available response choices, is 
problematic from a measurement perspective because a “4” response is intended to 
designate a relative value on a spectrum of opinion rather than the absence of an opinion. 
During the follow-up interview, Participant 3 reported that she “would definitely have 
chosen” a Does Not Apply (N/A) option had it been available as an option. Another 
participant (P1) suggested that “bailout” use of the midpoint by respondents is not 
uncommon (“Oh, yeah, if they’re—if they don’t really know at all, they’d just pick 4”).  
 There were also rare instances in which a participant used response option 4 to 
indicate that s/he did not comprehend an item and was thus unsure how to answer it. The 
following excerpt involved item 11:  
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P8: “Learning about people from different cultures is not an [pause]  
unimportant part of my education.” Um, it IS important, so [pause] “is not 
an unimportant part of my coll—of my education.” Um [pause] I would 
say Agree? What—wait. “Learning about people from different cultures 
[pause] is an important—is not an unimportant part of my education.” I 
don’t know how to answer that one, so I’ll put 4 [laugh].  
This response behavior, while again understandable given the available response choices, 
is undesirable from a measurement perspective for obvious reasons. The participant 
reported in her interview that she would have opted for N/A or Not Sure had either been 
available. She went on to describe another Likert-based measurement instrument 
(administered electronically by the university to all incoming freshmen) which had labels 
only for the anchor points on the response scale:  
P8: They didn’t really give you one [option] where you neither agree nor  
 disagree. It was just like, Strongly Disagree [on one end] or Strongly 
 Agree [on the other], so whenever you weren’t sure about it, I would 
just click the middle one, cause I didn’t know what else to do…   
R: When you weren’t sure, was that because the statement itself was  
 confusing? 
P8: Yeah. Yep, or it didn’t apply to me too, so I would click the middle one.  
R: So it would have been good if they had a box like Doesn’t Apply to Me? 
P8: Yeah. In order just to answer the question, cause I felt like I HAD to  
 answer it. So, that’s what I would do.  
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In sum, the present study yielded evidence that Likert-based midpoints, in the 
absence of an option such as N/A, may be used at times to communicate information that 
is not scale-meaningful. Specifically, participants reported opting for the midpoint 
response (“4”) in situations where an item was either very confusing or not applicable to 
them. Such responses are problematic because they appear to represent a point on the 
attitude spectrum when in fact they were intended as non-responses.   
Discussion of Study 2 
 The Study 2 research question concerned measurement items with negative 
wording and/or keying. In short, why do such items tend to elicit differential response 
patterns than items that are positively worded/keyed? The qualitative data yielded several 
pertinent themes under the “universal” umbrella of individual differences. Text excerpts 
were classified into three global themes—Reading Skill, Personality, and Style of 
Responding—and, at the next level down, six organizing themes: Negative Wording; 
Semantic Interpretations; Attitude/Effort; Frustration Tolerance; Desire for Consistency; 
and Use of Midpoint (see Figure 5 for a schematic presentation of the network). The 
organizing themes reflected variation in respondent characteristics, usually as they 
interacted with scale/item characteristics and the situational context (i.e., a think-aloud 
research study). In the following paragraphs, each organizing theme will be discussed in 
turn with regard to posited explanations for the differential functioning of positive and 
negative measurement items (these explanations were summarized in Chapter 2).  
 The Negative Wording organizing theme involved participant processing of 
negatively-worded items on the adapted ODCS. The data certainly provided supporting 
evidence for the well-established theory that cognitive/linguistic demands are higher for 
 
126 
 
grammatically negative statements than for equivalent positive statements (e.g., Sherman, 
1976; Wason, 1961). Negative items (particularly complex items such as 9 and 11) were 
often associated with participant misreads, rereads, response delays, and confusion. To 
the extent that relative difficulty processing negatively-worded statements is experienced 
by the general population, that phenomenon may manifest as method variance (i.e., 
variation that cannot be explained in terms of respondent characteristics). However, in 
addition, and consistent with the findings of Marsh (1986; 1996), Study 2 participants 
with (documented) weaker reading skills experienced more frequent and severe 
comprehension difficulties on negatively-worded items than did individuals with stronger 
reading skills.  
 The Semantic Interpretations organizing theme centered on perceived meanings 
of certain adapted ODCS items. Many of the relevant text excerpts came from the 
structured interviews, during which participants were asked whether items 1 and 4 (which 
were parallel and differentiated only by the word “not”) seemed equivalent in terms of 
meaning and/or strength. These interview questions were designed to glean information 
related to two posited explanations for the differential functioning of positive and 
negative measurement items: (1) the substantive explanation, or the idea that positive and 
negative items may tap separable constructs such as “presence of anxiety” and “absence 
of anxiety” (e.g., Mook, Kleijn, & van der Ploeg, 1991); and (2) the item extremity 
explanation (Spector, Van Katwyk, Brannick, & Chen, 1997), or the idea that systematic 
differences in the extremity (strength) of oppositely-keyed items can lead to keying-based 
artifactors. The qualitative data yielded partial support for each explanation. Whereas 
some participants perceived distinctions in meaning between items 1 and 4, others 
 
127 
 
perceived differences in extremity; and some participants felt the items were equivalent 
in both meaning and extremity (i.e., polar opposites). This diversity of opinions suggests 
that semantic interpretations are subtly idiosyncratic, and that the use of language as a 
measurement medium may introduce construct-irrelevant variance. 
 The Attitude/Effort organizing theme involved variation in participant 
engagement in the research tasks—for example, some students were thorough and 
conscientious while others seemed more susceptible to satisficing behaviors. The data 
strongly supported the long-established theory that personality-based factors are relevant 
to response behaviors (e.g., Cronbach, 1946, 1950). In addition, although the research 
design was not conducive to extreme satisficing, there were instances where individuals 
processed negatively-worded items so quickly/impulsively that apparent response errors 
resulted. Thus there was evidence of some degree of careless responding, a phenomenon 
that has been identified as a potential explanation for keying-based artifactors (e.g., 
Woods, 2006).   
 The Frustration Tolerance organizing theme, which emerged based on participant 
comments as well as researcher observations, involved variation in the degree to which 
participants became annoyed or frustrated with aspects of the think-aloud task (e.g., 
repetition of content; items that were difficult to comprehend). The data suggested that 
for some individuals, frustration was detrimental to investment/conscientiousness and 
conducive to increased satisficing. This theme provided further evidence that personality 
characteristics are relevant to response behaviors, and that careless responding (in 
varying degrees) may contribute to differential response distributions for negative and 
positive items.  
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 The Desire for Consistency organizing theme reflected variation in the degree to 
which participants treated similar items on the adapted ODCS as independent entities. 
Some respondents exhibited and reported a holistic strategy whose goal was apparently to 
establish congruent responses across parallel items or item sets (e.g., strongly agreeing 
with items 3 and 9, and strongly disagreeing with items 6 and 12). This behavior seemed 
to constitute evidence of a particular response style possibly related to personality factors 
such as conscientiousness or compulsiveness.  
Finally, the Use of Midpoint organizing theme centered on instances when 
participants opted for the Likert midpoint response (Neither Agree nor Disagree) because 
they found an item to be either very confusing or not applicable to them. The data 
suggested that in the absence of a response choice such as “Does Not Apply,” 
respondents may feel more comfortable (mis)using the midpoint option than skipping the 
item. Such response behavior, which has previously been identified as an important 
measurement issue (e.g., Harter, 1997; Marsh, 2013; Presser & Schuman, 1980), is not 
specific to balanced scales. However, it may be more likely to occur with negatively-
worded items, which tend to be more difficult for respondents to comprehend.  
 In summary, Study 2 yielded some degree of validating evidence for most, if not 
all, of the literature-based explanations for the differential functioning of positive and 
negative measurement items. The evidence seemed more compelling for some 
explanations (method variance; careless responding; response styles; individual 
differences in cognitive/reading skills) than for others (substantive differences; item 
extremity), though this pattern may have been a function of the research design. As noted 
earlier, most of the posited explanations are not mutually exclusive. For example, in a 
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given measurement study it would seem possible to have a substantial percentage (e.g., 
10%) of careless responders, a substantial percentage of individuals with weak reading 
skills, and a systematic difference in extremity between negative and positive items.  
Study 2 Limitations. There are several limitations of Study 2 that may affect the 
generalizability of its results. First, the group of participants lacked diversity in terms of 
age, race, and educational level. Second, the adapted version of the ODCS included (by 
design) a high degree of repetition and a preponderance of lengthy, complex statements. 
Because such features would typically be undesirable in (and, hopefully, absent from) a 
measurement scale, some respondent behaviors observed in the study (e.g., 
comprehension difficulties; efforts to ensure congruent responses) might be less 
frequent/prominent with more typical measures. Third, the think-aloud methodology no 
doubt impacted respondent behavior. For example, would participants have given the 
same level of attention to items had they remained in a large testing room and completed 
measures independently? Might their reading/comprehension of items have been more 
accurate had they not been reading aloud for the researcher? In light of such questions, 
the results reported here should be interpreted with caution until they can be replicated.  
 
 
 
 
 
V. General Discussion 
 Overall, findings from Studies 1 and 2 implicated a number of phenomena that 
may contribute to the oft-reported differential functioning of positive and negative 
measurement items on balanced scales. These phenomena can be conceptualized as 
characteristics of respondents, measurement items, or the data collection context—or 
interactions among those characteristics. Some can also be conceptualized in terms of 
previously posited explanations for differential positive/negative item functioning. With 
regard to those explanations, the contrasting designs of Study 1 and Study 2 yielded some 
convergent evidence and some divergent evidence. The overall findings and their 
implications are summarized below.  
Study 2, which was qualitative and exploratory in nature, elicited several themes 
related to the types of characteristics noted above: that negatively-worded items are more 
difficult to process than positively-worded equivalents (item characteristic); that the 
difficulty of processing negatively-worded items is greater for individuals with weaker 
reading skills (respondent characteristic); that perceptions of item meaning/strength vary 
by individual (item-respondent interaction); that individuals vary in terms of personality 
characteristics that may be predictive of satisficing behaviors (respondent characteristic); 
that response styles, such as the desire for consistent responding across similar items, 
impact response patterns (respondent characteristic); and that in some situations, 
respondents may “misuse” Likert scale midpoints in order to indicate that an item lacks 
applicability or comprehensibility (item-respondent interaction).  
In Study 1, which concerned the psychometric properties of scales with different 
wording/keying configurations, results were not entirely consistent across measures and 
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conditions. However, several trends were apparent. First, reliability estimates were 
generally highest for scales where all items were positively worded and keyed, slightly 
lower for scales with consistent (negative) keying and balanced wording, and lowest for 
scales with balanced keying (with or without balanced wording). Similarly, CFA results 
indicated that method variance was more substantial/evident when keying was balanced 
(conditions 2 and 3, where the best-fitting models posited method effects) than when it 
was not (conditions 1 and 4, where the best-fitting models accounted for only substantive 
variance). Analysis of a combined SEE-R/ODCS model suggested that the association of 
keying-based method effects across instruments (.40) may be similar in strength to that 
previously reported for wording-based method effects.  
Condition 4 in Study 1 was of particular interest, as it had not been utilized in any 
previous (published) studies. The configuration—in which all items were negatively 
keyed and half were negatively worded—yielded higher reliability estimates than did the 
other balanced conditions. In addition, as noted above, the best-fitting models in 
conditions 2 and 3 posited method effects while the best-fitting models in condition 4 did 
not (although the advantage of those substantive models was slim). Thus it appeared that 
balanced keying was more conducive to method effects than was balanced wording, at 
least in an unstructured data collection situation (i.e., where participants could proceed 
through multiple measures at their own pace). It should be noted, however, that the nature 
of the employed item adaptation approaches may have affected the Study 1 results. For 
example, the strategy of creating negatively-worded items in a highly consistent manner 
(via the addition of “not” or “do not”) could have inflated (at least some) correlations 
among them, whereas negatively-keyed adaptations may have been more semantically 
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distinct from one another (and thus less highly correlated) because they were necessarily 
crafted on an item-by-item basis. Further research is needed to determine whether 
consistent keying can in fact reduce method effects associated with balanced wording, 
and/or whether its apparent benefits come at the expense of validity because it essentially 
masks careless responding.  
Questions about the effects of negative wording and keying were also informed 
by Study 2, which featured more structure and encouraged participants to read and think 
aloud. The nature of the research design was not conducive to “pure” careless responding 
and other strong forms of satisficing, but participants did have consistent difficulty 
processing certain negatively-worded items (some of which were also negatively keyed). 
The extent of the comprehension difficulties, which sometimes led to response errors, 
tended to be greater for individuals identified as having average (rather than above-
average) reading skills. These patterns seemed consistent with the Study 1 finding that 
the combination of negative wording and negative keying (condition 2) may be more 
conducive to method effects than either in isolation.   
Among literature-based theories for the psychometric consequences of balancing 
scales, current results yielded no support for the “substantive differences” hypothesis 
(e.g., Mook et al., 1991; 1992). That hypothesis states that balanced keying/wording can 
result in the emergence of related but distinct substantive factors (e.g., presence of 
ethnocultural empathy; absence of ethnocultural empathy). In Study 1, models positing 
only wording/keying-based factors (POS/NEG) generally exhibited poor fit and were 
always outperformed by competing models. Study 2 provided at least initial evidence that 
respondents vary in their perceptions of the relative meaning/extremity of parallel but 
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oppositely-keyed items, rendering unlikely the possibility that positive and negative items 
are perceived as substantively distinct across respondents.  
Similarly, current findings did not support the “item extremity” hypothesis—that 
artifactors can result when at least some pairs of oppositely-keyed items are semantically 
extreme relative to the standing of most respondents on the target construct (Spector et 
al., 1997). Implicit in this explanation is the idea that perceptions of extremity are 
uniform across respondents. However, as described above, Study 2 participants did not 
agree on the relative meaning or extremity of pairs of items written to be semantically 
equivalent but oppositely keyed. It should be noted that the items in Study 2 may not 
have been sufficiently extreme to elicit evidence for the item extremity hypothesis. In 
addition, the Study 1 design was probably not conducive to triggering this complex 
phenomenon; observed item means did not suggest that the ODCS or SEE-R items were 
“extreme” relative to the response scale spectrum.  
By contrast, there was compelling evidence from both studies in support of the 
method variance hypothesis (e.g., Russell & Carroll, 1999). That hypothesis argues that 
the balancing of measurement scales introduces systematic but construct-irrelevant 
variance because negative and positive items elicit different response distributions. Study 
2 participants reported and exhibited difficulty processing a number of negatively-worded 
items, some of which were also negatively keyed. In Study 1, models positing method 
effects related to wording/keying generally fit “balanced” data better than did simpler 
models (condition 4 was an exception to this trend). Thus it appears that balancing scales 
via negative wording and/or keying (item characteristics) is in fact conducive to method 
effects, as most prior studies of balanced scales suggests.  
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Study 2 findings provided at least some support for several respondent-based 
hypotheses about the nature of differences in the psychometric properties of balanced and 
unbalanced scales. First, although the Study 2 research design was not conducive to 
strong satisficing, some apparent response errors were observed. This pattern provided 
support for the “careless responding” explanation (e.g., Woods, 2006), which suggests 
that aberrant responding to negative items by a portion of respondents can result in 
artifactors (or method factors). Study 2 findings also supported the idea that item 
response distributions can be impacted by individual differences in cognitive/reading 
skills (e.g., Marsh, 1986; 1996) as well as by response styles that may be related to 
personality traits (e.g., DiStefano & Motl, 2006). It was not a goal of this project to 
detect/disentangle these mechanisms in the Study 1 datasets; however, it seems likely 
they were present given CFA results (particularly for conditions 2 and 3) and the 
relatively unstructured data collection conditions (i.e., participants proceeded through 
multiple measures at their own pace).  
Interestingly, the Desire for Consistency response style (which emerged as a 
Study 2 theme) would theoretically counteract or override the mechanism by which 
wording/keying-based method variance would typically be expected to operate. By 
giving congruent responses to parallel items with opposite keying, respondents would 
minimize the extent to which their response patterns could differ across positive and 
negative items. Further research of this phenomenon is warranted, given the consensus 
among Study 2 participants that it is not uncommon.  
  
 
 
135 
 
Implications 
As noted elsewhere, most of the explanations posited for the differential 
functioning of negative and positive items are not mutually exclusive. Contributing 
factors may include item characteristics, respondent characteristics, and/or contextual 
characteristics (e.g., the stakes and degree of structure involved in the data collection 
process). Regardless of the constellation of such factors that may be present in a given 
research situation, the strategy of balancing scales via wording/keying and scoring all 
items seems likely (based on a preponderance of published studies) to introduce method 
variance. As suggested by Marsh (1986; 1996), researchers may want to consider 
alternative strategies for minimizing and/or identifying potentially anomalous/invalid 
response patterns. For instance, certain clinical measures (e.g., the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory) include items, some negatively worded, that are intended to gauge 
response consistency rather than loading on a substantive subscale. For computer-
administered measures, the tracking of item-level response time may allow for the 
identification of extreme satisficers (e.g., careless responders).  
Additional strategies for collecting “better data” may include careful attention to 
scale instructions, item comprehensibility, respondent motivation, and data collection 
procedures (e.g., Crocker & Algina, 1986; Cronbach, 1950; Finney, 2001). For example, 
shorter and clearer items (whether positively or negatively worded/keyed) should be less 
conducive to confusion, frustration, impatience, fatigue, and other potential threats to 
validity. Regarding Likert scales, the provision of a “Don’t Know” or “N/A” option may 
reduce inappropriate use of the midpoint response option. Scale instructions can be 
written to remind participants that their responses are valued and that accurate responses 
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to attitude items will require both thought and time. Similarly, data collection conditions 
that are highly structured—for example, having participants complete measures one at a 
time—can yield higher-quality data (Finney, 2001).    
 In closing, it should be reiterated that none of the ODCS and SEE-R adaptations 
used in this project matched the original, published versions of those instruments. Thus 
caution should be exercised in drawing inferences about the properties of the original 
measures based on current findings. However, the Study 1 results did provide support for 
the presumed factor structure of the SEE-R (CTCM-) and raise concerns about the 
unidimensionality of the ODCS.   
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Appendix A 
 
Versions of the Openness to Diversity/Challenge Scale (ODCS) 
Administered in Study 1 
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**ODCS-1 (all positive wording/keying)** 
Please respond by indicating how much you agree or disagree with each statement using  
the response options 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  
There are no right or wrong answers; just answer thoughtfully and honestly.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
************************************************************************ 
1. I enjoy having discussions with people whose ideas and values are different from 
my own.  
2. The real value of a college education lies in being introduced to different values.  
3. I enjoy talking with people who have values different from mine because it helps 
me understand myself and my values better.  
4. Learning about people from different cultures is a very important part of my 
education.  
5. The courses I enjoy the most are those that make me think about things from a 
different perspective.   
6. I enjoy taking courses that challenge my beliefs and values. 
7. Contact with individuals whose background (e.g., race, national origin, sexual 
orientation) is different from my own is an essential part of my college education.   
8. I enjoy courses that are intellectually challenging.  
************************************************************************ 
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**ODCS-2 (half positive wording/keying, half negative wording/keying)** 
Please respond by indicating how much you agree or disagree with each statement using  
the response options 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  
There are no right or wrong answers; just answer thoughtfully and honestly.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
************************************************************************ 
1. I do not enjoy having discussions with people whose ideas and values are 
different from my own.  
2. The real value of a college education lies in being introduced to different values.  
3. I enjoy talking with people who have values different from mine because it helps 
me understand myself and my values better.  
4. Learning about people from different cultures is not an important part of my 
education.  
5. The courses I enjoy the most are those that make me think about things from a 
different perspective.   
6. I do not enjoy taking courses that challenge my beliefs and values. 
7. Contact with individuals whose background (e.g., race, national origin, sexual 
orientation) is different from my own is an essential part of my college education.   
8. I do not enjoy courses that are intellectually challenging.  
************************************************************************ 
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**ODCS-3 (half positive wording/keying, half positive wording/negative keying)** 
Please respond by indicating how much you agree or disagree with each statement using  
the response options 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  
There are no right or wrong answers; just answer thoughtfully and honestly.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
************************************************************************ 
1. I try to avoid having discussions with people whose ideas and values are different 
from my own.  
2. The real value of a college education lies in being introduced to different values.  
3. I enjoy talking with people who have values different from mine because it helps 
me understand myself and my values better.  
4. Learning about people from different cultures is an unimportant part of my 
education.  
5. The courses I enjoy the most are those that make me think about things from a 
different perspective.   
6. I dislike taking courses that challenge my beliefs and values. 
7. Contact with individuals whose background (e.g., race, national origin, sexual 
orientation) is different from my own is an essential part of my college education.   
8. I try to avoid courses that are intellectually challenging.  
************************************************************************ 
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**ODCS-4 (half positive wording/negative keying, half negative wording/keying)** 
Please respond by indicating how much you agree or disagree with each statement using  
the response options 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  
There are no right or wrong answers; just answer thoughtfully and honestly.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
************************************************************************ 
1. I try to avoid having discussions with people whose ideas and values are different 
from my own.  
2. The real value of a college education does not lie in being introduced to different 
values.  
3. I do not enjoy talking with people who have values different from mine, even if it 
could help me understand myself and my values better.  
4. Learning about people from different cultures is an unimportant part of my 
education.  
5. The courses I enjoy the most are not those that make me think about things from a 
different perspective.   
6. I dislike taking courses that challenge my beliefs and values. 
7. Contact with individuals whose background (e.g., race, national origin, sexual 
orientation) is different from my own is not an essential part of my college 
education.   
8. I try to avoid courses that are intellectually challenging.  
************************************************************************ 
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Appendix B 
 
Versions of the Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy – Revised (SEE-R) 
Administered in Study 1 
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**SEE-R-1 (all positive wording/keying)** 
 Read each of the statements below and decide whether you agree or disagree with each 
statement. Mark the alternative that best describes your opinion. There are no right or 
wrong answers so do not spend too much time deciding on an answer. The first thing that 
comes to mind is probably the best response. Be sure the number on the answer sheet 
corresponds to the number of the statement to which you are responding. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
************************************************************************ 
1.  It’s okay with me when people speak something other than standard English. 
2.  I am touched by movies or books about discrimination issues faced by racial or 
ethnic groups other than my own. 
3.  I know what it feels like to be the only person of a certain race or ethnicity in a 
group of people. 
4.  I am patient when communicating with people from other racial or ethnic 
backgrounds, regardless of how well they speak English.  
5.  I am aware of institutional barriers (e.g., restricted opportunities for job 
promotion) that discriminate against racial or ethnic groups other than my own. 
6.  I feel comfortable when people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds speak 
their language around me.  
7.  When I know my friends are treated unfairly because of their racial or ethnic 
backgrounds, I speak up for them. 
8.  When I interact with people from other racial or ethnic backgrounds, I show my 
appreciation of their cultural norms. 
9.  I feel supportive of people of other racial or ethnic groups, if I feel they are being 
taken advantage of. 
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10.  I get disturbed when other people experience misfortunes due to their racial or 
ethnic backgrounds. 
11.  I am likely to participate in events that promote equal rights for people of all 
racial and ethnic backgrounds. 
12.  It is easy for me to understand what it would feel like to be a person of another 
racial or ethnic background other than my own. 
13.  I can see how other racial or ethnic groups are systematically oppressed in our 
society. 
14.  It bothers me when people make racist statements against other racial or ethnic 
groups. 
15.  I recognize that the media often portrays people based on racial or ethnic 
stereotypes. 
16.  I am aware of how society differentially treats racial or ethnic groups other than 
my own. 
17.  I am able to put myself in the shoes of someone who is racially and/or ethnically 
different from me. 
18.  I feel comfortable when I am around a significant number of people who are 
racially/ethnically different than me. 
19.  It is easy for me to relate to stories in which people talk about racial or ethnic 
discrimination they experience in their day to day lives.  
************************************************************************  
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**SEE-R-2 (half positive wording/keying, half negative wording/keying)** 
 Read each of the statements below and decide whether you agree or disagree with each 
statement. Mark the alternative that best describes your opinion. There are no right or 
wrong answers so do not spend too much time deciding on an answer. The first thing that 
comes to mind is probably the best response. Be sure the number on the answer sheet 
corresponds to the number of the statement to which you are responding. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
************************************************************************ 
1.  It’s not okay with me when people speak something other than standard English. 
2.  I am touched by movies or books about discrimination issues faced by racial or 
ethnic groups other than my own. 
3.  I know what it feels like to be the only person of a certain race or ethnicity in a 
group of people. 
4.  I am not patient when communicating with people from other racial or ethnic 
backgrounds, regardless of how well they speak English.  
5.  I am aware of institutional barriers (e.g., restricted opportunities for job 
promotion) that discriminate against racial or ethnic groups other than my own. 
6.  I do not feel comfortable when people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds 
speak their language around me.  
7.  When I know my friends are treated unfairly because of their racial or ethnic 
backgrounds, I speak up for them. 
8.  When I interact with people from other racial or ethnic backgrounds, I do not 
show appreciation of their cultural norms. 
9.  I feel supportive of people of other racial or ethnic groups, if I feel they are being 
taken advantage of. 
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10.  I get disturbed when other people experience misfortunes due to their racial or 
ethnic backgrounds. 
11.  I am not likely to participate in events that promote equal rights for people of all 
racial and ethnic backgrounds. 
12.  It is easy for me to understand what it would feel like to be a person of another 
racial or ethnic background other than my own. 
13.  I can see how other racial or ethnic groups are systematically oppressed in our 
society. 
14.  It does not bother me if people make racist statements against other racial or 
ethnic groups. 
15.  I recognize that the media often portrays people based on racial or ethnic 
stereotypes. 
16.  I am aware of how society differentially treats racial or ethnic groups other than 
my own. 
17.  I am not able to put myself in the shoes of someone who is racially and/or 
ethnically different from me. 
18.  I do not feel comfortable when I am around a significant number of people who 
are racially/ethnically different than me. 
19.  It is not easy for me to relate to stories in which people talk about racial or ethnic 
discrimination they experience in their day to day lives. 
************************************************************************ 
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**SEE-R-3 (half positive wording/keying, half positive wording/negative keying)** 
 Read each of the statements below and decide whether you agree or disagree with each 
statement. Mark the alternative that best describes your opinion. There are no right or 
wrong answers so do not spend too much time deciding on an answer. The first thing that 
comes to mind is probably the best response. Be sure the number on the answer sheet 
corresponds to the number of the statement to which you are responding. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
************************************************************************ 
1.  I feel annoyed when people speak something other than standard English. 
2.  I am touched by movies or books about discrimination issues faced by racial or 
ethnic groups other than my own. 
3.  I know what it feels like to be the only person of a certain race or ethnicity in a 
group of people. 
4.  I get impatient when communicating with people from other racial or ethnic 
backgrounds, regardless of how well they speak English.  
5.  I am aware of institutional barriers (e.g., restricted opportunities for job 
promotion) that discriminate against racial or ethnic groups other than my own. 
6.  I feel irritated when people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds speak their 
language around me.  
7.  When I know my friends are treated unfairly because of their racial or ethnic 
backgrounds, I speak up for them. 
8.  When I interact with people from other racial or ethnic backgrounds, I avoid 
showing appreciation of their cultural norms. 
9.  I feel supportive of people of other racial or ethnic groups, if I feel they are being 
taken advantage of. 
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10.  I get disturbed when other people experience misfortunes due to their racial or 
ethnic backgrounds. 
11.  I am unlikely to participate in events that promote equal rights for people of all 
racial and ethnic backgrounds. 
12.  It is easy for me to understand what it would feel like to be a person of another 
racial or ethnic background other than my own. 
13.  I can see how other racial or ethnic groups are systematically oppressed in our 
society. 
14.  I am okay with people making racist statements against other racial or ethnic 
groups. 
15.  I recognize that the media often portrays people based on racial or ethnic 
stereotypes. 
16.  I am aware of how society differentially treats racial or ethnic groups other than 
my own. 
17.  It is difficult for me to put myself in the shoes of someone who is racially and/or 
ethnically different from me. 
18.  I feel uncomfortable when I am around a significant number of people who are 
racially/ethnically different than me. 
19.  It is difficult for me to relate to stories in which people talk about racial or ethnic 
discrimination they experience in their day to day lives.  
************************************************************************ 
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**SEE-R-4 (half positive wording/negative keying, half negative wording/keying)** 
 Read each of the statements below and decide whether you agree or disagree with each 
statement. Mark the alternative that best describes your opinion. There are no right or 
wrong answers so do not spend too much time deciding on an answer. The first thing that 
comes to mind is probably the best response. Be sure the number on the answer sheet 
corresponds to the number of the statement to which you are responding. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
************************************************************************ 
1.  I feel annoyed when people speak something other than standard English. 
2.  I am not touched by movies or books about discrimination issues faced by racial 
or ethnic groups other than my own.  
3.  I do not know how it feels to be the only person of a certain race or ethnicity in a 
group of people. 
4.  I get impatient when communicating with people from other racial or ethnic 
backgrounds, regardless of how well they speak English.  
5.  I am not aware of institutional barriers (e.g., restricted opportunities for job 
promotion) that discriminate against racial or ethnic groups other than my own. 
6.  I feel irritated when people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds speak their 
language around me.  
7.  When I know my friends are treated unfairly because of their racial or ethnic 
backgrounds, I do not speak up for them. 
8.  When I interact with people from other racial or ethnic backgrounds, I avoid 
showing appreciation of their cultural norms. 
9.  I do not feel supportive of people of other racial or ethnic groups, even if I feel 
they are being taken advantage of. 
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10.  I do not get disturbed when other people experience misfortunes due to their 
racial or ethnic backgrounds.  
11.  I am unlikely to participate in events that promote equal rights for people of all 
racial and ethnic backgrounds. 
12.  It is not easy for me to understand what it would feel like to be a person of 
another racial or ethnic background other than my own. 
13.  It’s not clear to me that other racial or ethnic groups are systematically oppressed 
in our society. 
14.  I am okay with people making racist statements against other racial or ethnic 
groups. 
15.  I do not think that the media often portrays people based on racial or ethnic 
stereotypes.  
16.  I do not believe that society differentially treats racial or ethnic groups other than 
my own. 
17.  It is difficult for me to put myself in the shoes of someone who is racially and/or 
ethnically different from me. 
18.  I feel uncomfortable when I am around a significant number of people who are 
racially/ethnically different than me. 
19.  It is difficult for me to relate to stories in which people talk about racial or ethnic 
discrimination they experience in their day to day lives.  
************************************************************************ 
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Appendix C 
 
Version of the Openness to Diversity/Challenge Scale (ODCS) 
Administered in Study 2 
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Think-Aloud Questionnaire 
 
Please respond by indicating how much you agree or disagree with each statement using  
the response options 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  
There are no right or wrong answers; just answer thoughtfully and honestly.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
************************************************************************ 
1. I enjoy having discussions with people whose ideas and values are different from 
my own.  
2. Learning about people from different cultures is not an important part of my 
education.  
3. The courses I enjoy the most are those that make me think about things from a 
different perspective.   
4. I try to avoid having discussions with people whose ideas and values are different 
from my own. 
5. Learning about people from different cultures is an important part of my 
education.  
6. The courses I enjoy the most are not those that make me think about things from a 
different perspective. 
7. I do not enjoy having discussions with people whose ideas and values are 
different from my own.  
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8. Learning about people from different cultures is an unimportant part of my 
education.  
9. The courses I enjoy the least are not those that make me think about things from a 
different perspective.  
10. I do not mind having discussions with people whose ideas and values are different 
from my own.  
11. Learning about people from different cultures is not an unimportant part of my 
education.  
12. The courses I enjoy the least are those that make me think about things from a 
different perspective.  
************************************************************************ 
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Appendix D 
 
Instructions and Training Materials Used in Study 2 
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Researcher Introduction/Practice/Instructions 
I’m going to ask you to complete a short questionnaire. As you are responding to each 
statement, I’d like you to think aloud—that is, say all the things that go through your 
mind as you’re choosing your answer. I’ll demonstrate that process using the first 
statement on this practice questionnaire.  
 
Please respond by indicating how much you agree or disagree with each statement using  
the response options 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).  
 
There are no right or wrong answers; just answer thoughtfully and honestly. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
************************************************************************ 
 
1. I’m an impulsive person.  
2. I tend to remember important meetings and appointments.  
3. I’m an organized person.   
4. I’m usually able to pay attention during conversations. 
************************************************************************ 
 
OK, I see that the response scale goes from 1 to 7, with these choices (SD > SA). The first 
statement says, “I’m an impulsive person.” Well, what does that mean? That I do or say 
things without thinking about them first. I can definitely think of times when I’ve done 
that. So maybe I don’t totally agree with that statement, but it’s sometimes true. So my 
answer will be 5 (Slightly agree).  
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That example was just one way people might think through their answers. There’s no 
“right” way to do it. I just want you to say all the things that go through your mind as 
you’re choosing your answers. Does the thinking-aloud thing make sense? OK, you go 
ahead and try the next couple.  
 
[Give feedback/clarification/encouragement as needed for items 2 and 3. If additional 
practice is needed, item 4 can be used.] 
 
Now I’m going to turn on the recorder and we’ll move on to the real questionnaire. 
Remember to talk out loud—say everything you’re thinking as you figure out your answer 
choices. You don’t have to write down your answers, because they’re not the focus of the 
study. I’m more interested in the process by which you reach your answers. Does that 
make sense? OK, one thing you’ll notice about this questionnaire is that some of the 
statements appear several times with slightly different wording. Don’t worry about trying 
to be consistent. Just process each statement as if it’s the first one you’ve answered.  
 
[During process, can prompt by saying, Remember to tell me what you’re thinking.] 
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Brief Structured Interview Questions  
[Administer as soon as the 12 ODCS statements are finished.] 
 
Great, thank you! We’re almost done, but before you go back to the other room I want to 
ask you a couple of quick questions. And I’ll keep the recorder on if that’s OK, so I don’t 
forget your answers. 
 
First, were there any of these that you found confusing or difficult to process? Which 
one(s)? Why?  
 
OK, now re-read #1 and #4 (pause). Do you feel like they mean the same thing? Why 
(not)? Does one seem more extreme than the other? If so, why? Can you imagine a 
situation in which somebody might disagree with both #1 and #4? 
 
Next, look at #3 and #6 (pause). Did one of those seem easier to process than the other 
one? Why (not)? If you were just filling out this questionnaire on your own—not as part 
of a study—would you feel like you had to give consistent answers for those? That is, if 
you chose Agree for #3, and then you got down to #6, would you think, “Oh, #6 is 
basically the opposite of #3, so I should choose Disagree”?  
 
Thank you very much. Do you have any questions about anything? 
[Turn off recorder.] 
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Appendix E 
 
 “Golden Ticket” Used to Recruit Study 2 Participants 
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Dear _________________________,                                             
Instead of participating in the regularly scheduled Assessment Day activities, you have 
been selected to participate in a special research study today! The research is designed to 
help us understand the thinking processes involved in completing assessment tests and 
questionnaires. In short, we’ll be asking you to help us make our assessment measures 
better. Please gather your belongings and report to room _______   immediately after 
reading this message. Participation in the research will meet all of  the requirements for 
Assessment Day. Once you arrive at room ______, we will describe the research in more 
detail and you will have the opportunity to either accept or decline participation, as well 
as the chance to ask any questions you might have about the research. We look forward 
to hearing what you have to say! 
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Appendix F 
 
Correlation Matrices for Datasets 
Collected in Study 1 
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Table F1 
Correlations for the ODCS-1 and ODCS-2 Datasets 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 -- .36 .55 .45 .48 .47 .38 .37 
2 -.23 -- .63 .53 .46 .42 .52 .16 
3 -.32 .46 -- .56 .53 .47 .52 .27 
4 .33 -.31 -.37 -- .55 .49 .69 .34 
5 -.20 .38 .42 -.27 -- .69 .53 .40 
6 .33 -.30 -.37 .34 -.43 -- .52 .43 
7 -.29 .50 .41 -.38 .41 -.33 -- .32 
8 .29 -.12 -.26 .23 -.25 .40 -.18 -- 
Note. Correlations for the ODCS-1 sample (N = 502) are presented above the diagonal.  
Correlations for the ODCS-2 sample (N = 523) are presented below the diagonal. 
 
 
 
 
Table F2 
Correlations for the ODCS-3 and ODCS-4 Datasets 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 -- -.28 -.44 .20 -.30 .40 -.23 .30 
2 .25 -- .53 -.30 .39 -.25 .37 -.18 
3 .44 .43 -- -.30 .46 -.32 .41 -.16 
4 .27 .30 .34 -- -.28 .16 -.40 .24 
5 .20 .31 .23 .18 -- -.39 .49 -.24 
6 .32 .40 .37 .26 .26 -- -.24 .34 
7 .32 .40 .40 .31 .24 .36 -- -.22 
8 .27 .30 .26 .25 .21 .40 .31 -- 
Note. Correlations for the ODCS-3 sample (N = 519) are presented above the diagonal.  
Correlations for the ODCS-4 sample (N = 508) are presented below the diagonal.  
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Table F3 
Correlations for the SEE-R-1 and SEE-R-2 Datasets 
Item Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 ACD -- .43 .16 .46 .29 .54 .36 .46 .38 .31 .28 .23 .24 .34 .33 .38 .29 .39 .17 
2 EFE -.10 -- .14 .30 .38 .35 .33 .40 .43 .42 .47 .22 .29 .45 .38 .42 .25 .29 .17 
3 EPT -.08 .10 -- .24 .16 .20 .17 .21 .17 .09 .22 .49 .23 .15 .11 .13 .38 .22 .43 
4 ACD .31 -.14 -.11 -- .28 .46 .42 .53 .44 .35 .26 .19 .14 .33 .19 .26 .32 .43 .15 
5 EA -.14 .28 .09 -.06 -- .33 .29 .38 .34 .22 .24 .22 .40 .22 .36 .46 .19 .16 .15 
6 ACD .43 -.10 -.09 .42 -.04 -- .40 .47 .38 .31 .32 .30 .24 .31 .28 .30 .35 .45 .28 
7 EFE -.13 .23 .10 -.24 .11 -.23 -- .52 .57 .42 .35 .25 .26 .39 .20 .32 .32 .37 .21 
8 EFE .18 -.16 -.08 .34 -.10 .34 -.24 -- .60 .43 .40 .32 .29 .43 .33 .39 .39 .45 .23 
9 EFE -.25 .32 .06 -.37 .21 -.32 .40 -.32 -- .52 .35 .27 .27 .45 .28 .38 .35 .41 .19 
10 EFE -.14 .30 .03 -.24 .20 -.17 .35 -.17 .48 -- .38 .16 .19 .49 .21 .27 .18 .33 .08 
11 EFE .23 -.24 -.03 .28 -.15 .30 -.26 .21 -.36 -.29 -- .30 .29 .49 .28 .29 .31 .38 .23 
12 EPT -.08 .08 .48 -.19 .16 -.17 .19 -.16 .18 .14 -.07 -- .27 .22 .14 .16 .63 .27 .52 
13 EA -.14 .26 .10 -.14 .38 -.07 .18 -.12 .27 .21 -.17 .20 -- .23 .38 .47 .28 .21 .18 
14 EFE .22 -.22 .04 .24 -.12 .24 -.19 .20 -.26 -.25 .23 .01 -.11 -- .27 .27 .30 .42 .13 
15 EA -.21 .29 .14 -.17 .32 -.11 .23 -.15 .27 .29 -.15 .17 .34 -.11 -- .57 .24 .22 .11 
16 EA -.21 .30 .13 -.20 .41 -.19 .19 -.22 .28 .29 -.23 .13 .46 -.19 .60 -- .32 .24 .13 
17 EPT .10 -.12 -.27 .22 -.10 .25 -.18 .22 -.20 -.16 .24 -.52 -.11 .10 -.12 -.10 -- .42 .50 
18 ACD .25 -.13 -.01 .31 -.06 .44 -.19 .25 -.28 -.14 .28 -.21 -.10 .25 -.06 -.11 .32 -- .27 
19 EPT .07 -.15 -.34 .23 -.07 .20 -.15 .17 -.16 -.08 .18 -.46 -.08 .02 -.10 -.12 .36 .26 -- 
Note. Correlations for the SEE-R-1 sample (N = 540) are presented above the diagonal. Correlations for the SEE-R-2 sample (N = 
532) are presented below the diagonal. Scale key: ACD = Acceptance of Cultural Differences; EPT = Empathic Perspective Taking; 
EA = Empathic Awareness; EFE = Empathic Feeling and Expression.  
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Table F4 
Correlations for the SEE-R-3 and SEE-R-4 Datasets 
Item Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 ACD -- -.11 -.16 .45 -.11 .68 -.10 .27 -.24 -.17 .24 -.22 -.14 .28 -.09 -.18 .25 .33 .22 
2 EFE .28 -- .03 -.14 .13 -.16 .28 -.18 .36 .39 -.25 .15 .18 -.29 .18 .18 -.10 -.10 -.09 
3 EPT .12 .09 -- -.02 .10 -.09 .15 -.03 .10 .04 -.08 .47 .14 -.03 .10 .15 -.34 -.09 -.34 
4 ACD .44 .29 .18 -- -.07 .49 -.17 .33 -.25 -.26 .23 -.09 -.14 .27 -.15 -.15 .11 .31 .15 
5 EA .12 .19 .31 .20 -- -.07 .05 -.08 .13 .13 -.06 .19 .32 -.02 .22 .40 -.02 .01 -.10 
6 ACD .63 .26 .11 .44 .21 -- -.10 .23 -.24 -.20 .23 -.14 -.09 .30 -.04 -.06 .21 .33 .19 
7 EFE .21 .29 .14 .30 .18 .27 -- -.24 .34 .33 -.28 .16 .17 -.22 .10 .14 -.16 -.16 -.08 
8 EFE .30 .32 .14 .40 .20 .34 .34 -- -.23 -.15 .22 -.05 -.08 .24 -.25 -.10 .19 .22 .11 
9 EFE .31 .32 .10 .44 .22 .34 .41 .62 -- .37 -.14 .15 .21 -.26 .21 .19 -.07 -.10 -.10 
10 EFE .29 .36 .09 .36 .19 .34 .35 .52 .65 -- -.26 .11 .14 -.33 .22 .21 -.05 -.16 -.12 
11 EFE .29 .33 .16 .28 .25 .32 .29 .33 .40 .44 -- -.06 -.06 .32 -.06 -.13 .21 .20 .12 
12 EPT .25 .15 .44 .24 .30 .22 .17 .26 .25 .26 .35 -- .21 -.11 .09 .20 -.48 -.13 -.45 
13 EA .23 .25 .21 .22 .42 .27 .19 .22 .32 .34 .40 .50 -- -.05 .36 .46 -.01 -.13 -.10 
14 EFE .30 .31 .10 .31 .16 .39 .35 .34 .41 .41 .38 .30 .34 -- -.07 -.09 .16 .26 .15 
15 EA .15 .14 .11 .12 .31 .16 .14 .23 .22 .29 .16 .21 .34 .14 -- .39 .04 -.03 -.02 
16 EA .19 .27 .22 .22 .34 .23 .18 .20 .27 .33 .31 .29 .45 .25 .47 -- -.01 -.07 -.13 
17 EPT .29 .16 .43 .32 .32 .29 .21 .26 .29 .24 .31 .65 .41 .22 .18 .25 -- .28 .51 
18 ACD .41 .25 .21 .43 .24 .41 .32 .33 .33 .35 .41 .33 .38 .38 .17 .23 .42 -- .29 
19 EPT .31 .14 .35 .30 .23 .29 .17 .28 .25 .22 .27 .52 .33 .19 .16 .24 .61 .45 -- 
Note. Correlations for the SEE-R-3 sample (N = 524) are presented above the diagonal. Correlations for the SEE-R-4 sample (N = 
512) are presented below the diagonal. Scale key: ACD = Acceptance of Cultural Differences; EPT = Empathic Perspective Taking; 
EA = Empathic Awareness; EFE = Empathic Feeling and Expression.  
 
 
164 
 
Appendix G 
 
Parameter Estimates 
from Selected Study 1 CFA Models 
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Table G1  
Completely Standardized Parameter Estimates and Error Terms from ODCS-1 Model 1 
Item Substantive Factor 
Method 
Factor Error (1-R
2) 
1 .62  .62 
2 .66  .56 
3 .74  .45 
4 .77  .40 
5 .76  .42 
6 .72  .48 
7 .74  .45 
8 .45  .79 
Note. For Model 1, no method factor was posited. 
 
 
 
Table G2  
Completely Standardized Parameter Estimates and Error Terms from ODCS-2 Model 5 
Item Substantive Factor 
Method 
Factor Error (1-R
2) 
1 -.41 .31 .74 
2 .66  .57 
3 .67  .55 
4 -.51 .17 .71 
5 .61  .63 
6 -.53 .42 .54 
7 .68  .53 
8 -.30 .55 .61 
Note. In condition 2, items 1, 4, 6, and 8 were negatively keyed and worded. 
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Table G3   
Completely Standardized Parameter Estimates and Error Terms from ODCS-3 Model 5 
Item Substantive Factor 
Method 
Factor Error (1-R
2) 
1 -.48 .38 .63 
2 .63  .60 
3 .73  .47 
4 -.47  -.03ns .78 
5 .67  .55 
6 -.45 .51 .54 
7 .63  .60 
8 -.31 .39 .75 
Note. In condition 3, items 1, 4, 6, and 8 were negatively keyed. 
nsNot statistically significant (p>.05). 
 
 
 
Table G4  
Completely Standardized Parameter Estimates and Error Terms from ODCS-4 Model 1 
Item Substantive Factor 
Method 
Factor Error (1-R
2) 
1 .54  .71 
2 .63  .60 
3 .66  .57 
4 .49  .76 
5 .41  .84 
6 .63  .62 
7 .61  .63 
8 .50  .75 
Note. In condition 4, all items were negatively keyed and four (2, 3, 5, and 7) were 
negatively worded. For Model 1, no method factor was posited. 
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Table G5  
Completely Standardized Parameter Estimates and Error Terms from SEE-R-1 Model 1 
Item ACD Factor 
EPT 
 Factor 
EA 
Factor 
EFE 
Factor 
Method 
Factor Error (1-R
2) 
1 .68     .54 
2    .62  .62 
3  .57    .67 
4 .67     .55 
5   .60   .64 
6 .71     .50 
7    .67  .56 
8    .76  .43 
9    .75  .44 
10    .63  .61 
11    .58  .67 
12  .81    .35 
13   .60   .64 
14    .64  .59 
15   .67   .56 
16   .80   .36 
17  .78    .39 
18 .65     .58 
19  .65    .58 
Note. For Model 1, no method factor was posited.  
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Table G6  
Completely Standardized Parameter Estimates and Error Terms from SEE-R-2 Model 5 
Item ACD Factor 
EPT 
 Factor 
EA 
Factor 
EFE 
Factor 
Method 
Factor Error (1-R
2) 
1 .41       .29ns .75 
2    .46  .78 
3  .55    .69 
4 .55       .29ns .61 
5   .52   .73 
6 .49       .53ns .48 
7    .54  .71 
8    -.38 .31 .76 
9    .74  .45 
10    .62  .61 
11    -.45    .30ns .71 
12  .87    .25 
13   .57   .68 
14    -.36 .24 .81 
15   .70   .51 
16   .82   .33 
17  -.58      .29ns .58 
18 .36    .48 .64 
19  -.54      .20ns .67 
Note. In condition 2, items 1, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, and 17-19 were negatively keyed/worded. 
nsNot statistically significant (p>.05). 
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Table G7  
Completely Standardized Parameter Estimates and Error Terms from SEE-R-3 Model 5 
Item ACD Factor 
EPT 
 Factor 
EA 
Factor 
EFE 
Factor 
Method 
Factor Error (1-R
2) 
1 .75    .31 .34 
2    .58  .66 
3  .58    .66 
4 .53    .28 .65 
5   .51   .74 
6 .76    .32 .33 
7    .52  .73 
8    -.33 .34 .78 
9    .61  .63 
10    .63  .61 
11    -.39 .33 .74 
12  .81    .34 
13   .63   .60 
14    -.47 .32 .68 
15   .53   .72 
16   .74   .46 
17  -.58   .45 .46 
18 .27    .47 .71 
19  -.57   .36 .55 
Note. In condition 2, items 1, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, and 17-19 were negatively keyed. 
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Table G8  
Completely Standardized Parameter Estimates and Error Terms from SEE-R-4 Model 1 
Item ACD Factor 
EPT 
 Factor 
EA 
Factor 
EFE 
Factor 
Method 
Factor Error (1-R
2) 
1 .71     .50 
2    .48  .77 
3  .52    .73 
4 .65     .58 
5   .56   .69 
6 .73     .47 
7    .51  .74 
8    .69  .52 
9    .79  .38 
10    .76  .42 
11    .58  .67 
12  .78    .40 
13   .73   .47 
14    .57  .68 
15   .53   .72 
16   .65   .58 
17  .84    .29 
18 .64     .59 
19  .71    .50 
Note. In condition 4, all items were negatively keyed and ten (2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 
and 16) were negatively worded. For Model 1, no method factor was posited.  
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